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Among the many paradigm shifts brought about in the seventeenth century was an 
increased dissociation between the subject and time as a lived, shared 
experience. Clockwork Subjects in the Seventeenth Century: Shakespeare, Herbert, and 
Milton investigates how changes in the social understanding and experience of time, 
concurrent with changes in timekeeping technologies, were reflected in the literature of 
the period. This dissertation is closely concerned with the phenomenon of time from the 
perspective of the subject and the various ways subjects represent themselves as beings in 
time. Chapter One provides a theoretical introduction, establishing a Heideggerian 
framework of temporality and ontology, while emphasizing the characteristics of clock-
time as time that is movable and separable from what Heidegger would term “originary 
time.” Chapter Two analyzes metaphors of hearing in Richard II in relation to the play’s 
pivotal conceit, in which a dethroned Richard compares himself to broken clockwork; 
exploring temporality in tandem with the phenomenon of hearing, I argue that aural 
captivation distorts Richard’s perception of his placement in a larger historical 
framework. Chapter Three employs a reading of Augustinian time George Herbert’s 
poems, “Even-song” and “Church-monuments,” analyzing the soul’s experience of time 
in contrast to temporal metaphors that ask, with Augustine, whether time can be 
measured by and within the self. Chapter Four, analyzing Milton’s Samson Agonistes, 
explores Samson’s attempt to act and interpret divine intent while in the middle of 
history, paralleling early modern efforts to construct an interpretive framework for nature 
and time. 
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Introduction: Subjectivity and Time in the Seventeenth Century 
 
Between Two Times: “Vast deserts” and “Man’s eternal prime” 
Henry Vaughan’s poem, “The Evening Watch: A Dialogue,” functions as a useful 
case study in some of the oppositions this dissertation explores: not merely the dichotomy 
of soul and body, but those of time and eternity, temporality and measured time. The 
Body begins a discourse with the Soul, where sleep foreshadows death and resurrection, 
“Farewell! I go to sleep; but when/ The day-star springs, I’ll wake again.” The Soul’s 
rejoinder emphasizes the contraction of the body into dust:  
SOUL  
Go, sleep in peace; and when thou liest  
Unnumber’d in thy dust, when all this frame  
Is but one dram, and what thou now descriest  
In sev’ral parts shall want a name,  
Then may his peace be with thee, and each dust  
Writ in his book, who ne’er betray’d man’s trust! 
 
When the Body finally dies and returns to dust, it will be no larger than “but one dram.” 
The somewhat cold comfort offered by the Soul in its first address anticipates the nature 
of the Body’s fear, and indeed bodily fear at a root level—a fear of fragmentation. In its 
second portion of dialogue, the Body betrays its true anxiety concerning the separation of 
soul from body in death-like sleep. The question posed by the Body, “ere we two stray/ 
How many hours dost think ’till day?”, indicates the kind of comfort the Body seeks from 
the Soul: the comfort of a known end, of counting down toward a predetermined 
endpoint. The Body’s anxiousness to know the number of hours until day seems to justify 
the Soul’s attempt at solace in the previous stanza; the Soul is already attuned to the 
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Body’s preoccupation with counting, as illustrated in the Soul’s final attempt at 
assurance:   
SOUL  
Ah go; th’art weak, and sleepy. Heav’n  
Is a plain watch, and without figures winds  
All ages up; who drew this circle, even  
He fills it; days and hours are blinds.  
Yet this take with thee. The last gasp of time  
Is thy first breath, and man’s eternal prime. 
 
The Soul’s rejoinder in this stanza mirrors its earlier emphasis on “unnumber’d” dust; the 
substance of time that human beings measure out so carefully are, in the light of eternity, 
merely “blinds.”  
 Although Vaughan’s poem is not frequently anthologized, it illustrates a  
sometimes ambivalent attitude in the seventeenth century between counted time and the 
truth it attempts to measure. In declaring that “Heav’n/ Is a plain watch” and that “days 
and hours are blinds,” Vaughan produces an analogy of human, measured time that runs 
parallel to the earlier concern about measured dust. In each, the anxiety is over the threat 
of contraction: to be reduced to “one dram” or to reach the “last gasp of time.” At each 
point, however, the threat is paradoxically undermined as contraction becomes a means 
of revealing the truth of the subject’s situation with respect to time. Vaughan’s final irony 
in the poem, undermining the numbering of ages with the “prime” of eternity, is 
reminiscent of “vertiginous abbreviation,” a term Giorgio Agamben uses to explain “the 
panoramic that the dying supposedly have of their lives, when the whole of their lives 
passes before their eyes in a flash.”1 This sort of irony, in which the illusory nature of 
time is brought into stark relief against time’s measurement, is of particular interest 
                                                          
1 Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 77. 
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within an age in which hours and minutes increasingly marked out reality. As 
conceptions of temporality shifted increasingly to clock-time, England in the seventeenth 
century was suffused with the widespread belief that history was reaching its end (what 
might lend a shade of urgency to Vaughan’s “last gasp of time”). In this century, more 
accurate timekeeping technology represented the belief that time could be divied up, 
while widespread and varied beliefs about the millennium and the apocalypse gave a 
sense of urgency to beliefs about time and history. Some of these end-times beliefs 
implied a literal chronology in keeping with a linear clock-time; others, however, implied 
a belief in history as disclosure, more akin to Vaughan’s “eternal prime.” As I argue in 
this dissertation, as these oppositions pile up, the position of the early modern subject in 
relation to time was often an ironic one.  
 Vaughan’s “eternal prime” presents an opposite perspective on time to Marvell’s 
“deserts of vast eternity” in “To His Coy Mistress,” however ironically Marvell’s verse 
may be coded. Instead of the generative possibility of the “last gasp of time” becoming a 
“first breath,” as in Vaughan’s poem, eternity to Marvell’s speaker is a wasteland devoid 
of pleasure. The ironic position of the subject with respect to these contrasting versions of 
time—Vaughan’s “eternal prime” and Marvell’s “vast deserts”—reaches a critical 
moment in the seventeenth century. Clock-time denotes chronometry, the measurement 
of time, but chronometry disconnected from a referential basis in the civic or communal, 
or even the natural or social. Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum observes, “Through clock-time 
indications, the times of assembly and council meetings...were potentially detachable 
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from the dense bundle of other municipal times and their signals.”2 Clock-time, in 
Dohrn-van Rossum’s term, is “detachable”; Jacques LeGoff similarly highlights how the 
increasing rationalization of time lends time a “pliability,” while Stuart Sherman 
describes its malleability.3 These descriptors invite further questions: Detachable from 
what? Pliable and malleable towards whose ends? Clock-time is time abstracted from 
attachment to the world, and therein consists its moveability and pliability. While clocks 
do not necessitate this abstraction of time, they do heighten its possibility and likelihood 
within a historical moment increasingly defined by empiricism and scientific 
constructionism. To employ a much older example, French scholastic Guillaume 
d’Auxerre (1160-1229) criticized the practice of usury by arguing that the sale of time 
was a violation of nature in general (not just humans). He argued, “The usurer acts in 
contravention to universal natural law, because he sells time, which is the common 
possession of all creatures....Since, therefore, the usurer sells what necessarily belongs to 
all creatures, he injures all creatures in general, even stones.”4 As is well demonstrated, 
the same attitude toward usury is present in the Renaissance. Or, as David Hawkes argues 
regarding usury, Don Juan “sees his amoral life as a loan of time, imagines God as a 
usurer waiting to collect a debt...”5 Marvell’s poem includes a hint of usury in the lines 
“For, lady, you deserve this state, / Nor would I love at lower rate,” where rate could be 
                                                          
2 Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders, trans. Thomas 
Dunlap (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 239. 
3 See Jacques Le Goff, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 38, and Stuart Sherman, Telling Time: Clocks, Diaries, and 
English Diurnal Form, 1660-1785 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
4 qtd. in LeGoff, 289-290. 
5 David Hawkes, The Faust Myth: Religion and the Rise of Representation (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 124. 
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speed or interest paid on a loan, a double-meaning that is difficult not to interpret with 
irony, preceded as it is by Marvell’s satire of Petrarchan itemization.  
 In a manner similar to d’Auxerre’s belief that time belongs to the world, 
temporality in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy reminds us that the nature of being is to be 
bound via our attachments to the world, attachments that themselves create the 
experience of temporality. Stated inversely, I would argue that clock-time is time without 
attachment, time detached from everyday connection to the world outside the subject. 
These descriptions of detachment are enabled by the distinction that Heidegger draws 
between “originary time” and chronological time. Originary time is time in its raw form 
as it is experienced by the subject, prior to any attempt at measurement.6 It is time 
without tense, meant to describe the subject’s encounter with the world of phenomena 
and to delineate the relationship between subjects and what exists. Paul Ricouer does a 
good job of summarizing how this detachment is reflected in clock-time’s abstraction, 
thereby spelling out the key difference in Heidegger’s thought between temporality and 
clock-time:  
Saying ‘now’ becomes synonymous for us with reading the hour on the clock. But 
to the extent that the hour and clock are perceived derivations from the day, which 
itself links Care to the world’s light, saying-now retains its existential meaning, 
but when the machines that serve to measure time are divested of this primary 
reference to natural measures, that saying-now returns to the abstract 
representation of time.7  
 
So, insofar as it becomes detached from the ontic world, clock-time is an “abstract 
representation” that loses its relation to “the world’s light.” None of this is to say that 
                                                          
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001), 377. 
7 Paul Ricouer, Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 63. 
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what Heidegger calls originary time—or, in general, temporality—is so intuitively known 
as to need no further description. Agamben has pointed out that, chronos is representable 
but not thinkable, but “if you reflect on a real experience of time, you end up with 
something thinkable, but absolutely unrepresentable.”8 It is hard to imagine time other 
than chronos, but it takes no effort to experience. Augustine, who is like Heidegger in 
distilling time to the phenomenal impressions it leaves on the subject, rejects Aristotle’s 
notion than time is the measure of motion, but alternatively, this leaves no easy resolution 
to the question of what time is. Time may be nothing more than the “measure” of the 
mental effects of phenomena, but even the act of “marking” is called into question by the 
fact that the moment is always passing.9 Before the early modern period, before clocks 
become increasingly relevant, the question persists: Why does the passing moment 
continually elude us? Why, like Marvell’s “vast deserts of eternity,” does the “now” 
always seem empty? 
 
Saying Now 
 In How Soon is Now?, Carolyn Dinshaw points out that the now of desire, though 
seemingly empty, is actually “constituted by...‘purposes and activities,’ needs and 
attachments.”10 Dinshaw’s analysis is one among many to be published in recent years, 
offering intriguing explorations of temporality, or time as it is humanly experienced, 
often in sensuous and asynchronous forms. The current trend in criticism about 
temporality is toward desire, since desire explains how the subject can have an 
                                                          
8 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 64. 
9 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding (New York: Vintage Spiritual Classics, 1998), 11.27.36. 
10 Dinshaw, 4. 
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asynchronous experience of time, how temporality can diverge from chronos. In the 
background of these readings is Derrida’s concept of différance as it applies to time. This 
refers, of course, to the idea that there is never a present that inheres in the moment, but 
that the present always defers to another time.11 The emptiness of now, or framed in 
Derrida’s terms, the present that always seem to constitute delay and deferment within 
itself, was as much a problem for Augustine as it has been for critics concerned with 
temporal différance. Augustine, for example, conceives of time as a nothing, only 
meaningful in describing the order of subjective perceptions: “What I measure is the 
impression which passing phenomena leave in you [my mind], which abides after they 
have passed by: that is what I measure as a present reality, not the things that passed by 
so that the impression could be formed.”12 While Dinshaw invokes Augustine at many 
points, Dinshaw’s claim that the now is not empty but filled with “‘purposes and 
activities,’ needs and attachments” seems much more sanguine than Augustine’s about 
the subject’s position with respect to constitutive deferment. In Augustine, this lack of 
presence in turn prevents subjects from being self-present. Derrida’s notion is that the 
present is filled with nothing other than traces, or signs whose meaning is never present 
because they both differ from and defer to the next in the chain of signification.13 In this 
respect at least, Augustine’s repeated lament that to experience time is to be distended, 
                                                          
11 See Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (The Harvester Press: 
Brighton, 1982). 
12 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding (New York: Vintage Spiritual Classics, 1998), 11.27.36. 
13 Derrida writes, “It is because of différance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-
called ‘present’ element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other 
than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated 
by the mark of its relation to the future element.” “Différance,” Margins of Philosophy, 13. Simon 
Critchley succinctly explains Derrida’s notion of traces as follows: “The present is constituted by a 
differential network of traces. In order for the present to be present, it must be related to something non-
present, something différant, and so not be present.” The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, 
Second Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 37. 
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torn apart between past and future, seems to align with Derrida’s insistence that the 
subject is likewise divided via the process of signification, that this process includes 
“everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphyscial 
language, every being, and singularly substance of the subject.”14   
 This examination of différance in literary-historical studies is relevant to my own 
analysis insofar as the present, the now, is central to any description of time as it is 
experienced by subjects. Prior to clock-time as universal (the rationalization of time that 
grew in the medieval era and was solidified with accurate and precise instruments during 
the seventeenth century), humans encounter self-division in the present, the experience of 
being out of synch with time. Clocks do not introduce anything new with respect to time. 
What clock-time does introduce, however, is an opportunity to elide and conceal these 
experiences of disjunction, to increasingly alienate the sacred and the secular, to make 
time individual rather than communal, shared, and “the common possession of all 
creatures.” Edward S. Casey argues that the global reach of communication technologies 
are partially responsible for the new placelessness in the modern age. While not a 
traditional “communication” technology, the clock meets the criteria Casey outlines by 
“exhibit[ing] a dromocentrism that amounts to temporocentrisim writ large; not just time 
but speeded-up time (dromos connotes ‘running,’ ‘race,’ ‘racecourse’)....”15 In the 
everyday experience of temporality, as previously discussed, the now is empty becase it 
always seems to reference another time; it never quite seems self-present. Ironically but 
fittingly, as time turns increasingly toward individual, personal use (and detached from 
                                                          
14 Derrida, “Différance,” Margins of Philosophy, 13. 
15 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), xiii. 
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natural or communal ends), this aspect of chronos is heightened. Walter Benjamin has 
famously pointed out the “homogeneity” and “emptiness” that characterize this epoch.16 
Clock-time, as chronos taken off the hook and accelerated, is time not tied to place; this 
form of time reduces the multiplicity of place to the singularity of space. Casey writes, “It 
is as if the acceleration discovered by Galileo to be inherent in falling bodies has come to 
pervade the earth (conceived as a single scene of communication), rendering the planet a 
‘global village’ not in a positive sense but as a placeless place indeed.”17 In becoming 
placeless, clock-time is tied, in Derrida’s terms, to a present that can never be present. 
 For my purposes, the problem of time posed by différance, like the fear of 
disintegration in Vaughan’s poem, is the threat to the subject as it seeks unity and self-
coherence in the moment. However, as I seek to demonstrate in this dissertation, the 
moments when the subject’s sense of coherence seems most threatened, most out of 
synch with time, are the moments when the subject’s relationality to the world reveals 
itself. If chronos is secular time and kairos is sacred time, clock-time, in being a 
detached, empty, and accelerated chronos, essentially reduces all time to secular time.18 
Agamben’s explanation of messianic time in The Time That Remains seems to contain an 
implicit critique of différance without ever mentioning Derrida; relevant to my purposes, 
it does so by means of an inversion of our traditional, chronos-driven, concept of the 
now. Agamben does not fail to take seriously the threat to subjectivity when humans are 
out of synch with time—when time never seems to cohere in the moment. However, in 
proposing messianic time as an operational time, his analysis indicates that the 
                                                          
16 Qtd. in Sherman, 10. 
17 Casey, xiii. 
18 Agamben uses this secular/sacred distinction in relation to chronos and kairos throughout The Time That 
Remains. 
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constitutive deferral encapsulated by différance is a consequence of the way we represent 
time to ourselves. While chronological time is represented as past, present, and future 
lined up on a continuum, a representation known as a “time-image,” operational time is 
defined as “the time the mind takes to realize a time image.”19 In other words, 
operational time is the time it takes to think a representation of time. The concept, 
borrowed from linguist Gustave Guillaume rather than the Saussurian linguistics that 
ground Derrida, entails the scale between potentiality and action established by Aristotle; 
Agamben sees this scale as “implicit in the Saussurian distinction between langue and 
parole, yet far more complex.”20 This concept aligns well with Agamben’s emphasis on 
modality and aspect as realities of time, rather than simply tense.21 This is not a time 
other than chronological time but a “time within time,” a time not wholly captured by our 
spatial representation of chronological time. This is the crux of Agamben’s argument as it 
is relevant to mine: our representations of chronological time, “time images,” imply a 
non-representable time, a pure potentiality of thought, captured within the chronological 
time it takes to conjure them. Because a time image implies potentiality, it cannot simply 
be represented by the amount of time it takes to think about it, whether five seconds or 
five days; there will always be a remainder that escapes representation. However, this 
operational time, by allowing us to stand aside from the stream of chronos, is likewise 
what allows us to act within that stream.22 
                                                          
19 This is the definition given by its originator, the linguist Gustave Guillaume, whom Agamben engages 
with extensively in describing operational time. The Time That Remains, 66. 
20 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 65. 
21 See Agamben’s comments on prophecy on p. 60 and the Hebrew system of verbs in relation to the 
inversive waw on pp. 74-75 of The Time That Remains. 
22 “This ulterior time, nevertheless, is not another time, it is not a supplementary time added on from 
outside to chronological time. Rather, it is something like a time within time--not ulterior, but interior--
which only measures my disconnection with regard to it, my being out of synch and in noncoincidence with 
11 
 Here, Agamben’s theory begins to make clear how and why the experience of 
being out of synch, dislocated in chronological time, may not be completely dooming for 
the subject. Agamben, in the following passage, addresses the threat posed when the self, 
out of synch with time, becomes self-divided and alienated:  
Whereas our representation of chronological time, as the time in which we are, 
separates us from ourselves and transforms us into impotent spectators of 
ourselves—spectators that look at the time that flies without any time left, 
continually missing themselves--messianic time, an operational time in which we 
take hold of and achieve our representations of time, is the time that we ourselves 
are, and for this very reason, is the only real time, the only time we have.23 
 
Notably, Agamben does not mention différance but “our representations of chronological 
time.” Agamben’s explanation of messianic time as operational time implicitly points out 
the problem with différance being taken as a feature of time itself, and by extension, the 
argument that the subject’s experience in time is nothing but self-division; this is implied 
by the statement that “our representation of chronological time...transforms us into 
impotent spectators of ourselves.” One implication of Agamben’s analysis is that the 
chain of signification in différance assumes the logic of represented chronos only. While 
time experienced in desire is one of continual deferral, a present that is emptied of 
everything but traces, operational time offers a time, not other than chronos, but at the 
disposal of chronos, a time which is “not entirely consumed by representation.”24  
 In his Nativity Ode, Milton describes the music at Christ’s birth as the music of 
creation, a messianic time that initiates a dislocation of past into present: “Time will run 
back, and fetch the age of gold.” Earlier in the poem, he addresses the Muse as if it can 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regard to my representation of time, but precisely because of this, allows for the possibility of my achieving 
and taking hold of it.” The Time That Remains, 67. 
23 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 68. 
24 Agamben, 67. 
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outrun the “star-led wizards” in presenting gifts to the child Christ: “Oh, run, prevent 
them with thy humble ode, / And lay it lowly at His blest feet.” Agamben’s explanation 
of “the time of the now” (messianic time) not only provides a way of addressing the 
problem Derrida poses of the non-presence of presence, but it also overlaps with 
Heidegger’s originary time. Messianic time, as a type of operational time, lies between 
two chronological events, the resurrection and the second coming, or parousia. While 
parousia refers to the end of time, it “literally signifies to be next to; in this way, being is 
beside itself in the present.”25 Heidegger’s notion of temporality also rejects tenses in 
favor of “‘ecstases’ of temporality.” Like the “beside itself” of parousia, “ecstasis” 
signifies the experience of standing outside of oneself.26 However, the perpetual deferral 
of this time, as literal second coming and therefore end of an age, introduces a paradox of 
represented time. Delay in messianic time might be compared to a mathematical equation 
infinitely approaching a limit but never reaching it. This kind of delay, internal to a 
concept of time, escapes representation. An ecstatic relationship to time, in the sense of 
standing outside one’s own experience, does not imply that the subject is continually self-
divided in time, but it does imply that the subject is not at the center of their own 
experience of time and their own perceptions. Like Edgar’s last lines in King Lear, “the 
weight of this sad time we must obey,” our cares (Sorge) exercise a weight, a force of 
gravity on time. Ricouer has explained Heidegger’s ontologoical concept being-towards-
death as imposing “…the primacy of the future over the present and the closure of this 
                                                          
25 Agamben, 73. 
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 
377. 
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future by a limit internal to all things and every endeavor.”27 Realizing an internal limit 
to time—an ending, and even the inevitability of one’s own death—dislocates the subject 
in time and reminds them of their own contingency. In describing this raw experience of 
time, one cannot take for granted either the essence of things or the nature of one’s 
encounter with what exists, driving home Heidegger’s working principle that “Ontology 
is only possible as phenomenology.”28 
 My interest in exploring metaphors of broken clockwork, disordered clocks, and 
more abstract disjunctions between various temporalities and their orders of meaning 
shares a Heideggerian foundation with many of these critics. While sharing these ground-
level distinctions, however, my interest in temporality is focused in another direction than 
desire. In the next three chapters, my interest is engaged in encounters with time as they 
relate to the provisional nature of human understanding; put simply, my interest is less 
“time and desire” than “time and truth.” In “The Question Concerning Technology,” 
Heidegger argues that truth is not “correctness of representation” but that truth becomes 
revealed through relationality.33 This emphasis on relationality implies a totality beyond 
our ability to reduce or dissect. Similarly, in the introduction to Being and Time, 
Heidegger points out the etymological connection between “logos” and “legomenon”; 
legomenon “can also mean what is addressed, as something that has become visible in its 
                                                          
27 Ricouer, 61. 
28 Heidegger, “Being and Time: Introduction,” Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2008), 80. 
29 Agamben, 73. 
30 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 
377. 
31 Ricouer, 61. 
32 Heidegger, “Being and Time: Introduction,” Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2008), 80. 
33 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell 
(New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 318. 
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relation to something else, in its ‘relatedness.’” In this connection, “logos acquires the 
meaning of a relationship with and a relating to something.”34 The impression these 
observations create, in relation to both being and time, is that the individual’s grasp of the 
whole is partial and provisional—something seen aslant and only experienced by means 
of relationship and attachment. This dynamic becomes important in my final chapter, on 
Milton’s Samson Agonistes, where the difference in scale between divine knowledge and 
human knowledge makes interpretation important to the experience of temporality. 
 This same principle, where “relatedness” between things creates a partial 
knowledge, applies to Heidegger’s nonlinear temporality. Temporality in Being and Time 
is described in terms of a totality, held together by care, or Sorge in the German. Sorge 
connotes anxious care, which Heidegger at one point inscribes as “concern and 
solicitude.”35 Heidegger says that “Temporality reveals itself as the authentic meaning of 
care”36 and that care constitutes a “primordial structural totality.”37 Again, it is this 
emphasis on totality that implies the primacy of connection. Instead of abstract, measured 
time, temporality in Heidegger is determined by relationships within a totality, and it is 
this totality of attachments that is responsible for his nonlinear description of time and 
gets us beyond the description of merely subjective experience of linear time.   
 Rather than static, linear time, Heidegger’s conception of telos and his conception 
of cause, both entailing temporality, are rooted in relationality. Heidegger defines telos as 
“that which gives bounds, that which completes” rather than as “aim” or “purpose,” 
                                                          
34 Heidegger, “Being and Time: Introduction,” 80.  
35 Heidegger, Being and Time, 238. 
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, 374. 
37 “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before' [‘vor’] every factical 'attitude' and 'situation' of 
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which he argues are misinterpretations.38 Interpreted in the latter, more standard way, 
telos implies an unknown endpoint in which fulfillment will be reached; implicitly, 
therefore, this interpretation construes telos as future-oriented. Heidegger’s whole 
philosophy works against this interpretation and against chronology as the basis of time. 
A key building block in this conception of telos is the Greek concept of “cause”; once 
again, driven by chronology, we tend to think of causes as existing along a chain and 
lined up like dominos. Heidegger reminds the reader that the Greek conception indicated 
indebtedness, and therefore co-responsibility. “The four causes,” he writes, “are the ways, 
all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else.”39 Telos in 
this sense also avoids a chronos-driven definition of the term; like his description of the 
primally concealed, telos here is about responsibility, or in other words, relationality.  
 Temporality in Heidegger reveals a deeper order to things, or a “coming to 
presence,” that reveals (or “unconceals”) the truth of a thing. In his essay, “The Question 
Concerning Technology,” Heidegger writes: 
All coming to presence, not only modern technology, keeps itself everywhere 
concealed to the last. Nevertheless, it remains, with respect to its holding sway, 
that which precedes all: the earliest. The Greek thinkers already knew of this 
when they said: That which is earlier with regard to its rise into dominance 
becomes manifest to us men only later. That which is primally early shows itself 
only ultimately to men.40   
 
Heidegger emphasizes technology, or tools (broadly construed as anything with use 
value), in the interplay between being and temporality because truth, or essence, “comes 
into presence” with regard to human awareness, and humans become aware only by 
interacting with the world. Heidegger’s claim that “that which is primally early shows 
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itself only ultimately” demonstrates that essence and time are closely related concepts in 
his ontology. The “primally early” closely relates to essence; therefore, only in a kind of 
messianic future is the true nature of things revealed, yet we can only arrive at this future 
by sticking very closely with the past: “Therefore, in the realm of thinking, a painstaking 
effort to think through still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd 
wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before the 
coming of the dawn.”41 This orientation of time toward the different degrees of truth’s 
presencing, in turn, reflects Heidegger’s understanding of telos as completion. 
 
Why the Seventeenth Century? 
 The idea of time as “truth’s presencing” was arguably very present in the early 
modern period. The proliferation of very literal and linear predictions about the end of 
history during this time, as well as the move toward an increasing governance by clock-
time (an extension and result of a prior ongoing shift to rationalized time, as I will 
explore in the section on clock-time) created an ironic situation for early moderns who 
recognized time as erupting in the present.  
 Sherman’s study on the intersection of clock-time and the literary form of diaries 
(though concentrated within 1660-1785, the period immediately following the one I focus 
on in this dissertation), argues that Christiaan Huygen’s strides to perfect the drive that 
regulated a clock’s oscillation enabled a temporality of its own, evidenced by the 
explosion of “diurnal” writing, such as diaries. According to Sherman, sameness and 
regularity in the intervals of a clock’s tick, the isochronicity mentioned above, enable the 
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“homogeneity” and “emptiness” that Benjamin points out; however, if time is empty, it 
can also be filled.42 Sherman’s argument posits that diary writing is structured on this 
very “uniformity, specificity, and seriality,” heightened by increasingly regular clock 
time, but that it is precisely the regularity of this form that allowed diarists “to reckon 
fullness and hence to ‘realize’ it: to embody it palpably on the page.”43 Time in an 
unbroken series, repetitive in form and without any shaping narrative to history, is given 
a shape through the innovation of writing and daily, lived experience. Liturgy and 
devotional life have a similar structuring function, as my chapter on George Herbert 
explores. Sherman does not, however, argue that this version of “fullness” is somehow 
opposed to or does away with the emptiness that Benjamin identifies. Rather, “the 
openness of the calendar and the rigor of the clock” provide occasion for narrative 
innovation and for meaning—a shaping kairos in a stream of unbroken and 
undifferentiated chronos.44 
Without challenging the brilliance of Sherman’s analysis, one might still wonder 
about the relationship between space and place in this new, malleable time. In The Fate 
of Place, Edward S. Casey describes how Aristotle’s account of place is haunted by the 
notion of emptiness between place and time “as if to say that to get out of place is to get 
into the void and to get into time is to get out of the void. Time is therefore one way of 
avoiding, indeed of devoiding the void—emptying its emptiness by introducing measured 
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cadences and reliable rhythms into its abyss. These cadences and rhythms are dependent 
on motions and magnitudes that belong in turn to place.”45 Indeed, Casey rightly points 
out that as place became subsumed by space in the seventeenth century, the periods 
following also made place “subject to time, regarded as chronometric and universal.”46 If 
Casey is right in categorizing “measured cadences and reliable rhythms” as 
manifestations of place, then the ways that subjects fill the void should create a stronger 
sense of relationship to place and to what Heidegger calls the originary experience of 
time.47 In answer to Sherman, therefore, I would posit that one corollary of this more 
malleable, empty time is its ability to be movable and separable from deeper rhythms of 
temporality, whether social, sacred, or natural. Time’s very pliability entails its 
abstraction, and Ricouer’s comment about reading the hour on a clock indicates a certain 
amount of ambivalence about what this sort of abstraction may intimate for the subject. 
In Shakespeare’s Richard II, broken clockwork comes to illustrate in the way kingly 
identity may be out of time with history and change. The speaker in George Herbert’s 
poetry, rhythms of private spiritual practice become the means of both marking time and 
revealing a deeper structure of temporality joined to God’s eternity, thus divorcing it 
from the measurement and abstraction that subjects become caught in. Finally, in Samson 
Agonistes, Milton’s Samson attempts to discover how to discern God’s will while both 
time and God’s will appear indeterminate; here, Samson discovers a more immanent 
approach to reading history and interpreting God’s will while bound by time.  
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Time as an open series, a corollary of empty time, implies that history has no 
inherent narrative apart from what is shaped by humans. Seventeenth century England 
was suffused with the widespread belief that history was reaching its end, an inevitability 
that, more than simply implying a chronology, entailed history as disclosure. In this 
century, prior to the more deistic era that is the object of Sherman’s study (from 1660 
into the late eighteenth century), the position of the early modern subject in relation to 
time was therefore an ironic one. In addition to being a time fertile for the 
experimentation and new inventions leading to accurate and precise timekeeping 
technology, the seventeenth century was also a time in which widespread and varied 
beliefs about the millennium and the apocalypse gave a sense of urgency to beliefs about 
time and history.  
Apocalypse, in its basic sense, means “to uncover, disclose.” Since cataclysmic 
revelation can happen at any point in history or any moment in the individual’s 
experience, apocalypse construed as disclosure challenges the precise notion that the 
concept should assume a linear form. However, the concept is nevertheless inherently 
temporal; after all, Heidegger’s description of time, in contrast to linear or measured 
time, is built upon a more primary understanding of Being disclosing itself.48 Scholars of 
the Renaissance have long recognized that early moderns’ preoccupation with the 
apocalypse often conveys a sense of the uncanny; those familiar with Freud will recall 
that this entails an inside-outside distortion of the subject via one’s encounter with time. 
This is as evident in the art of the period as it is in tragedy. For example, in his discussion 
of Michelangelo’s The Last Judgment, Pye discusses anamorphs, images in paintings that 
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are oblique and distorted from a direct view (an anamorphic image of flayed skin, in this 
example). The angled view of the anamorph, one which would yield a correct view, “is 
oriented toward a vantage point no viewer on the chapel floor can inhabit.”49 Pye goes 
on to say that the “anamorphic figure falls...outside even the time of universal judgment 
and human history.”50 The painting is, in itself, an apocalypse—a disclosure or 
revelation in a manner similar to the ways I explore temporality erupting into 
chonological, linear time in this dissertation.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the subject’s experience of temporality is at times 
inextricable from, and at times jarringly disassociated from, clock-time. I use the term 
“clock-time,” to refer to the abstract form of measured time, alienated from the things in 
the world—rising, eating, working, worshipping, sleeping—that require time to be 
marked. The phrase does not merely refer to the marking of time by a clock but to the 
unique temporality introduced by the increasing use of and reliance on the technology. I 
previously pointed out how clocks made it possible to separate the measurement of time 
from “natural and social frames of reference,” which happened over the course of several 
centuries.51 Clock-time denotes chronometry (temporal measurement), but a 
chronometry disconnected from a referential basis in the civic or communal, or even the 
natural, social, or biological that heretofore grounded time in the external world. 
Although clocks do not necessitate this abstraction of time, they do introduce its 
possibility and increasing likelihood into the everyday use and practice of marking time.  
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Rationonalized time therefore becomes increasingly “detachable,” to invoke 
Dohrn-van Rossum’s expression; highlighting different aspects of the same trend, 
Jacques Le Goff uses the term “pliability” while Stuart Sherman describes its 
malleability. Another example of how clock-time in its abstraction assumed this 
characteristic was in the separability of economic and religious spheres as the seventeenth 
century progressed. Advancements in the technology of timekeeping did not, in and of 
themselves, bring about secularized time--the time used by merchants to turn a profit. 
However, as Le Goff has demonstrated, clock-time leading up to the Renaissance was a 
natural extension of the rationalization of time, and one consequence of the 
rationalization of time was the separation of the sphere of economics from the sphere of 
religion.52 The possibility of pursuing contradictory aims, usury and spiritual practice, 
was less about the merchant’s individual hypocrisy than about how this distinction among 
times lent structural legitimacy to usurious practices. “Debts came inexorably to term,” 
writes Le Goff, “and yet time was pliable, and it was in this pliability that profit and loss 
resided.”53 It was the medieval Church’s practice of confession, beginning in the 
thirteenth century, that “closed the merchant’s loophole,” ostensibly reconciling 
conscience and interior motive with worldly action.54 However, while confessional 
practices and their prescribed penances began as means of holding merchants accountable 
for sins specific to their profession, the content of these prescriptions dwindled over time, 
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until they were, instead, largely left open to the individual’s interpretation.55 The end 
result was amelioration of the economic sphere rather than a true integration. Le Goff’s 
expansive study also highlights how usury in the middle ages was despised in part 
because usurers were known to sell time, a notion that demonstrates the possibility of 
ethical ambivalence in time’s separability and movability, which only increased in the 
early modern period.56 
The drive to measure time is prior to any kind of technology made to answer the 
need. Chronometry, of course, does not begin or end with a clock. As Paul Ricouer notes 
in Time and Narrative, “It is because we do reckon with time and do make calculations 
that we must have recourse to measuring, not vice versa.” Ricouer’s description of 
temporality emphasizes the relational nature of language, which, in contrast to the 
abstraction of time, invokes frames of reference particular to human cares and ends, 
making it “possible.... to give an existential description to this ‘reckoning with’ [time] 
before the measuring it calls for.”57 Time is not detached from the “natural and social 
frames of reference” that Dohrn-van Rossum has mentioned, but attached to these via a 
“grammatical network.” What Ricouer recognizes as part of the underlying role of 
language in shaping the perception of time—that human “reckoning” with time is a 
deeper process than the technology it produces and precedes—is confirmed by historian 
David Landes, who notes, “The clock did not create an interest in time measurement; the 
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interest in time measurement led to the invention of the clock.”58 Therefore, while clock-
time was heightened by the advancement of technological precision in the seventeenth 
century, specific advancements in clockwork technology were not solely responsible for 
the ascendency of time over place, or the “empty,” space-like nature of time.   
However, the larger point leveraged by Ricouer in this passage clarifies the 
relationship between the shape given to time through narrative structure (the subject of 
Ricouer’s analysis) and what philosopher Martin Heidegger conceives as the originary 
experience of time.59 As I have just noted, clock-time is abstracted from natural 
measures, such that the abstraction only becomes the greater as technology improves. Yet 
even without technology, humans reckon, measure, and calculate time. When considered 
as prior60 to the abstraction of clock-time, such instinctive forms of measuring are rooted 
in the world and in daylight.61 This raw experience of time is driven by what Heidegger 
defines as care—in the German, Sorge, most closely translated as “anxiety.” The word 
encompasses possibilities for both suffering and longing. It is care that structures one’s 
relationship to the world, such that the subject is “within time” prior to any represented 
measure of time.62 Despite the fact that Heidegger’s investigation of historicality is 
separate from his discussion of within-time-ness, Ricouer connects this notion of an 
originary experience of time to his own theory of a framing narrative in order to illustrate 
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an underlying, shared aspect of Care: “Narrative configurations and the most elaborated 
forms of temporality corresponding to them share the same foundation of within-time-
ness.”63 
Emerging from this analysis is the understanding that it is not merely the subject’s 
perception of time that is important, but the subject’s experience of time in relation to the 
scene they inhabit. Indeed, time as empty runs parallel to the rise of space over place; 
time becomes increasingly linear as space dominates. As the revolution in science and 
epistemology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries progressed, the world as a 
plenum, in which no empty spaces exist, was replaced by the concept of void.64 The 
absence of place flattens time by reducing the world to a “single scene of 
communication.”65 Reducing place to a unitary whole and to mere lines of intersection 
has the same temporal effect as separating the subject from the scene. When Tim Ingold 
writes, “The notion that we can stand aside and observe the passage of time is founded 
upon an illusion of disembodiment,” his statement acknowledges the importance of place 
to our experience of time, such that it is impossible for temporality to be disentangled 
from the environment in which we are fixed and which shapes our relationships with the 
world.66 To escape this illusion is to be in place. Likewise, Ricouer’s description of 
temporality as a “grammar” or “network” posits time as particular, social, and 
relational—something we are already in, not something we stand and observe. Yet, the 
trend of the seventeenth century, both in terms of the accelerated pace of timekeeping 
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invention and in terms of the rise of space over place, is to create subjects who are 
separated from the scene.  
 Shapin has observed that “Galileo's work on the pendulum was cited to show the 
physiological utility of the doctrine of proportions—‘the soul of the mathematicks 
themselves’” and that the corresponding mathematical framework of the pendulum 
became a heuristic for “the understanding of a corpuscular and mechanical universe.”67 
In our modern era, Casey counts world wars and endless displacement, both forced and 
voluntary, as well as the global reach of communication technologies, as responsible for 
the new placelessness. The clock meets the criteria Casey sets out for such a technology 
in “exhibit[ing] a dromocentrism that amounts to temporocentrisim writ large; not just 
time but speeded-up time (dromos connotes ‘running,’ ‘race,’ ‘racecourse’)....” In a 
certain sense, the mechanism of the pendulum was more than simply a heuristic or a 
metaphor, but, in its precipitation of this more dromocentric time, it reduced the 
multiplicity of place to the singularity of space. Casey writes, “It is as if the acceleration 
discovered by Galileo to be inherent in falling bodies has come to pervade the earth 
(conceived as a single scene of communication), rendering the planet a ‘global village’ 
not in a positive sense but as a placeless place indeed.”68 If Galileo’s discovery 
precipitated this effect, this observation is all the more applicable in Huygens’ invention, 
which perfected Galileo’s invention of the pendulum for use in clocks, as well as creating 
a mechanism for increased accuracy.69    
                                                          
67 Steven Shapin, The Social History of Truth (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 319. 
68 Casey, xiii. 
69 See Joella G. Yoder, Unrolling Time: Christiaan Huygens and the Mathematization of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
26 
 At this point, a brief history of the inventions associated with advances in 
clockwork technology in the seventeenth century (and leading up to it) would serve to 
situate my larger points about the nature of clock-time and the rise of space over place. 
Although the mechanics of timekeeping developed gradually, the seventeenth century 
was significant to this history insofar as, first, timepieces themselves became increasingly 
accurate and precise, and second, these devices were adopted for everyday, personal use. 
Judged based on these grounds (increased precision and personal use), the most strident 
innovations in modern timekeeping occurred in the latter half of the seventeenth century. 
This “Horological Revolution,” 1660-1760, saw the increased production of “clocks that 
were sufficiently accurate and sufficiently plentiful for the needs of urban man in 
society.”70 The rise of the individual subject seems to lie at the intersection between the 
material history of the mechanisms and Enlightenment values, such that the discussion of 
clockwork must inevitably involve speculation about the terms of modernity, to invoke 
Bruno Latour.71 Though much ink has been spilled tying the Horological Revolution to 
the full emergence of Enlightenment ideology, few studies have paid attention to the 
influence of clockwork’s history on the literature of England leading up to it. The swift 
advances of the Horological Revolution did not happen in a vacuum. In fact, the 
Renaissance and pre-Civil War era saw many important technological precursors that 
enabled the efficiency and technological precision of these later inventions.  
Even more significantly for my purposes, the terms of modernity that necessitated 
the subject and object parting company did not occur in a vacuum, either; the 
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establishment of the Royal Society was foregrounded by Baconian science and its 
destabilization of Aristotle, and Hobbes’s mechanistic version of political representation 
was anticipated by Cartesianism. Arguably, the motivating factor that drove the need for 
increasingly precise timekeeping mechanisms is rooted in the Copernican turn. Not only 
did the grounds of philosophy and science shift away from the human as center 
(simultaneously opening a path for the new science that Bacon would later pioneer), 
Copernicus’s conclusion about the earth’s heliocentric orbit (published in 1543) 
necessitated practical changes to the field of astronomy, leading astronomers “[to 
become] ever more insistent in their demands for increased accuracy in time 
measurement.” 72 It hardly seems coincidental that one of the first clockmaking guilds as 
such, in Paris, was formed merely a year after in 1544.73  
Clockmaking demanded an interdependence of skills and crafts and was 
especially dependent on various kinds of metalworking.74 Clockmaking in the Middle 
Ages was performed under the auspices of smithing guilds, and Dohrn-van Rossum 
speculates that the late medieval period “saw the first attempts by the guilds of smiths 
and locksmiths to restrict the making of clocks to their members.”75 Thus, the earliest 
English clockmakers were smiths who were skilled enough to bring a project to its 
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fulfillment. Independent clockmaking guilds would not come on the scene on the 
continent until the middle of the 1500s. The Worshipful Company of Clockmakers, the 
first guild of its kind in England, was established in 1631, a late inception in comparison 
to the major clock- and watchmaking guilds on the continent, beginning with the one in 
Paris nearly a century earlier in 1544. The Augsburg clockmakers, though not officially 
separate from the smiths’ guild, achieved some measure of autonomy in 1564; the Blois 
and Geneva guilds followed in 1600 and 1601, respectively.76 However, England’s 
Worshipful Company was assembled after guilds themselves were on the wane “so that 
almost from the start the functions of the Clockmakers’ Company were more ceremonial 
than professional.” The guild system did not prevent those from practicing the craft, 
usually by a nominal fee.77 Yet, as Landes argues, the technological boom in the 
clockwork of the late seventeenth century was in part driven by trade in so-called 
“unincorporated areas,” areas outside London where clock manufacture was essentially 
unrestricted.78 
The improvements that followed the inception of clockmaking as an organized 
trade were demonstrably practical, each correcting a deficiency in the one that came 
before. Of course, it is necessary to acknowledge that developing and incorporating 
individual mechanisms into clockwork as a whole took time; there was usually a 
considerable lag between the date of an invention and the time it actually became 
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marketable.79 For example, the earliest watches can be traced back to the mid-sixteenth 
century, though their portability was only made possible by the spring drive, which dates 
nearly a century further back. When the spring drive replaced weight-driven clocks in the 
mid-fifteenth, its use was mainly harnessed toward the production of table clocks, not 
watches.80 The most important figure in precipitating accuracy and precision in 
clockwork was Christiaan Huygens. The first successful pendulum (for clocks) was 
achieved by Huygens in 1657, and the balance spring (for watches) was also perfected as 
a mechanism by Huygens by 1675. The two inventions served the same function in 
clocks and watches respectively: to regulate isochronous measurement (enabling time 
indication by measuring regular intervals independent of the motivating effects of spring 
or weight), resulting in increased accuracy. The balance spring provided a corrective, 
counteracting force to the earlier invention of the spring drive and entered the market at a 
time when the need for both portability and increased accuracy drove the development of 
the pocket watch forward. These technologies were not fully realized until demand in the 
market drove the need to invent and perfect existing mechanisms.81  
As even this brief overview shows, the mechanical clock has a long, gradual 
history, and just as no single invention can be credited with the achievement of what we 
recognize as modern timekeeping, technological progress does not bear a direct and one-
to-one correspondence to shifts in the representation and understanding of time. Although 
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tracking the development of physical timekeeping is important and necessary, I operate 
under the assumption that, to get at an understanding of subjectivity in relation to time, 
one must not only consider the advance of the mechanisms themselves but also the social 
understanding of time and the use of temporal concepts that drove and enabled the 
inventions to be perfected and marketed--a supposition supported by Landes’ observation 
mentioned earlier that time measurement preceded the actual inventions that enabled it.82 
Anecdotally, in terms of time in its social use, it has been noted that “at least until the end 
of the sixteenth century one simply cannot talk of a customary use of minutes, let alone 
seconds.”83 Perhaps not coincidentally, then, the Swiss clockmaker Jost Burgi’s crystal 
clock, invented around the year 1600, measured hours, minutes, and even seconds on 
separate hands, marking “one of the first recorded uses of the second hand.”84 However, 
this invention does not count as rendering the social use of minutes “customary,” 
especially given that minute hands only appeared gradually, around and after 1650.85 
 
Case Study: Parousia in Donne 
Early modern life was suffused with a widespread belief in a literal and eminent 
end-of-the-world. Scholars, sermon writers, and pamphleteers made precise predictions 
about when Christ would return to inaugurate his full, thousand-year reign. Not 
surprisingly, many of these systems for prophetically dating the beginning of the 
millennium coincided with political change and revolution.86 One millenarian pamphlet 
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writer, William Burden, premising his own calculation on the principle that “one day 
with the Lord is as a thousand years,” assumed a parallel between historical time and the 
six days of creation (based on 2 Peter 3:8). He predicted Christ’s reign would begin in 
1666.87 Belief in a history always on the brink of ending has the effect of heightening 
action, for good or for ill.88 Conjuring anxiety as much as true concern, this drama of 
history links early moderns to a non-linear temporality. Belief in the end of the existing 
order, historical time as we know it, was at a premium. However, preparation for a literal 
“day of the Lord” or “day of visitation”89 was not elided by more subtle, metaphorical 
manifestations of these terms.  
It scarcely needs to be argued that early moderns believed Christ’s return was 
close at hand chronologically; however, for many early moderns, Christ’s parousia, his 
presence if not his literal coming, was considered to be “at hand” in a more pervasive 
sense. In The Time That Remains, Giorgio Agamben encourages the reader to read the 
scripture commonly interpreted as “the kingdom of God is within yourselves” as, instead, 
“the kingdom of God is close at hand,” defining “at hand” as “within the range of 
possible action.”90 Definitionally, kairos is also a time at hand in this sense, since the 
word indicates a passing moment able to be grasped or seized. It is not enough to simply 
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identify a perception of time that is internal versus a linear and objective chronology. 
What Benjamin, Agamben, and others refer to as messianic time is not wholly opposed to 
chronology but introduces a tension with clock-time. In the same way that kairos is not 
qualitatively different from chronos but constitutes “contracted and abridged chronos,” 
messianic time renders the promise of a second coming, continually deferred, able to be 
grasped.91   
The problem I have posed in earlier sections is a problem inherent in the 
representation of time, pointing to a disjunction between the subjective experience of 
time (what Heidegger would call “originary” time) and chronological time represented 
linearly. This is the problem Ricouer locates when he notes that “saying now” in the 
modern sense has become identical to noting clock time (and Ricouer’s analysis as a 
whole reinforces the same disjunction by seeking to separate human action from 
narrative). The paradoxical relationship of messianic time to fulfillment helps to define 
the ironies of representation brought to the forefront by the rise of clock time. Messianic 
time lies between two key events, the resurrection and the second coming. Parousia is 
used in the New Testament to refer to the second coming, but while its referent is the 
endpoint of chronological time, its denotative meaning is presence. However, the 
perpetual deferral of this time, as literal second coming and therefore end of an age, 
introduces a paradox of represented time. Delay in messianic time might be compared to 
a mathematical equation infinitely approaching a limit but never reaching it. This kind of 
delay, internal to a concept of time, escapes representation. However, Agamben expands 
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on the denotative meaning of parousia, which, he says, “literally signifies to be next to; 
in this way, being is beside itself in the present.”92 In this expansion of meaning, 
parousia is situated in the now, rather than in an indefinite, continually delayed future; as 
such, it is “beside itself in the present”—or “at hand,” “within the range of possible 
action.”93  
While chronological time is concerned with tense, a clear division of past and 
future that can be mapped onto a linear timeline, the subjective experience of time more 
closely involves aspect. Aspect concerns completion; as we have already understood 
through Heidegger’s description of telos as completion rather than endpoint on a 
timeline, completion is a temporal concept but not necessarily a chronological one. 
Agamben explains the same principle: “The Hebrew system of verbs distinguishes 
between verb forms not so much according to tense (past and future) but according to 
aspect: complete (which is usually translated by the past), and incomplete (which is 
usually translated by the future).”94 Agamben’s explanation, however, introduces the 
possibility that temporality may not behave in the way we expect it to, and indeed may 
actively reverse our expectations about time. This is the case with messianic time, which, 
for both Jews and Christians, carries the expectation of fulfillment in the return of the 
Messiah, a final resurrection, and a renewal of all things instituted in the reign of the 
Messiah. However, while messianic time looks forward in this expectation of fulfillment, 
of completion, it is constituted by the delay and deferment mentioned previously. For this 
reason, Agamben uses the same metaphor of language embedded in Hebrew verbs to 
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explain messianic time: “If, however, you put a waw (which is, for this reason, called 
inversive or conversive) before a complete form, it changes into an incomplete, and vice-
versa.”95 In other words, temporality can be experienced as a dialectic of fulfillment and 
unfullfillment.  
In a sermon on death and resurrection, Preached at the funerals of Sir William 
Cokayne Knight, Alderman of London, December 12, 1626, John Donne illustrates this 
inversive quality of messianic time that enables fulfillment to be stood on its head. 
Donne’s argument plays with time both directly and indirectly, exerting the poles 
between God’s perfection and infinity and man’s imperfection and finitude. Donne’s 
argument is ultimately an argument for God’s presence, his parousia (though Donne does 
not invoke this word) in the present, before the chronological fulfillment of a final 
resurrection promised in Christ’s second coming. Donne’s text is John 11:21, the words 
of Martha spoken to Jesus after the death of Lazarus: “Lord, if thou hadst been here, my 
brother had not died.” Through an examination of the body in death, Donne divides the 
first part of his sermon between imperfection, illustrated by the quality of Martha’s grief, 
and impermanence, proven in the decay and death of the body. The sermon ultimately 
hinges upon a tension between the death of the body and the final resurrection, a tension 
that is embedded in Donne’s third point, namely, “the easiness, the propensnesse, the 
largenesse of Gods goodness towards us, in the acceptation of our imperfect Sacrifices.”96 
This final point provides a natural resolution for the first two, and Donne’s argument 
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implies a sense of inevitability in God’s nature that prevents either spiritual defect or 
temporal impermanence from determining a judgment upon man in life or death.  
Donne’s insistence that God’s perfection swallows up the imperfections of the 
created and temporal order is what ultimately enables a temporal inversion of his sermon 
text: “Lord, because thou wast here, our Brother is not dead.” Here, one might notice an 
echo of the finality of “Death, thou shalt die” in Holy Sonnet X, but insofar as Donne’s 
rhetorical purpose in the sermon is to provide comfort to his hearers, Donne’s inversion 
of the expression of mourning from Martha locates the signs of a final resurrection, the 
death of death, in the present. In one respect, this exegesis is unsurprising; in Donne’s 
acknowledgement at the end of the sermon that “In the person of Christ, [our brother] is 
risen already,” his hearers would recognize standard theology of Christ’s resurrection, 
typified in verses like 1 Corinthians 15:20, “But now Christ is risen from the dead, and 
become the firstfruits of them that slept.”97 In this same theological vein, still mediated 
by the body in death, Donne classifies funerals themselves (“Buriall, and Christian 
Buriall, and Solemne Buriall”) as “evidences, and testimonies of Gods presence.”98 
Christian burial as a sign of the promise of final resurrection is still fundamentally future-
oriented, however. Rather than dwelling wholly on the body in death, Donne departs 
from presence-as-sign by exploring the visible presence of God in the recent life of the 
deceased—a less symbolic spiritual mode and one more closely aligned with the present. 
For a comparatively brief passage in this sermon, Donne cites Knight’s success in trade, 
his reputation for good business sense, and the enlargement of his estate as evidences of 
God’s presence in his life. Setting aside the observation that this praise seems somewhat 
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lukewarm in comparison with the theological heights Donne soars to in the rest of the 
sermon, this passage reinforces a concern expressed throughout—that human action not 
be separated from divine meaning. Dwelling in the present, this meditation is even closer 
to the dilated parousia of messianic time, a presence that stretches into the present rather 
than being contained in the second coming as an end-of-history event. 
Donne’s anxiety that human action should express meaning shaped by God’s 
presence is what enables his sense of temporality not to be shaped by chronos. His 
theology of death and the body expresses the in-between nature of messianic time, caught 
between Christ’s resurrection in the past and a final resurrection of saints yet to be 
fulfilled in the future. In an apophatic aside in this same sermon, Donne condemns those 
Catholics who “antidate and postdate their prayers; Say to morrows prayers to day, and to 
dayes prayer to morrow, if they have other uses and employments of the due time 
betweene….” Here, Donne expresses a common post-Reformation suspicion of Catholic 
prayer and administration of sacraments, but it is also one that calls to mind the 
merchants’ loophole mentioned earlier—the concern that the rationalization of time 
expressed in clock time allows time to be manipulated. Like the medieval merchants who 
used the growing separation between secular and religious time as an excuse to 
manipulate profit, certain Catholics, Donne essentially argues, exploit clock time by 
outsourcing their prayers. In so doing, they “make merchandise of prayers by way of 
exchange….”99 By treating prayer as impersonal labor that can be reassigned, they erase 
the active part of faith in prayer and reduce it to ritual. Likewise, in ordinary life as well 
as in prayer, Donne argues for a re-centering of faith’s activity according to redemptive 
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history, an orienting that lies outside of simple chronos. Any human action or expression 
that may be termed “sacramental” may either rely too much on the sign of Christ’s 
presence or may discount his presence altogether. For this reason, Donne attributes 
excess of sacramental thinking to Martha’s complaint, since Martha’s logic implies a 
confidence in Christ’s physical presence rather than his authority as God.  
So is it an error, and a weaknesse to attribute too much, or too little to Christs 
presence in his Sacraments, or other Ordinances. To imprison Christ in Opere 
operato, to conclude him so, as that where that action is done, Christ must 
necessarily bee, and necessarily work, this is to say weakly with these Sisters, 
Lord, if thou hast beene here, our brother had not died. As long as we are present 
at thine Ordinance, thou are present with us. But to banish Christ from those holy 
actions, and to say, That he is no otherwise present, or works no otherwise in 
those actions, then in other times, and places, this is to say with Peter, in his 
astonishment, Exi á me Domine, O Lord Depart from me...100 
 
In identifying Martha’s logic as in Opere operato (“by the work worked”), Donne 
implicates a Protestant characterization of a Catholic doctrine of the operation of God’s 
grace via the sacraments; whether or not this is a fair portrayal, Donne is clearly pointing 
to a reception of the sacraments that trusts to the sign for its efficacy rather than 
emphasizing the active faith of the recipient. Thus, in seeking a golden mean in 
everything that may be termed “sacramental,” Donne seeks to keep Christ’s presence 
paired with the ordinary actions of human life, a parousia in the now, and as such, his 
theology presents one version of closing the merchants’ loophole.    
For Donne, God’s goodness is the means enabling a summary judgment to be 
spoken on behalf of man. Donne’s funeral sermon develops a theology of the body, 
posited as index and summary of God’s creative logos: “The world is a great Volume, 
and Man the Index of that Booke; Even in the body of man, you may turne to the whole 
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world; This body is an illustration of all Nature; Gods recapitulation [italics mine] of all 
that he has said before, in his Fiat lux, and Fiat firmamentum, and in all the rest, said or 
done, in all the six dayes.”101 Donne’s emphasis on man, especially man’s body, as the 
“recapitulation” of God’s creative word is reminiscent of Agamben’s description of 
messianic time as “a summary recapitulation of the past, even according to the meaning 
of the adjective in the juridical expression ‘summary judgment.’”102 While messianic 
time also retains the aspect of deferral in regard to its fulfillment, that deferral (of Christ’s 
return, of a new kingdom, of a final resurrection) is held in tension by what has already 
been fulfilled (Christ’s resurrection). Messianic time constitutes the time between these 
two periods, both the unfulfilled and the fulfilled, but just as kairos is not qualitatively 
different from chronos, Agamben is careful to note that messianic time introduces a 
“remnant,” a pause or gap, between the two times, rather than creating a third.103 In the 
same way that kairos is condensed chronos, messianic recapitulation pronounces a 
“summary judgment” on the past, as if time had been fulfilled and the end of history had 
already been reached. In Donne’s sermon, man as “Index” of creation not only implies 
that everything contained in the expansiveness of God’s creative word reaches its 
fulfillment in man, but that this fulfillment may be expressed in abbreviated form. God 
pronounces his creation “very good”; likewise, embodied man constitutes God’s 
“summary judgement” on creation. That this recapitulation should be positive illustrates 
the tension inherent in messianic time, the tension between fulfillment and unfillment 
experienced in the present. Even though the body is subject to the temporal effects of the 
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fall, man’s body is considered the recapitulation of God’s creation in its original 
perfection; the body is not considered in its fallen, temporal state but from the vantage 
point of the resurrection, as if a final restoration or fulfillment had already been reached. 
This reading of Donne represents the tension that early moderns experienced between 
literal or linear representations of time (embodied by clock-time) and the eruptions of 
other temporalities into these measured moments.    
      
Dissertation Summary 
In “True Time Broke,” I explore the fluid version of time represented by kingship 
in Shakespeare’s Richard II. In the final act of this history play, the dethroned Richard 
employs the conceit of broken clockwork to represent his asynchronous relationship to 
time. Broken clockwork reveals a disjuncture within the subject. This goes beyond the 
mere question of the subject becoming an object, because even objects have preshaped 
ends, a telos. Somewhat counterintuitively, Heidegger posits the subject's overbearing 
mastery over nature as a defensive response to being figured forth by technology, to 
becoming standing reserve himself (“Standing-reserve” refers to matter viewed as 
available for use, prior to undergoing some kind of ordering that would render it actually 
useful).104 The sovereign, already in a position of mastery, is all the more susceptible to 
an illusory relationship to the world and more inclined to view both history and the social 
as instruments for his own ends. Hearing is analogous to time insofar as hearing can be 
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selective, just as the modernist can be selective about the the narrative he represents. As 
soundscapes become standing reserve and history becomes instrumental, the clock 
becomes machine, rather than asynchronous tool, mediated by scale and relationality. In a 
positive sense, however, broken clocks reveal disruption and disjuncture in the subject, 
but in a way that reveals the subject's relationship to history and the larger social realm. 
My third chapter, “Disorder’d Clocks,” investigates the temporal structure of the 
devotional self in George Herbert’s poetry. Arguing that Herbert’s speaker assumes an 
Augustinian orientation to time, I explore limits of perspective, vanishing temporal 
horizons, and other modes of being that confine the speaker to the now—the only 
moment in time that Augustine admits as real. My reading focuses on poems influenced 
by the church calendar and by daily rhythms of prayer and reflection, and as such, 
emphasizes the ways in which Protestant devotional practices were Augustinian in nature. 
More importantly, I argue that Herbert, like Augustine, defined subjectivity in 
relationship to an ever-receding present.  
Finally, my fourth chapter explores how Milton’s Samson Agonistes can be read 
as a means of recovering a “middleness” to time even as it situates its protagonist within 
an “interpretive middle” (to borrow from Stanley Fish). Using Hannah Arendt’s 
commentary on the reversal of thinking and action, I investigate the implications of this 
shift for Samson’s hermeneutics of self, history, and meaning in time. For these purposes, 
my reading draws upon Victoria Silver’s seminal study of deity and meaning in Milton, 
entailing the nature of the intelligibility of divine truth accommodated to human 
understanding. This relationship between divine intelligibility within time and the human 
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action, either ethical or instrumental, that attempts to uncover it is tied to midrashic 
hermeneutics, opening alternative reading as well as an alternative temporality.   
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“True Time Broke”: Hearing Time and History in Shakespeare’s Richard II 
 
 Whether in listening mode or stopping his ears to unfavorable counsel, Richard II 
is uniquely positioned to illustrate how the sovereign is connected to history and time by 
route of the ear. The varieties of hearing contained in Shakespeare’s play—mishearing, 
selective hearing, active listening—carry particular moral valences. In Act Five, scene 
five, Richard willfully mixes metaphors of hearing and timekeeping. He laments that he 
“had not an ear” to discern the temporal cues leading up to Bolingbroke’s advancement to 
the throne (5.5.48). In doing so, he acknowledges that hearing and timekeeping share a 
similar ethical component.  
 Overly refined hearing, as manifested by Richard throughout the majority of the 
play, not only ignores surrounding context but actively practices decontextualization 
from outer reality, which not only constitutes a removal of the self from external, material 
reality, but from the temporal/historical situation as well. Richard’s “dainty” hearing 
takes for granted a particular meter at play. Serres’s model of time, topological rather 
than geometric (and therefore linear, a simple matter of cause and effect), seems most 
relevant to Richard’s renewed hearing and his placement in a reconfigured temporal 
schema at the end of the play. The well-discussed example of the rumpled handkerchief, 
demonstrating the distinction between time and its measurement, emphasizes the multi-
layered, or folded, nature of reality, and therefore temporality.1 To experience time as in 
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its phenomenological array is to experience multiple dimensions at once, as one 
experiences music. 
 The passage of Richard II in Act Five, scene five, where I have chosen to ground 
my interpretation is one in which (a)synchrony comes into conflict with the drive to 
measure or “keep time.” Here, a deposed and self-pitying Richard describes himself in 
terms of both broken music and broken clockwork: 
      Music do I hear? 
Ha, ha, keep time! How sour sweet music is 
When time is broke and no proportion kept! 
So is it in the music of men’s lives. 
And here have I the daintiness of ear 
To check time broke in a disordered string, 
But for the concord of my state and time 
Had not an ear to hear my true time broke. 
I wasted time, and now doth Time waste me; 
For now hath Time made me his numb’ring clock. 
My thoughts are minutes, and with sighs they jar 
Their watches on unto mine eyes, the outward watch, 
Whereto my finger, like a dial’s point, 
Is pointing still, in cleansing them from tears.  
Now, sir, the sound that tells what hour it is 
Are clamorous groans which strike upon my heart, 
Which is the bell. So sighs, and tears, and groans 
Show minutes, times, and hours. But my time 
Runs posting on in Bolingbroke’s proud joy, 
While I stand fooling here, his jack o’ the clock. (41-60) 
 
In this portion of Richard’s soliloquy, two technologies are at work: the clock that marks 
time and the ear that listens. Clockwork becomes a central metaphor, entailing a 
connection to the temporal that is represented by the phenomenon of hearing.2 Aural 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of different historical moments as well as the agency of matter. My emphasis is less on the agency of 
matter than on the limits this agency places on the subject’s will to know. 
2 There is reason to believe the “jack o’ the clock” refers to a particular and well-known mechanized 
figure, a link which corroborates what I see as the passage’s implicit connection between the human body 
and temporality. Adam Max Cohen writes, “Shakespeare and his audience members could have seen the 
original Jack o’ the clock at Wells Cathedral, where a puppet known as Jack Blandifer moved his head and 
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captivation is itself a temporal problem, distorting Richard’s perception of his placement 
in a larger historical framework. Clock technology, with all the accompanying and 
mounting expectations in the period for accuracy and precision, distorts perception in 
much the same way as faulty hearing. Mechanical timekeeping during Shakespeare’s 
time signals an uneasy relationship between time as something communal and relation-
centered, denoting particularities of different times and places and connections among 
them, and time as something abstract. Time in the abstract, as a colonized territory of 
space,3 is easier to impose a mathematics and linearity upon; communal time, however, 
in being more premised on the relational and the social, is also more fluid—not in the 
sense that it is detachable and pliable in the sense that rationalized time comes to be, as 
mentioned in my introduction, but in the sense that it flows. Time in Richard is at once 
personal and asynchronous--in other words, out of step with the person.4 
 Certain core similarities between hearing and timekeeping emerge in the scene in 
which a dethroned and imprisoned Richard describes himself as broken clockwork. Time 
can be heard, as evidenced by the many clock towers in England that audibly struck the 
hour since the middle ages. Likewise, sound itself contains an inherent temporal order, a 
rhythm. The first meaning of “broken time” in Richard’s soliloquy is musical time, “How 
sour sweet music is / When time is broke and no proportion kept!” (5.5.42-3), though 
further resonances of “broken time” as broken clockwork further complicate the conceit. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
struck a bell on the hour” Shakespeare and Technology: Dramatizing Early Technological Revolutions 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 140. 
3 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), x. 
4 Cohen writes, “This notion that private timekeeping could have encouraged individuality and personal 
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As I demonstrate in this chapter, both hearing and timekeeping are grounded in the need 
to avoid individual bias, to reference what is outside the self in order to keep time 
accurately. As a form of sense experience, hearing is a useful metaphor for the subjective 
relation of the self to time. Changing one’s ethics of hearing, as Richard does by the end 
of the play, means re-orienting the self in relation to the world and even to time. To hear 
time aright, Richard must reassess his very being and its placement. Ontology is at stake, 
as well as ethics, or rather, the two are inherently linked. 
 In the medieval period, time for the community, whether determined by the 
church or merchants, was often something sounded. Textile workers in Artois, France 
were the first in either England or the continent to hear their daily labour marked by a 
work bell, beginning in 1355. Clock bells united people across social and class divides to 
acknowledge time through a common experience of hearing.5 Even though many clocks 
had elaborate faces designed to draw the eye, the same shared experience would not be 
possible through sight; hearing of the clock as it tolled was what rendered the experience 
communal. Therefore, it is possible to distinguish communal time from the rationalized 
ordering of time that was present in society even before accurate mechanisms gave rise to 
clock-time. This medieval context for an early modern play is important both because the 
term “communal time” needs grounding and because the references to clockwork in 
Richard’s soliloquy in Act 5, scene 5 require a longer historical framework.  
 The problem that unfolds for Richard is how the individual ear can arrange a 
temporal ordering according to a subjective bias. The phenomenology of sound is 
therefore necessary in connection to a deeper temporality, a “true time” that avoids 
                                                          
5 Jacques Le Goff, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1980), 35. 
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placing the self (here, literally the sovereign self) at the center of both perception and 
history. My reading here is in some degree of contrast (though, I hope, not contradiction) 
with what other critics have noticed about the dominance of sight and the gaze in the 
play. In the argument that follows, I will be bringing to the fore aspects of early modern 
temporality, such as the temporality of music, which entail relativity built into the nature 
of time. These notions of scale demand a temporality that recovers place by putting 
different standards of measurement alongside one another, rather than the more spatial, 
more void-like sense of time represented by the sovereign, an experience of time that 
arguably predicts the condition of the modern subject. The asynchronicity revealed by 
broken clockwork, I would argue, serves to recover Richard’s “true time”; the re-
incorporation of the ear signals a restoration of Richard to this communal sense of time. 
  
Sovereignty and the Subject in Time  
 The boundaries of the polis are what the sovereign body is commonly said to 
determine, and it is precisely this determination (the state and social whole) that makes 
the discourse of place central to the question of communal time. As Edward S. Casey 
puts it, “The very word ‘society’ stems from socius, signifying ‘sharing’—and sharing is 
done in a common place.”6 Shared time, the kind that would have been dictated by a 
communal work bell or by the motions of Jack Blandifer, is also placed time. This 
departure from communal time is not natural to sovereignty per se, but problematizes the 
sovereign’s shift away from a connection to the people, signified by listening. On the 
level of the phenomenal, hearing is the most effective metaphor when it comes to 
                                                          
6 See Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997): xvi. 
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representing the sovereign’s relationship to everyday rhythms of life, as well as 
determinable cycles of history (the more concrete manifestations of “temporality” in this 
chapter). In what sense is Richard’s “true time broke,” lacking “proportion” or 
“concord,” and to what extent are these precipitated by a faulty ear? 
 From Act 3 onwards, the king’s body begins to become placed, taken out of its 
mystical realm and recovering some of its human and finite character. In his seminal 
study investigating the roots of kingly identity, Ernst Kantorowicz cites the halo in late 
Roman art as “a special mark of distinction indicat[ing] that the figure was meant to 
represent in every respect a continuum, something permanent and sempiternal beyond the 
contingencies of time and corruption.”7 Kingly identity, then, was premised on being 
coextensive with time as “continuum,” not subject to its vagaries. Mark Netzloff has 
convincingly argued that historicist interpretations of Richard II that read its political 
moment as one of transition repeat the same modernist tendency to read history only in 
light of its own interests.8 If modernist history is a perspectival problem, perhaps the 
answer lies in recovering a heard history, rather than one that unnaturally stretches out 
time behind the modernist moment and along a field of optics. The identarian mode of 
history, basing its linear construction of time on identity and the system of similarity 
from which metaphor is derived, embodies all the flaws of faulty and selective hearing. 
According to Jonathan Gil Harris, such views of history strictly modeled on identity, like 
Hegelian Aufhebung, tend to cancel or ignore difference. The identarian mode illustrates 
one of the pitfalls of modernism in producing “an uncritical universalism that naturalizes 
                                                          
7 Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), 79. 
8 Mark Netzloff, “Insurgent Time: Richard II and the Periodization of Sovereignty,” Richard II: New 
Critical Essays, Shakespeare Criticism Vol. 25, Ed. Jeremy Lopez (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
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the assumptions of the present.”9 Recovering a cyclical view of history is insufficient for 
the sovereign subject determined to perceive history in light of his mystical body. 
Kantorowicz writes, “Political mysticism in particular is exposed to the danger of losing 
its spell or becoming quite meaningless when taken out of its native surroundings, its 
time and its space.”10 But when the sovereign is taken out of his space, he is necessarily 
put in place, returning to an awareness of his physical body, the site-specific needs of the 
community, and those aspects of state life that, not bounded by the idea of a mystical 
body, hold no self-interest. These communal interests are what turn hearing from an 
identarian mode to conjunctive, enabling the recognition of how different moments work 
together apart from the subject’s activity; Richard’s hearing thus becomes no longer 
selective but in tune with “the concord of [his] state and time.” 
 One example of Richard’s modernist mistake of placing his own identity at the 
center of history is when he relates to past kings only to identify with their martyrdom. 
Storytelling, in particular, takes control of historical narrative, enlisting the ears of its 
audience and positioning listeners in relation to time. Storytelling establishes a 
connection to the past by enacting a ritual of speaking and listening, but the nature of that 
connection remains ambiguous for Richard. Upon learning of the deaths of his favorites 
after Bolingbroke’s rise to power, Richard’s recourse is to channel grief via storytelling: 
“For God’s sake let us/ sit upon the ground / And tell sad stories of the death of kings” 
(3.2.155-156). Despite the tone of self-pity so characteristic of the way Richard at equal 
times both repels and captivates his audience, the moment itself is emblematic of the 
                                                          
9 Jonathan Gil Harris, Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009): 2. 
10 Kantorowicz, 3. 
51 
need to recover a connection to cyclical history. Ernst Kantorowicz glosses this passage 
to highlight how Richard relates to past kings by identifying with their martyrdom and 
the sacred cycle of death and suffering: “The king that ‘never dies’ here has been 
replaced by the king that always dies and suffers more cruelly than other mortals.”11 
Thus, even when relying on a cyclical view of temporality, in which patterns of repetition 
should offer interpretive clues about the present moment, the hearer of history can choose 
to be selective about the comparisons drawn; it is this selectiveness of hearing that most 
defines the “daintiness of ear” that Richard confesses in Act Five, scene five. Richard’s 
macabre narration of “graves and worms and epitaphs” (3.2.145), insofar as it reveals 
how kingly death compels a hearing, might seem (at last) like a recognition of the truth of 
Gaunt’s words: “O, but they say the tongues of dying men / Enforce attention like deep 
harmony” (2.1.5-6). Yet Gaunt’s view of hearing removes agency to the narration itself, 
requiring the listener to become truly passive; even the speaker of the message, passing 
from life into death, is not fully agentive. Richard’s shallow storytelling is not the same 
“deep harmony” that Gaunt has in mind. Rather, efficacious hearing in Richard involves 
a forced encounter, one that precludes the full exercise of agency in arriving at the truth 
and reveals the impossibility of even the sovereign being truly autonomous. 
 
Clockwork Technology and Hearing 
 As I discussed in my introduction in relation to Heidegger, the subject’s 
relationship to technology is untimely. We make and shape our inventions to answer 
particular ends, even as those ends reveal the ways we have arbitrarily ordered our own 
                                                          
11 Kantorowicz, 30. 
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societies, states, and even histories. What, then, should we make of the subject’s 
relationship to timekeeping technology, particularly the modern invention of the clock, 
which signifies the doomed efforts both to harness time as a resource and to accurately, 
minutely, represent it? Modernity’s drive for precision in temporal measurement 
discloses its need to accurately represent, but this need is strangely at odds with its 
tendency to re-make the past in its own image. Shakespeare’s Richard II demonstrates 
this self-contradictory predicament of the subject in relation to time. In Richard, 
sovereign hearing as a phenomenal activity possesses the same structural relationship as 
the modernist to history. Beginning with Richard’s description of clockwork subjectivity 
and out-of-tune hearing at the end of Act Five and using this passage to make sense of 
what comes before, I argue that the re-incorporation of the ear signals Richard’s 
restoration to communal time, insofar as communal time stands in opposition to modes 
wherein the subject projects his experience of the world a priori onto pasts and futures.12 
I am less interested here in revealing the nature of sovereignty per se than in illustrating 
how Richard, as sovereign, both enacts and resists the role of modernist subject. The 
drive to represent the self via technology only succeeds in revealing the subject’s finitude 
and limited agency; similarly, employing clockwork technology to discern historical cues 
reveals the reality of the subject’s untimely and asynchronous nature. 
 To understand why Richard’s hearing cannot keep time, only fully realized near 
the end of the play, as well as the higher demand Gaunt’s description places on a “deep 
harmony” of hearing in his death scene, it is necessary to say something about the 
                                                          
12 This is Heidegger’s concern with Kantian subjectivity, since, as Taylor Carman notes, “Some time after 
the Second World War Heidegger came to believe that Western metaphysics had moved beyond the 
Cartesian-Kantian subjectivism that projects the world as an objective ‘picture’ (Bild) over against itself” 
(xv). Forward to Basic Writings by Martin Heidegger, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 
2008). 
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phenomenal differences between hearing and sight. Walter J. Ong connects sound with 
consciousness and interiority; hearing is essentially the only sense that can perceive the 
interior of its object without leaving behind an impression on that object. Because sight is 
inherently analytical (“Sight isolates, sound incorporates,” says Ong), its object is at a 
remove from the observer. Sound, however, is immersive, placing the listener in its 
center rather than approaching her from one direction and distance. Rather than the 
analytical “dissection” entailed by the structure of sight, “The auditory ideal...is harmony, 
a putting together.”13 Such differences also go part of the way toward explaining how 
agency is more limited in an auditory model of perception. The immersive aspect of 
sound means that reception is less easily controlled.14 Harmony, then, situates the 
listener in a soundscape that is already relational, both among its own notes and 
vibrations and between itself and its perceiver.15 Incidentally, this contrast is also 
indicative of what criticism of Richard II can gain by looking more closely at hearing 
phenomena, considering that criticism of the play tends to return most often to optics to 
demonstrate the groundless nature of sovereignty. Though Richard provides plenty of 
opportunities to perform such readings, particularly the broken mirror of the deposition 
                                                          
13 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002): 70. Ong also references Maurice Merleau-Ponty in affirming that vision is dissective: 
“L’Oeil et I’esprit,” Les Temps modernes 18: 184–5. Numéro special: “Maurice Merleau-Ponty” (1961): 
193–227. 
14 Writer and theorist Ursula K. LeGuin usefully and succinctly sums up this point about reception and 
control: “Being on opposite sides of the head, ears are pretty good at telling where a sound comes from, but 
though the mind, the attention, can focus hearing, can listen to, the ear essentially hears from: it can’t focus 
narrowly and can select only with effort. The ear can’t stop hearing; we have no earlids; only sleep can shut 
off our reception. While we are awake our ears accept what comes.” “Telling is Listening,” The Wave in 
the Mind: Talk and Essays on the Writer, the Reader, and the Imagination (Boston: Shambhala, 2004). 
15 Marshall McLuhan and Edmund Carpenter highlight how sound demands something more relational 
between the auditor and the heard environment: “Auditory space has no point of favored focus. It’s a 
sphere without fixed boundaries, space made by the thing itself, not space containing the thing. It is not 
pictorial, boxed in, but dynamic, always in flux, creating its own dimensions moment by moment...It is 
more immediately connected to the nervous system than anything visual.” “Acoustic Space,” Explorations 
in Communication (Boston: Beacon Publishing, 1960): 67. 
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scene, many such efforts to establish the empty and reified nature of sovereignty via the 
gaze (panoptics and synoptics) ultimately render ghostly and unreal not only the 
sovereign, but also the subject as such.16 However, hearing encounters are at least as 
prevalent in the play as metaphors of vision. I use the term “encounter” consciously to 
denote the subject’s limited autonomy through this model of perception, thus anticipating 
the relational and interdependent nature of communal time that I argue is Richard’s 
restoration in the final moments of the play. 
 Most significant in Gaunt’s dying utterance is the recognition that the evanescent 
nature of a dying man’s speech is what “enforce[s] attention,” in the same way that 
harmony forces a certain kind of reception. “More are men’s ends marked than their lives 
before” (2.1.11); here, “mark” means “pay attention to.” Gaunt’s auditors can pay 
attention to his words, but the temporal moment of their utterance can only be referenced, 
not “marked” in the sense of noting or counting; dying speech escapes measurement as 
both the speaker and his message pass into nothing. As Ong observes, “All sensation 
takes place in time, but sound has a special relationship to time unlike that of the other 
fields that register in human sensation. Sound exists only when it is going out of 
existence.”17 This lack of a clear temporal referent can be traced to the problem of 
duration. Carolyn Dinshaw places the present--the now--at the center of her discussion of 
                                                          
16 Both Slavoj Zizek and Christopher Pye read the play in terms of optics, interpreting metaphors of 
perspective in terms of nearly tangible realities created by the gaze and driven by illusion. For example, 
both scholars examine the exchange about how grief and tears affect vision in the exchange between the 
queen and Bushy in 2.2. Zizek notes that the queen’s grief is “perceived in a distorted way, because outside 
this distortion, ‘in itself,’ it does not exist.” Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through 
Popular Culture (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991): 9.  
     Similarly, Pye notes that “Bushy raises the possibility that the queen’s sorrow is more radically 
groundless than he intended; seen rightly, grief may be a shadow not of any prior substance at all but 
simply of ‘what it is not.’” The Regal Phantasm (London: Routledge, 1990): 90. 
17 Ong, 31. 
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temporality (like Augustine does, as well, as I will explore in the next chapter). On first 
glance, the now seems empty, and as each moment of the present slips back into the past, 
now has no clear referent; it lacks duration. However, it is populated by attachments, held 
together by affect and desire. “Often, apparently,” writes Dinshaw, “our experience 
departs from the metrical clocking of time that measures a succession of moments one 
after another.”18 Dinshaw’s analysis is useful here because affect is what enables the 
distinction between a “lived sense of time” and a linear, measured time (for my purposes, 
the modernist dream of the clock). What unites the temporality of the clock and the 
temporality of the ear is the notion of synchrony, or its opposite, asynchrony, which 
Carolyn Dinshaw defines as “different time frames or temporal systems colliding in a 
single moment of now.”19 Not only does hearing fundamentally resist a model of linear 
mapping, hearing is even more poised than other senses or affects to be asynchronous and 
to interrupt the flow of time, since its perceptual object, sound, is itself impermanent. The 
technology of the clock is an attempt to measure what cannot be fully measured; the same 
attempt is mirrored in Richard’s ambivalent employment of the clockwork metaphor to 
represent subjective life. The question becomes whether Richard’s self-injunction to 
“keep time” is at least partially ironic—whether he realizes that this is not an autonomous 
endeavor and that “keep[ing] time” is less like counting and more like paying attention.  
 
Place, Relationality, and the Measurement of Time 
                                                          
18 Carolyn Dinshaw, How Soon Is Now?: Medieval Texts, Amateur Readers, and the Queerness of Time 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012), 9. 
19 Dinshaw, 5. 
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 Tracing the history of time in the Middle Ages, LeGoff states, “The same process 
responsible for the rationalization of time was responsible for its secularization.” This 
“rationalization of time,” attributed to Aristotle’s influence, was implemented by the 
Church but adapted by the merchants.20 For scholastics in the Middle Ages, motion was 
central to time as a concept, since the dominant mode of theorizing time came from 
Aristotle filtered through Aquinas. In the Physics, Aristotle defines time as “the number 
of motion.” Since mobility belongs to the physical world, Aristotelian time is tied to the 
world at large, to narrative, and to relationality.21 As Dohrn-van Rossum explains, 
“measures, numbers, and weights were of interest only as relationships such as bigger-
smaller, slower-faster, harmonious-unharmonious, or proportional-unproportional.”22 
Clockwork technology, musical meter, and scientific theory related to time all show the 
same movement away from Aristotelian time as the Renaissance progresses.  
 Richard’s extended metaphor of “keep[ing] time” is twofold; it begins by clearly 
referring to musical tempo but then overlays this conceit with that of clockwork’s 
mechanical means of keeping time. Do these temporal metaphors, the musical and the 
mechanical, convey the same notion of time? In both, time as the measurement of 
                                                          
20 Jacques LeGoff, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, Trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980): 36. 
21 Aquinas glosses Aristotle’s principle by explaining that “when we discern a ‘before’ and ‘after’ and 
count them, then we say that time is produced. This is so because time is nothing less than ‘the numbering 
of motion according to before and after’: for we perceive time, as was said, when we count the “before and 
after” of motion. It is clear therefore that time is not motion, but accompanies motions inasmuch as it is 
counted. Hence time is the number of motion. 
   “But if someone objects against this definition and says that ‘before and after’ are determined by time, 
and consequently, that the definition is circular, he should remember that ‘before and after’ are placed in 
the definition of time inasmuch as they are caused in motion by magnitude, and not inasmuch as they are 
measured out of time” (Section 580). Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Book IV, Trans. by Pierre H. 
Conway. 
22 Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders, trans. Thomas 
Dunlap (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 284. 
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physical motion is central, a perspective that was waning leading up the Horological 
Revolution. Roger Mathew Grant makes a convincing case that conventions of metrical 
theory ran parallel to the changing conception of time in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, beginning with the Aristotelian notion of time as the measurement of motion 
and shifting to the Newtonian, wherein time becomes fully abstracted from any relation 
to physical space. Music theorists of the early and mid-seventeenth centuries defined a 
beat as fundamentally tied to the length of time it takes for the hand to move through the 
air on an upswing, “a motion theorists codified in the terms thesis and arsis 
respectively.”23 The temporal duration of the beat was therefore inherently linked to 
physical motion. The distinction between the notational bar (abstract musical measure) 
and the duration of physical motion that signified the beat did not come until later in the 
century. Moreover, motion-as-duration held such primacy in these earlier conceptions 
that triple meter is conceived as temporally uneven, or non-isochronous, precisely 
because its durations are based on the double movement of the hand (thesis and arsis) 
rather than an abstract theorization plotted on the bar.24  
 By situating Richard’s temporality in terms of abstract duration rather than time 
bound up with embodiment and an interconnectivity between place and space, critics of 
Shakespeare can misread the clockwork conceit as simply an instance of Richard’s 
objectification by time while overlooking the asynchronous quality inherent in the 
                                                          
23 Roger Mathew Grant, “Epistemologies of Time and Metre in the Long Eighteenth Century,” Eighteenth 
Century Music 6.1 (Cambridge University Press, 2009): 60. Agostino Pisa and Pier Francesco Valentini 
published treatises in 1611 and 1643, respectively, which situated metrical theory in motion rather than 
abstract duration.  
24 The non-isochronous nature of triple-meter is discussed and diagrammed in Valentini’s treatise, Trattato 
della battuta musicale (1643). Grant states, “Therefore triple meter emerges as an unbalanced version of 
duple. The motion of thesis and arsis take precedence over beat cardinality (the number of beats per bar), 
even to the extent of yielding an asymmetrical triple meter” (62). 
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conception of the mechanism. For example, one critic is quoted in the Arden edition at 
5.5.51-4 as follows: “The disturbed state of Richard’s mind is reflected in the complexity 
of the metaphor: his thoughts are minutes and the frequent and regular sighs to which 
they give rise are the groaning of the pendulum which ticks them out (jar(s) Their 
watches).”25 Though the detail may at first seem trifling, the jarred timekeeping that 
marks out minutes like sighs cannot be attributed to “the groaning of the pendulum,” 
since the pendulum was not perfected for use in clocks until sixty years after the first 
performances of Richard (the pendulum was successfully incorporated into clockwork by 
Huygens in 1657). Older striking clocks with communal bells were weight-driven.26 In 
terms of sound, “The tick is the sound of the whole system of gears supporting the weight 
being brought to a sudden stop after being momentarily released.”27 So ticking by the 
minute is not comparable to striking by the hour, since the former was the side-effect of 
the gears shifting into place and the latter was initiated by a separate device intended 
specifically for marking the time by sound. And as we may recall from the historical 
overview of clockwork technology, the pendulum enabled the mechanism to be 
isochronous; this meant that the driving force (the pendulum) could operate at a particular 
frequency without effecting the overall rate of timekeeping for the device. This is not the 
case for the weight-driven clocks which Richard’s comparison draws upon. The 
relationship between thoughts and sighs, or minutes and their “outward watch” (entailing 
both sound and motion) on the clock’s face, is the difference between internal and 
                                                          
25 Originally from Richard II, ed. Richard Adams (Macmillan Shakespeare, 1975): 252. 
26 The pendulum replaced weights as the driving force regulating the rate of timekeeping in clocks that 
were marketable, but large cathedral clocks remained weight-driven. As Adam Cohen notes, ““Developed 
around 1300, the first weight-driven mechanical clocks using the verge-and-foliot escapement were located 
inside cathedrals, abbeys, and monasteries. The first such clocks in England date from the late 1300s. A 
mechanical clock is mentioned in Salisbury in 1386, and a Wells Cathedral clock is noted in 1392” (134). 
27 Bruton, 16. 
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external, but this relationship is more complex than a simple causal link. The weight-
driven nature of a large tolling cathedral clock is a good analogy for Richard’s weighty 
grief in this passage. However, that the marking of minutes should outwardly jar the 
entire machine is hardly an intentional aspect of the clock’s design; rather, it is the 
gravity of the mechanism that creates this sigh-like “outward watch.” Just as minutes 
cannot be said to drive jarring, Richard’s thoughts do not unilaterally drive his sighs. The 
sighs exercise a natural gravity of their own, and as such, “the outward watch” on the 
clock face can never fully signify “minutes,” or thoughts; there is no perfect 
synchronicity between inner and outer, between grief and its representation. Here, the 
lines betray a subtle distinction between minutes as abstract temporal units (that we might 
even poetically conflate with the driving force as theoretically moving the mechanism) 
and the minutes represented on the “outward watch”; the conceit becomes unwieldy 
insofar as the metaphor employs the same vehicle for time and inner reality and the same 
tenor for the measurement of time and outward representation. 
 There is no easy relationship between internal and external largely because the 
mechanism itself, especially clockwork mechanism at this stage in the Renaissance, is no 
easy metaphor for subjectivity. While it is easy, in our age, to take for granted a piece of 
technology as something almost self-maintaining, it was not until after later in the period 
that substantial improvements to clockwork accuracy would be seen. However, “In the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mechanical clocks moved out of church towers and 
into homes, watches were invented, and public and private timepieces became ubiquitous 
throughout England.”28 The increasing privatization of time coincided with the older 
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order of clock towers, and the great communal clocks were particularly dependent on 
regular human intervention. For example, a pin triggered a lever that released the striking 
hammer once on the hour, but the clock still needed to be set by human hands: “If fast, 
the clock had to be stopped until it indicated the correct time. If slow, it had to be tripped 
so that it ran down quickly until the correct time was shown by the hands.”29 In addition 
to the imprecise marking of minutes, which required human intervention, the “sound that 
tells what hour it is,” which Richard compares to his “clamorous groans,” was made 
possible by a device called the locking plate, or “count wheel.”30 The train of gears that 
motivated the clock’s time and the device that precipitated the striking of the bell were 
separate, albeit connected mechanisms and operated independently.   
 It would be inaccurate to describe the modernization of time in the seventeenth 
century as a movement from qualitative to quantitative time. Although Aquinas, 
interpreting Aristotle, explains that “time is not determined by either [slow or fast] 
according to its quantity or its quality, because nothing is its own measure,” what 
produces the standard of measure must be found in the physical world.31 For example, 
Michele Savonarola in 1450 set the precedent for physicians in the Middle Ages 
determining a fevered pulse by comparing it with a normal pulse, rather than an objective 
measure of time. Not until the seventeenth century (after mechanical clocks with minute 
dials became common) did physicians begin consistently measuring the pulse of fevered 
                                                          
29 Bruton, 119. 
30 Bruton, 22. 
31 “Every change and motion is either slow or fast; but time is not either. Therefore time is neither a motion 
nor a change. He [Aristotle] explains the minor premise thus: Slow and fast are determined by time—
because that is fast which is moved a great distance in a short time and that is slow which is moved a short 
distance in much time. But time is not determined by either according to its quantity or its quality, because 
nothing is its own measure. Therefore, time is neither slow nor fast. And since he had proposed that change 
is fast or slow, without mention of motion, he adds that for the present it does not matter whether one says 
‘motion’ or ‘change’” (Aquinas 569). 
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patients using an objective standard of temporal units.32 Dohrn-van Rossum notes, “In 
1583, Galileo checked the regularity of the swings of a thread pendulum at first by the 
pulse. Only later did he arrive at the reverse concept, that of determining the rate of the 
pulse with the help of the swings of the pendulum.”33 There also appears to be a 
mutually influencing relationship between musical tempo and the pulse as standards of 
measure in the Middle Ages through the Renaissance. Early conducting derived tempo in 
common time by the pulse.34 In ironically circular fashion, Savonarola also “evidently 
did not know of a suitable time measure for the pulse rate and thus recommended 
instruction by musicians in conductor’s tempo.” Whether in music or in the physical 
sciences, the demand for temporal measure in the Middle Ages is fulfilled by relying on 
systems of scale derived from comparisons with other systems. In this sense, it is not the 
case that temporal measure was arbitrary before the Renaissance and certainly not that 
theorists and practitioners were unconcerned with the accuracy of quantitative 
measurement. However, “Only since the ‘Scientific Revolution’ in the middle of the 
seventeenth century can one speak of experimentally quantifying scientific procedures 
and of conceptions of time as a scaled continuum of discrete moments.”35 The notion of 
the “moment” itself undergoes a large shift from being bound to place to being bound to 
space, though some would describe this as occurring on a much more gradual basis, 
                                                          
32 Dohrn-van Rossum, 285-287. 
33 Dohrn-van Rossum, 287. 
34 The question in regard to these early accounts “is whether the pulse (usually in the range of 60-80 MM) 
corresponded to crotchets, minims, or semibreves in the standard tempo notated in the standard ‘alla 
semibreve’ common time.” Though this element of scale remains ambiguous, pulse was clearly tied to 
tempo as a system of measure. See Ephraim Segermen, “Tempo in fifteenth-century music,” Companion to 
Medieval and Renaissance Music, ed. Tess Knighton and David Fallows (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992): 338. 
35 Dohrn-van Rossum, 285-287. 
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rather than as a product of the renaissance science movement.36 Thus, temporal 
measurement pre-Renaissance is more markedly place-bound in the sense that it is 
wrapped up with embodiment: the heartbeat, the pulse, the body in conducting, and, in a 
more social sense, the rhythms of communal life as a whole. It is in this sense that 
Richard has lost touch with communal time, and comes to represent a temporality that is 
not only dis-placed (in terms of the social) but also place-less, anticipating the temporal 
subject leading up to and after Newton.37  
 There appear to be two separate instances of the asynchronous at work in 
Richard’s conceit, and each represents a contrast between new and old ways of keeping 
time. First, there is the explicit meaning of “true time broke,” where the analogy of either 
broken tempo or broken clockwork occurs at a level where technology is expected to 
maintain some level of accuracy, pointing toward a notion of time as objective (spatial). 
This points forward toward newer analogies of time that come to fulfillment as the 
science movement progresses. Temporal technologies are expected to tell us something 
about the person. Second, there is the implicit meaning that must necessarily be read into 
the vehicle of the metaphor (a weight-driven clock with a communal bell), whose social 
meaning is tied to an older notion of temporal measurement as inherently asynchronous. 
Time in this instance is always already relational, rather than representing some pure, 
abstract Time, as it does later in the seventeenth century. In the old notion, timekeeping is 
something that must be enacted and requires humans to enact it; timekeeping more 
                                                          
36 Casey is among those who argue for a gradual shift, though he admits that “the full ascendancy of space 
over place does not happen until the publication of Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy in the last part of the seventeenth century,” and “the critical turning point in the debate between 
space and place occurs during the sixteenth century” (129). Thinkers such as Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) 
and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) are key examples of the place/space discussion being increasingly 
complicated within scholasticism (See Casey, 116-129). 
37 See also LeGoff on space, pp. 34-37.  
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literally keeps time and time is as real as the community that enacts it. In the new model, 
however, timekeeping reveals a mathematically precise time that is objective and not 
bound by other relationalities. As old gives way to new, the accuracy of technology 
becomes increasingly important. 
 
Hearing Time in Richard II 
 As a play concerned with determining the grounds of power, sovereignty in 
Shakespeare’s Richard II is most often predictably configured by critics along the lines of 
sight and the gaze. It is Richard’s faulty hearing, however, that implicates him as both out 
of tune with his own subjectivity and with time. Despite its pitfalls, the phenomenon of 
hearing reveals how the subject perceives and experiences history; hearing time becomes 
analogous to the ear mapping the subject’s relationship to a larger aural field. Faulty, or 
selective, hearing is essentially a temporal problem; it distorts Richard’s perception of his 
placement in a larger temporal (and ideological) framework. Like the “sad stories of the 
death of kings,” he would like to maintain absolute agency in telling time and in telling 
history; as such, he assumes control of the aural field in a manner typical of monarchs. 
Sound, speech, and hearing had profound roles in framing the power dynamics of 
renaissance court life, entailing authority over the aural space, or what Bruce Smith terms 
a “soundscape.”38 In Smith’s description, maintaining authority over the aural field 
involves a simultaneous subversion of the field of optics insofar as the spell-binding 
power of voice relies on the absent body, the absence of visible sign, and in a positive 
                                                          
38 Bruce Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1999). Smith also notes, “...Elizabeth tried to take absolute control of the acoustic environment: she 
managed to hold everyone’s visual attention at the same [time] that she eluded their visual curiosity.” (84). 
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sense, can force the kind of focused sensory encounter that engages with the world rather 
than immediately retreating to analyze it. Of course, this encounter involves a 
simultaneous relinquishing of agency, a problem posed by Richard’s disarticulated 
hearing at the end of the play.  
 Emphasizing this loss of agency, clockwork Richard describes himself as 
objectified by time, as time’s “numb’ring clock” and Bolingbroke’s “jack o’ the clock” 
(5.5.50-60). The clock conceit includes psychological as well as physical and affective 
categories in relation to time’s measurement: thoughts as minutes, eyes as clock-face, 
sighs as the ticking mechanism. The analogy ends by comparing the sound of a striking 
clock to the involuntary rise of affect triggered by grief: “Now, sir, the sound that tells 
what hour it is / Are clamorous groans which strike upon my heart / Which is the bell” 
(5.5.55-57). Significantly, the ear is not included in this itemization; sound emanates 
from the subject against the will but is not perceived by the subject. This is quite the 
contrast to the Richard of Act 3, who, though almost fully overthrown and facing 
overwhelming political loss, not only still commands a listening but controls the telling of 
history. 
 To know an object external to the self, all the senses must be brought to bear, but 
hearing has unique implications. As Sokolowski points out, using the example of a cube 
to explain perception, “only vision and touch present the object as a cube; hearing, taste, 
and smell present the material the cube is made of, not its character of being shaped as a 
cube.”39 Hearing, then, is first of all distinctive with respect to its tendency to involve the 
subject in its very materiality (rather than the more indeterminate categories of mind 
                                                          
39 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
18. 
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represented by vision and touch). Jonathan Gil Harris’s theory of “untimely matter” 
seems relevant here; Harris defines matter as “not simply physicality but rather dynamic 
material worked—or reworked—by subjects in their ‘sensuous’ interactions with objects 
over time.”40 The activity and engagement suggested by Harris’s definition should not 
give the impression that the subject is always aware of these interactions; the agency of 
both subjects and objects always seems to be implicated in temporality. For this reason, 
the agency of the hearer (and, weighed on the side of the phenomenal world, the agency 
of sound) poses a somewhat different problem than the agency of the viewer; different 
still are the implications for the hearer in time. We might summarize these trends by 
pointing out the underlying epistemological problem running throughout: the at once 
embodied and disembodied nature of sound (posing the question of where voice resides) 
challenges the Cartesian lapse into the self. Bruce Smith champions phenomenology as 
“counter[ing] the tyranny of Cartesian philosophy, with its privileging of visual 
experience, its ambition to speak with a single authoritative voice.”41 Panoptical vision, 
the idea that the king both commands and deflects the gaze of observers, is so wedded to 
the symbolic and illusory nature of kingship precisely because the physical body of the 
king is elided by the discursive, political one. Re-articulated hearing requires a more 
active participation on the part of the listener; aurality exacts a particular intentionality 
from the listener, who can neither take the apparent qualities of sound for granted or rely 
on faulty first principles.   
 Additionally, acoustics do not merely matter in the court, the sphere of the 
sovereign, but in the space of the theater, as well. Hearing, both in terms of its 
                                                          
40 Harris, 175. 
41 Smith, 26. 
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phenomenology and its epistemology, is wrapped up with questions of absent and present 
bodies; in terms of performance, this involves the positioning of bodies/characters on 
stage, the position of audience members in relation to those voices. Although Serres 
defines amphitheatre not as “a space where people speak, but one where many see,” it is 
also collective listening that properly focuses the attention of the audience.42 Rather than 
mapping hearing onto the same geometric lines of the gaze, implied by interpreting 
aurality as simply as ensnarement to the external world and as revealing the liminality of 
the subject, aural fields on stage can provide a means to read the subject as conjunctively 
engaged with the external world. Richard II provides many such moments of aural 
metatheater, where anxieties about concealed or absent listeners betray larger concerns 
about whose voice wins out in the political melee.   
 While spatial metaphor is often employed in the service of converging lines of 
sight in order to disclose difference, hierarchy, or authority, place is more closely linked 
to communal time. The trend throughout several key scenes I examine is the revealing of 
hearing divorced from its context, and therefore, from temporality that would necessitate 
place and embodiment. When Richard laments his “daintiness of ear,” he calls attention 
to a tendency toward an overly precise, sensual aurality that discerns faulty rhythm and 
time-keeping. Dainty hearing calls to mind York’s accusation that Richard’s ear is open 
to the “lascivious meters” of flattery “to whose venom sound / The open ear of youth 
doth always listen” (2.1.19).43 In the second instance, lascivious conveys an implicit 
condemnation of Richard’s court life, and according to the OED, the word at least 
                                                          
42 Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, Trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter 
Cowley (New York: Continuum, 2008), 87. 
43 In both passages, the Arden edition points out a correspondence to the courtly entertainments of Edward 
II and that both Marlowe’s and Shakespeare’s plays of the same name emphasize the sensuality of music 
and poetry in Edward’s court.  
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conveys “voluptuous, luxuriant,” as of a sensualist, if not carrying sexual overtones as 
well. An epistemological dilemma is posed here: how does Richard’s tendency toward 
sensuousness—an overly refined or hyper-tuned ear—actually limit his access to 
knowledge through the senses? In other words, how can hearing become too refined for 
the purposes of knowing and understanding the external, temporal world? We might 
parse out the question in relation to Bacon’s injunction to “stay faithfully and constantly 
with things, and abstract our minds no further from them than is necessary for the images 
and rays of things to come into focus (as in the case of sight)....”44 Bacon advocates a 
pragmatic method, wherein the organs of sense are sharpened as much as possible apart 
from the ideological effects of mind. Richard’s voluptuous ear, “stopped with other, 
flatt’ring sounds” (2.1.17), does not indicate a heightening of sense-as-instrument, but a 
very ideologically driven fixation on sense experience itself. When sense is reified, it 
becomes disarticulated, both from the soul and from the world; in the same way, Richard-
as-clockwork, taken as a whole analogy along with the metaphors of music and hearing, 
portrays the ear as out of sync with the rest of the self. 
 Though it does not include hearing, Richard’s changing phenomenological 
relationship to temporality can arguably be located in Act 3, scene two; after returning 
from Ireland to learn that most of his militia has defected to Bolingbroke, Richard fixes 
on the matter of blood, a discursive trope in the play that stands in for sovereignty and its 
iteration in time, by accounting for the color draining from his face: “But now the blood 
of twenty thousand men / Did triumph in my face, and they are fled” (3.2.76-77). Blood 
as life force--the now flushing, now paling face as sign of mutability--reinforces the 
                                                          
44 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 11. 
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king’s ultimate dependence on the militia as political life force. Richard still associates 
his own physical body with the body politic, but this moment reveals an incipient 
realization of the untimely relationship between these two bodies: one real and one 
discursive. These lines seem to be, at least partially, an answer to Salisbury’s prior 
exclamation at line 69, “O, call back yesterday, bid Time return.” Richard has, after all, 
arrived a day too late. The productive (or “sensuous”) involvement of humans in a social 
and historical sense reveals history in its virtuality, and in those terms, the scene heralds 
Richard’s forced recognition that the discourse of kingship is insufficient. Richard’s view 
of history is rooted in a symbolic and language-driven conception of his own body; time 
orients itself in reference to the body politic. It is no coincidence that the metaphors of 
physicality, once used by Richard purely to identify with the state, take on an 
increasingly material turn by the end of the play. Richard’s “true time broke” is revealed 
only after he is reacquainted with embodiment as such. The agency of different historical 
moments (reinforcing the enfolded nature of time, as with the example of the 
handkerchief) exert themselves on the body, forcing engagement with the external social 
and temporal reality while also revealing the subject’s limited autonomy in coming to 
knowledge.   
 Through the instrument of the dying voice, Gaunt’s words to Richard, attempting 
to “undeaf” his ear, which has been “stopped with other, flatt’ring sounds” and 
“lascivious metres” (2.1.17-21) actually illustrate how temporality makes itself apparent 
to perception through a forced encounter with mortality and embodiment. Gaunt’s 
declaration that “the tongues of dying men / Enforce attention like deep harmony” (2.1.5-
6) argues for a view of time marked out by death as a means to bring the subject to 
69 
knowledge. However, the rest of the Gaunt’s speech emphasizes not just words 
themselves as commanding attention, but voice itself, aspirated and embodied, as holding 
a special kind of time-marking power:  
Where words are scarce, they are seldom spent in vain, 
For they breathe truth that breathe their words in pain. 
He that no more must say is listened ore 
Than they whom youth and ease have taught to glose. 
More are men’s ends marked than their lives before. 
The setting sun and music at the close, 
As the last taste of sweets, is sweetest last, 
Writ in remembrance more than things long past. 
Though Richard my life’s counsel would not hear, 
My death’s sad tale may yet undeaf his ear. (2.1.7-16) 
 
Death, particularly the voice of the dying, reveals history in its virtuality by bringing 
certain moments to presence while others become part of the perceptual background.45 
As this chapter seeks to establish, Richard’s sensual hearing indicates an oversensitivity 
to certain rhythms to the expense of the wholeness of perception. This indicates the 
complicated relationship between sense experience and the will to acquire knowledge; 
over-refinement in one area may betray the will, or reveal that the subject was never fully 
autonomous to begin with.  
 In contrast to hearing, the structure of the subject along the lines of sight always 
seems to reveal, not simply a lack of autonomy, but a split subject who has no access to 
true knowledge of the world external to the self. Of course, the scene that provides the 
most potential for reading the gaze and its relationship to subjectivity is when Richard 
calls for a mirror after his deposition: “Was this the face / That like the sun did make the 
                                                          
45 Using the cube as an example, Sokolowski explains how an object is perceived via profiles and how 
these profiles are perceived in time: “As I turn the cube or walk around it, the potentially perceived 
becomes the actually perceived, and the actually perceived slips into absence; it becomes that which has 
been seen, that which is again only potentially seen...A profile is a temporally individuated presentation of 
an object” (19). 
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beholders wink?” (4.1.283, 284). Richard’s image reflected in the looking glass not only 
reveals the mortality of his body (thereby rendering him untimely) but the insufficiency 
of visual referents, either to constitute the subject or to reveal knowledge. Asserting the 
superiority of mind via the lines of sight in an attempt always seems to reveal a split, not 
just between mind and body or between self and world, but in the subject himself.46 
Examining the gaze in Renaissance anatomy art (though coming to fruition later in the 
period, Rembrandt’s Anatomy Lesson (1632) is an example), Jonathan Sawday argues 
that the corpse not only stood in as a vanitas symbol, but the criminal’s body represented 
the need to contain a political threat: “The corpse, then, was the remnant of a deviant 
‘will’ -- a potential threat to the social fabric mastered by the rational power.”47 
Likewise, Richard’s mirror reflects back his objectified “dead” flesh, already under the 
scrutiny of the onlookers who act as scientists. Bolingbroke’s comment, “The shadow of 
your sorrow / hath destroyed the shadow of your face” (4.1.292-3) illustrates the play’s 
overall anxiety that vision only gives access to the world of referents. In a similar 
moment in 2.2.14-15, Bushy attempts to assuage Queen Isabel’s sorrow, which views 
Richard’s leave-taking as heralding grief to come: “Each substance of a grief hath twenty 
shadows, / Which shows like grief itself, but is not so” (2.2.14-15). It is not difficult to 
observe, as Zizek does, an underlying parallel between the objet petit a, the Lacanian 
object of desire which posits itself as its own cause, in Bushy’s description of “sorrow’s 
                                                          
46 Sawday writes, “The impossibility of sustaining the ‘link between soul and body was itself based on a 
radical anatomy of the human subject. Indeed, it was the susceptibility of the body (as opposed to the mind) 
to the process of division which confirmed the distinction between body and mind inherent within the 
Cartesian project. Since bodies could be divided whilst minds appeared to be entirely resistant to division, 
then, as Descartes observed in the sixth of the Meditations on First Philosophy, no matter that as a ‘thinking 
thin’ the subject may have never perceived itself as ‘one single and complete thing’, the human subject was 
bifurcated” (146). Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in 
Renaissance Culture (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
47 Sawday, 152. 
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eye, glazed with blinding tears,” which “Divides one thing entire to many objects” 
(2.2.16-17). Grief creates its own gaze, and the only way to correct this distorted gaze is 
by “looking awry” (2.2.21). Yet even so, Bushy implies that the gaze can never truly 
represent its object, since grief itself consists of “naught but shadows / Of what it is not” 
(2.2.23-24).48 Likewise, Bolingbroke’s play of words demonstrates an overall distrust of 
visual experience to provide mastery over the world of referents.  
 While the visual metaphor in the deposition scene provides a means of revealing 
the baselessness of sovereign power, the device of the mirror should be juxtaposed 
against the much differently constructed clockwork metaphor of Act Five, scene five. In 
Richard’s own view, his identity as Sun-king produces an image that deflects the 
castrating gaze of observers. Interpreting the looking-glass passage as a moment wherein 
the spectral, phantasmic nature of sovereignty is revealed, Christopher Pye’s analysis of 
the gaze in Richard II problematizes Stephen Greenblatt’s formulation that subversion 
actually authorizes the power it seeks to overturn.49 The bodily presence of the king 
“remains irredeemably ‘untimely’ because, like the sign of treason, it is a sight that 
cannot be separated from the response it provokes.”50 Pye’s “sign of treason” refers to 
the belief that the king’s presence is powerful enough to make traitors reveal their secrets. 
In this reading, vision is anamorphic insofar as it causes a fundamental split as the self 
                                                          
48 A few scholars have commented on the resemblance of Bushy’s elaborate conceit of the teary gaze to 
Lacan’s objet petit a. Zizek notes that the queen’s grief is “perceived in a distorted way, because outside 
this distortion, ‘in itself,’ it does not exist” (Looking Awry, 9). Similarly, Christopher Pye notes that “Bushy 
raises the possibility that the queen’s sorrow is more radically groundless than he intended; seen rightly, 
grief may be a shadow not of any prior substance at all but simply of ‘what it is not.’” The Regal Phantasm 
(London: Routledge, 1990): 90. 
49 Pye, The Regal Phantasm, 84. 
50 Pye’s explanation of response is fundamentally Lacanian insofar as it is similar to the objet petit a, 
where temporal order and causality or confused insofar as the object of desire cannot be distinguished from 
its cause. The Regal Phantasm, 101. 
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becomes both as subject and as object of the gaze.51 An anamorphic subject becomes 
untimely only after some measure of agency is lost. While the broken reflection, through 
the hard lines of sight, indicates the ideologically-driven nature of sovereign subjectivity, 
the loss of that autonomous subjectivity heralds its replacement by a historically and 
contextually situated version of selfhood: “Ha, ha, keep time! How sour sweet music is / 
When time is broke and no proportion kept! / So is it in the music of men’s lives” 
(5.5.42-44). Richard’s broken, individuated time, a symptom of sovereignty, gives way to 
a realization of temporal situatedness and the need for “concord [between]” state and 
time” (5.5.47). Richard’s body in the second instance is compared to a mechanized figure 
(“Jack o’ the clock”) whose automated movements marked out measured time, rather 
than the sun by which clocks are set. The rise of perfected timekeeping mechanisms 
during Shakespeare’s time also signals a shift from the conceptualization of time as 
something fluid and communal to something measured, both personal and 
asynchronous.52 The re-incorporation of the ear signal a restoration of Richard to 
communal time.  
 Hearing, therefore, can be distanced from the entrenchment of subjectivity in a 
way that vision cannot. Descartes located the soul in the pineal gland, in reason and in the 
brain, but for Serres, the soul is located it in the solar plexus—engagement with the 
world, the drive of the senses. Serres writes: 
                                                          
51 Pye writes, “To know itself at all, the subject must enter into a dialectical oscillation between object and 
subject, a dialectic of loss and restoration. And yet, neither exactly a subject nor exactly an object, the 
anamorphic figure falls outside such dialectics of identity altogether, outside even the time of universal 
judgment and human history” (60). 
52 Cohen writes, “This notion that private timekeeping could have encouraged individuality and personal 
achievement seems as plausible as McLuhan’s theory that the private reading and interpretation of printed 
texts spurred the rise of individualism” (143). The individualization of time also runs parallel to the rise of 
capitalism for obvious reasons. 
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I only really live outside of myself; outside of myself I think, meditate, know; 
outside of myself I receive what is given, enduringly; I invent outside of myself. 
Outside of myself, I exist, as does the world. Outside of my verbose flesh, I am on 
the side of the world.  
 The ear knows the distance all too well. I can put it out the window, 
project it far away, hold it distant from my body.53  
 
By this line of thinking, the subject is split—anamorphic, untimely, suffering a loss of 
agency. However, hearing as encounter reveals how this divide happens on the 
boundaries of the person and the world. Richard’s broken image may represent loss, 
according to Pye’s description of anamorphic subjectivity as “a dialectic of loss and 
restoration,” but the metaphors of hearing at the end of the play ironically signal the 
corresponding restoration of subjectivity. Interpreting the subject (particularly the 
sovereign subject) in terms of its visibility--the self-same gaze--entails reading the 
subject as ultimately symbolic, interpellated by the world of objects. For example, in 
analyzing Hamlet, Pye writes, “The more [Hamlet] seeks to constitute himself, the more 
his reiterates an originative split within himself; the more he asserts difference from the 
object of revenge, the more he effaces difference.”54 Difference, producing endless 
binaries, finds its absent center in the subject; in gaze-centered approaches to 
epistemology, visibility produces signs of difference. The subject has no true connection 
to the phenomenal world because the split lies within. In contrast to this determination of 
subjectivity via semiotics, Serres’s term, “verbose flesh,” indicates his concern with how 
subjects are, in their Cartesian outlook on the world, addicted to language and experience 
reality mediated through words rather than the senses. Voice as something embodied and 
                                                          
53 Serres, The Five Senses, 94. 
54 Serres, The Five Senses, 111. 
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felt through the senses is important in this context. Thus, Gaunt’s dying voice commands 
attention not through words alone but through “dying breath.”  
 Present in Cartesianism is an implicit distrust of voice, because of “the possibility 
that something might remain hidden, unseen, unsaid.”55 It is this anxiety that, ironically, 
prompts speaking as the instinctive response to skepticism of another’s voice. When the 
queen cries, “O, I am pressed to death / Through want of speaking!” she can no longer 
refrain from expressing anger at the gardener’s prophecies of doom for Richard (3.4.83-
4). There is even some comic potential in the way the queen urges a prompt answer while 
delivering a string of questions that allow the listener no opportunity to respond: “Why 
dost thou say Richard is deposed? / Dar’st thou... / Divine his downfall? Say where, 
when, and how / ...Speak, thou wretch!” (77-80). Performance of this speech, regardless 
of delivery style, must be simultaneously a silencing and a calling to account. It is 
reminiscent of her husband’s earlier response to Gaunt’s prophetic admonitions: “Darest 
with thy frozen admonition / Make pale our cheek...?” (2.1.117-8); likewise, it reiterates 
the overall concern, for those siding with Richard, that an ontological order of subjects be 
the deciding factor in determining who is telling the truth or who has the right to speak. 
Of course, the political nature of such an epistemology, and the extent to which it may be 
negotiated or claimed as a matter of competition, is present in the very first scene of the 
play, in the conflict between Bolingbroke and Mowbray.56  
 Being present in the moment means being by to hear; yet, in a more judicial 
sense, the play is also concerned that a subject be permitted this access in the first place. 
                                                          
55 Smith, 26. 
56 Smith points out how this scene “plays out an aural competition in which Richard is the loser. His failure 
to establish verbal authority in this opening scene--in rhetorical effectiveness, Bolingbroke clearly carries 
the day--predicts the silencing of Richard’s voice in the end” (277). 
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In Act Four, scene one, the Bishop of Carlisle argues on the king’s behalf that 
determinations of guilt require the accused to be within hearing:  
 Thieves are not judged when they are by to hear,  
 Although apparent guilt be seen in them; 
 And shall the figure of God’s majesty, 
 His captain, steward, deputy elect, 
 Anointed, crowned, and planted many years,  
 Be judged by subject and inferior breath  
 And he himself not present? (124-30) 
 
Carlisle argues that a fair and judicial determination of guilt requires the hearing presence 
of the accused. “Apparent guilt” may be seen with the eyes, but sight is insufficient for 
determining guilt, innocence, or any other kind of knowledge. Like the queen, Carlisle 
believes that the ontological order of subjects leads to a corresponding epistemic 
uncertainty when that order is upset. However, unlike her almost comical attempt to pit 
one aural field against another, Carlisle’s speech advocates an orderliness to both 
speaking and listening. Carlisle’s advocacy for listening illustrates how the play’s 
phenomenology of hearing institutes its own ethics of hearing, as well. Richard’s fatal 
flaw as king was his tendency to see problems rather than listen to others. Hearing his 
“True time broke” entails not only recognizing his own limited autonomy, but 
understanding the agency of multiple aural fields in exerting themselves upon a particular 
historical moment. Re-tuning Richard’s ear does not mean curing deafness; his ear was 
always hypersensitive to the wrong cues. Rather, it means learning to listen. 
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 “Disorder’d Clocks”: Augustinian Time and the Devotional Self in George 
Herbert’s The Temple 
  
When George Herbert’s good friend, Nicholas Ferrar, wrote, “The best minds are 
like clocks, that to go right need daily winding up,”1 his words were borne out by the 
“winding up” of daily liturgy in his own home, Little Gidding. Reactions to the structure 
of household worship at Little Gidding were varied and complex, such that “the 
sympathetic among Ferrar's contemporaries applauded the hourly readings as evidence of 
exemplary spiritual fervor while others feared them as the not-very-thin end of the 
Romish monastic wedge.”2 One anonymous detractor described the household devotional 
practices at the Ferrar’s home as a “lip-labour of trolling out the litany four times a day” 
and “promiscuous private prayers all night long,” the latter referring to the household’s 
infamous “Night Watches.”3 Such reactions indicate a certain climate of generalized 
Protestant anxiety about proper times for worship and prayer. Personal or household 
devotions were encouraged by Protestants, but devotional practices that were too 
regulated were suspect. Dohrn-van Rossum notes, “Although it was repeatedly 
emphasized—following the original conceptions—that Christians were not bound to 
specific days and hours in their devotions and prayers, in practical terms all religious 
                                                          
1 Nicholas Ferrar, The Story Books of Little Gidding: Being the Religious Dialogues Recited in the Great 
Room, 1631-2 (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1899), 162. 
2 Joyce Ransome, The Web of Friendship: Nicholas Ferrar and Little Gidding (Cambridge: James Clarke 
& Co., 2011), 67. The latter, unsympathetic reaction is corroborated by the author of The Arminian 
Nunnery (London, 1641) in his description of the household as “monsasticall.” 
3 The Arminian Nunnery: Or, A Briefe Description and Relation of the Late Monasticall Place, called the 
Arminian Nunnery at Little Gidding in Huntington-Shire (London, 1641). 
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ceremonies were given a ‘particular time and hour.’” 4 Some Protestants during the 
height of the Reformation were concerned about “secret masses,” reflecting the fear that 
worship without a “particular time and hour” may be part and parcel of mystery in time 
as well as worship.5 
Calvinist Protestantism has been characterized both as invested in strict 
scheduling and, like the anonymous critic of Little Gidding, wary of timekeeping 
practices that were too ritualistic and smack of Catholicism. The former characterization, 
of course, has been cemented by Max Weber’s depiction of the Protestant work ethic.6 
While examining Protestantism may reveal some internal contradictions in its attitude 
toward timekeeping, George Herbert, in poetry and in life, seems to derive a certain 
consistency in his attitudes toward the spiritual practices of timekeeping precisely 
because he does not easily align with the attitudes of his day. While Herbert’s 
understanding of human nature is decidedly Calvinist, his beliefs about the structuring of 
devotional life and private liturgies are inflected by wider practices, including Arminian. 
Herbert read and admired the devotional works of Catholics such as Francis de Sales and 
Juan Valdesso, including a translation of Valdesso’s Considerations by Ferrar that was 
praised by Herbert.7 Herbert reveals a strong valuation of scheduling in one’s personal 
life, but so do the writings and spiritual practices of his Arminian friend, Nicholas Ferrar. 
Timekeeping as an extension of devotional practice was emphasized by Calvinists and 
Arminians alike. However, Herbert and his inner circle welcomed a higher rigor of 
                                                          
4 Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders, trans. by 
Thomas Dunlap (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 263. 
5 Dohrn-van Rossum, 265.  
6 I will add in the full reference later. 
7 Greg Miller, George Herbert’s “Holy Patterns”: Reforming Individuals in Community (New York: 
Continuum, 2007), 64.  
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frequency and precision in personal liturgy and did not treat such regimen with suspicion 
as betraying an element of Catholic “mystery” or obedience to ritual.8 In describing the 
household liturgies performed at Little Gidding, Ransome notes, “Surviving accounts 
describe these exercises as ‘hourly’ without being absolutely clear if those ‘hours’ were 
literal or canonical,” and “The content of their sessions, as opposed to their frequency, 
excited no such controversy, being impeccably biblical if somewhat unusual.”9 Although 
the religious and cultural context of the seventeenth century places certain of these beliefs 
and spiritual practices in tension, I would argue that their coherence in Herbert’s poetry 
stems from a deeper influence: a theology of time rooted in Augustine.  
  
Timekeeping and the Self 
Pervading George Herbert’s lyrics in The Temple is a deep consciousness of the 
importance of personal timekeeping to spiritual practice. In “Justice” (I), for instance, 
Herbert writes, “My soul doth love thee, yet it loves delay” (l. 12). A common use of the 
clock metaphor in this period, and in Herbert particularly, is to reinforce man’s need for a 
rule of life. Likewise, the fuller context of Nicholas Ferrars’ comparison of clocks and 
minds, referenced in the opening of this chapter, highlights the need for routines and 
schedules, “perpetual motions,” to ground being in virtuous habit: 
The best minds are like Clocks, that to goe right need dayly winding up. There be 
some very long, but no perpetual motions to be found. Many grounds there be of 
longer continuance in some kind of good things, but in the end there alwaies an 
abandoning of them, but where the Necessities of giving accompt holds forcibly. 
And where this Necessitie lyeth hard there may evidently be observed a greater 
                                                          
8 Of clocks in the Ferrar household, Ransome notes that he “reinforced his metaphor of the mind as clock 
or watch by providing within the house some sort of timepiece in every room as well as a clock with a 
sonorous bell to summon participants at appropriate times. He also placed sundials on three sides of the 
church tower, each with an appropriate motto” (65, 66). 
9 Ransome, 66 and 67. 
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progresse to be made by dull capacities then by the most excellent witts that may 
be found, if left at randome to their own libertie.10  
 
Ferrars’ concern for consistency and regularity as a means of giving an account of one’s 
time holds with Herbert’s general advice in “The Church-porch,” where Herbert includes 
a metaphor very similar to that of Ferrars. Here, he compares regular times for reflection 
and devotion to the winding of one’s watch:  
      if with thy watch, that too 
Be down, then winde up both; since we shall be 
Most surely judg’d, make thy accounts agree. (ll. 453-5) 
 
As if anticipating accusations of legalism that might arise in response to this primarily 
didactic poem, Herbert defends a life of rule-following by linking the need for rules with 
the nature of man: 
Slight those who say amidst their sickly healths, 
Thou liv’st by rule. What doth not so, but man? 
Houses are built by rule, and common-wealths. 
Entice the trusty sunne, if that you can, 
 From his Ecliptick line: becken the skie. 
 Who lives by rule then, keeps good companie. (ll. 133-138) 
 
To misunderstand the laws which govern man for the good is like believing that the sun 
can be drawn out of the path of its daily circuit. Thus far, Herbert agrees with Ferrars 
about the need for regularity in daily life as a spiritual necessity and that “Man is a shop 
of rules, a well truss’d pack,/ Whose every parcell under-writes a law” (ll. 141-142). 
If minds and souls are so closely aligned with clocks, it is clear why a well-
running clock would be a useful invention for these moral purposes. However, I would 
argue that these examples of outward action enabling spiritual practice (what modern 
society might refer to as habit formation) are necessary but not sufficient to a holistic 
                                                          
10 Ferrar, The Story Books of Little Gidding, 162. 
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understanding of the soul in time, as it is represented in Herbert’s poetry. For Herbert, 
clockwork subjectivity addresses the central question, posed with particular precision by 
Augustine, of whether time can be measured by and within the self.11 This is the missing, 
integrative vision that Augustine’s version of time supplies, since Augustinian time also 
implicates a thorough doctrine of the soul. If man’s “every parcel under-writes a law,” 
then one might suppose that the clock-like regulating of daily life guarantees a well-
ordered inner man and that this order extends to the soul’s experience of time. However, 
more nuance is required to show how Herbert follows Augustine’s lead; in both, the 
experience of a wholly unified self, at presence with itself and with God, only exists 
beyond a vanishing horizon. Even in prayer, as my analyses of “Evensong” and “Church-
monuments” to come will demonstrate, the soul may be distracted, even fragmented. No 
matter how well-regulated the patterns of life, the disorienting effect on temporal 
consciousness is inevitable. In “Justice” (II), for example, there are spiritual 
consequences to “lov[ing] delay” (l. 11). A few lines prior, the speaker laments, “My 
prayers mean thee, yet my prayers stray.” Delay in this poem is not merely literal but 
reads as a spiritual category that exceeds the rule-derived category of personal 
timekeeping. 
Augustine has a term for this in Book 11 of Confessions. It is the experience of 
distentio animi, or a distention of the soul. Because our minds are only able to process 
moment by moment, the only real moment is the indivisible present; thus, even past and 
future may be described in terms of a certain mental ordering that occurs only in the 
                                                          
11 Ricouer writes, “…the thesis that time is ‘in’ the soul and finds ‘in’ the soul the principle of the 
measurement of time, is sufficient in itself inasmuch as it replies to the aporias found within the notion of 
time,” Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984), 22. 
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present. This is Augustine’s notion of a “threefold present,” the means whereby time is 
translated in the mind via expectation (the present of the future), memory (the present of 
the past), and attention (the present of the present).12 However, distentio animi is more 
than just the effect of time on the soul, whereby the soul is stretched out; it is the mind’s 
effort to overcome its own temporal lack. It is only when time is compared with eternity 
that time is recognized as something bounded by non-being and absence, and therefore, 
the stress of distentio is felt.13 Andrea Nightingale points out, “The key cause of this 
tension [between time and eternity] is the temporalization of the human being (which is 
the punishment for sin).”14 We have no means of describing consciousness except in 
terms that are inherently temporal, such that a superficial understanding of Augustine’s 
version of time might give the impression of being virtually indistinct from God’s 
eternity.15 What distinguishes human consciousness from the divine is that God 
experiences all moments at once.16 The human present is marked out and distinguished 
by the non-being of the past and future, but God’s eternal present, constituting 
unbounded, pure being, needs no such distinctions to define it.  
                                                          
12 Ricouer, 9.  
13 Ricouer states, “It is the recoil effect of this ‘comparison’ [of time with eternity] on the living experience 
of the distentio animi that makes the thought of eternity the limiting idea against the horizon of which the 
experience of the distentio animi receives, on the ontological level, the negative mark of a lack or a defect 
in being” (26). 
14 Andrea Nightingale, Once Out of Time: Augustine on Time and the Body (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2011): 110. 
15 See Richard Sorabji for further discussion of Augustine’s psychological time. Time, Creation, and the 
Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1983), 
29. 
16 See Hermann Hausheer, “St. Augustine's Conception of Time,” The Philosophical Review 46.5 (1937). 
Hausheer comments, “Whereas human consciousness always knows exactly at which point of its 
unwinding activity it is, divine consciousness is unchangeably self-subsisting on its level.”: 509.  
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Insofar as all times are figured to be the mind’s emanations in the the irreducible 
present moment, the now, the present moment is bounded by non-being on both sides.17 
Augustine raises the problem of whether the past or future may truly be said to have 
being: “If, therefore, the present’s only claim to be called ‘time’ is that it is slipping away 
into the past, how can we assert that this thing is, when its only title to being is that it will 
soon case to be? In other words, we cannot really say that time exists, except because it 
tends to non-being.”18 The present is an irreducible moment that escapes measurement; 
however, the present only achieves its status as the present by ceaselessly flowing into 
the past. The future, equally ephemeral, only comes into being in the moment that it 
becomes the present. Theorist Paul Ricouer notes how Augustine builds his discourse on 
the human experience of time by introducing an aporia, a logical impasse, only to 
“resolve” this complexity by introducing a yet deeper aporia.19 Human inability to truly 
measure moments as they pass, apart from their mental effects, is what Paul Ricouer 
identifies as the central aporia of time that Augustine attempts to resolve.20  Our minds 
sense the passage of time whether an object is moving, interrupted, or at rest, and 
therefore, measuring the duration of an object’s movement through space does not 
express the measurement of time or our relationship to time, according to Aristotle’s 
theory that time is the measurement of motion.21   
                                                          
17 Paul Ricouer, Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, Trans. by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pallauer (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 7-16. 
18 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 11.14.17. 
19 Ricouer, 5. 
20 Ricouer, “The notion of distentio animi, coupled with intentio, is only slowly and painfully sifted out 
from the major aporia with which Augustine is struggling, that of the measurement of time. This aporia 
itself, however, is inscribed within the circle of an aporia that is even more fundamental, that of the being 
or the nonbeing of time. For what can be measured is only what, in some way, exists,” 7. 
21 Confessions, 11.24.31, “Therefore, if the motion of an object is one thing, and the standard by which we 
measure its duration another, is it not obvious which of the two has the stronger claim to be called time? 
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This paradoxical relationship between being and nonbeing is only addressed, 
according to Ricouer, by reconciling the immanence of distentio with the mental action of 
intentio.22 Both are temporal concepts, but distentio carries the weight of lack even as it 
stretches out the soul in a hollow parallel of eternity. Augustine’s concern with the 
question of how to describe time, if not with respect to measurement and duration, is not 
one he resolves in any way that re-establishes a strong foundation of chronological time 
or linearity, in part because he does not view spatial motion as a reference point for the 
measurement of time. Instead, he turns to a more nuanced model of the soul, in which 
temporality derives meaning and through which we may understand the passage of time. 
By enlisting the language of Paul in Philippians 3:12-14, Augustine attempts to resolve 
the problems he raised about measurement and duration in the beginning of Book 11 and 
to, at the same time, determine the means of overcoming distention. “Forgetting the past 
and moving not toward future things that are transitory but into the things that are 
before—not being distended but extended [non distentus sed extentus], and not in the 
mode of distention but with active-attention [non secundum distentionem, sed secundum 
intentionem]” (11.29.39).23  
I would argue that “Sin” (II), “Evensong,” and “Church-monuments” may be read 
as a group of three. Where “Evensong” depicts the central crisis, “Church-monuments” 
provides the resolution. “Sin” (II), paradoxically concerned with sin’s insubstantiality and 
the speaker’s corresponding need to see it, ends with a pun on “perspective.” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Moreover, if the motion is irregular, so that the object is sometimes moving and sometimes stationary, we 
measure not only its motion but also its stationary periods[...].” 
22 See Ricouer, 16-22. 
23 It is useful to compare translations here. Maria Boulder translates this passage in the following way:  
“...forgetting the past and stretching undistracted not to future things doomed to pass away, but to my 
eternal goal. With no distracted mind but with focused attention I press on to the prize of our heavenly 
calling [...].” 
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“Evensong,” as we have seen, is primarily retrospective. Meanwhile, the subsequent 
poem, “Church-monuments,” the dissolution of the self, the body, and even time, in part 
by using the metaphor of flesh as an hourglass through which time descends. In each of 
these poems, the speaker’s relationship with God is bound on all sides by nonbeing, by 
all the places God seems to be absent. Similarly, true perspective is limited by false 
perception, a theme built into the images of the mirror in “Sinne” (II), the ebony box in 
“Evensong,” and the return to dust of both bodies and inscriptions in “Church 
Monuments.” The expectations of devotional life conveyed in these poems imply a 
relationship between one’s spiritual life and one’s experience of time. As the speaker 
posits himself as a devotional self, these positions also limit the speaker in time, driving 
him to the most singular moment of the present as the closest possibility for communion 
with God. In the sections that follow, I will examine the speaker’s experience of time 
from an Augustinian time in “Even-song” and “Church-monuments”; commentary on the 
Augustinian context of sin and being in “Sinne” (II) which grounds the notion of time in 
the other two poems will be threaded throughout. 
In contrast to God’s eternal present, in “Evensong,” the human mind is its own 
clock, both measuring time as time unwinds and needing its own winding to properly 
mark it. Our measuring of time may be faulty, but the human mind’s innate capacity to 
measure time is part of the created order. The implication, as in “The Church-porch” 
(ll.451-456), that one’s watch may need winding in order to “make thy accounts agree,” 
or, as in “Evensong,” that “disorder’d clocks” must receive new wheels, assumes a 
disorder in one’s sense of time, even in the midst of scheduling and repeated action. 
Temporal disorder, ultimately mental and spiritual, has a direct effect on the speaker’s 
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relationship to the spiritual tasks, such as prayer and confession, which patterns of daily 
prayer, in the rhythms of liturgical time, are meant to fulfill. 
My argument leads later in this chapter to an examination of dissolution in 
“Church-monuments”; I argue that this poem enacts a tension between two modes of 
Augustinian time: distention, or the self being pulled apart and stretched by time, and 
intention, a kind of self-cohesion experienced in the present as it passes. Clock-time 
provides its users with a means of marking time in ever-increasingly small units of 
measurement. However, by Augustine’s view, time is also measured within the self; if the 
soul is driven by external measures of time but unable to measure time in the inner man, 
scheduling and keeping time are vexed endeavors, leading to fragmenting, not peace or 
union with the divine. The next section begins with a reading of “Evensong,” followed by 
“Church Monuments.” I adopt this out-of-order approach because the Augustinian 
version of time that resonates in Herbert is illustrated particularly clearly in “Evensong.”  
 
“Evensong” 
By centering his meditation on the superiority of day versus night, the speaker in 
George Herbert's "Even-song" raises the question of how and when God's grace 
intervenes in the life of the believer. Evidently, this intervention is continual, since with 
each new day, God puts "our amendment in our way/ And give new wheels to our 
disorder'd clocks" (ll. 23-24). This striking image of the metaphorical human clock and 
its need for adjustment recalls Francis de Sales' comparison of regular times of prayer in 
the daily life of a Christian to a mechanical clock’s need for consistent repair:  
No clock, no matter how well-made, can avoid needing to be wound or adjusted 
twice a day, morning and evening. Then beyond that, at least once a year the 
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clock must be completely taken apart, to remove any rust that may have appeared, 
to reshape any parts that have been damaged, and to repair the parts that are 
worn.24 
 
Sales uses precise mechanical imagery to develop an analogy to spiritual entropy. A life 
of daily, habitual prayer is needed because the natural state of the soul is to wear down 
and become more worldly and sinful. This passage in Introduction to the Devout Life 
would most likely have been familiar to Herbert; the devotional treatise was a favorite at 
Little Gidding.
25 Sales admonishes his reader, or “he who is truly concerned about his 
dear soul,” that he “must wind it up before God at night and in the morning following the 
exercises described above.”26 However, even given the precise recommendations Sales 
gives for prayer and meditation, he does not emphasize a particular schedule for prayer. 
Max Engammare observes that Sales in this passage “had no interest in clocks as 
instruments to measure time but simply as mechanisms that needed to be cared for.”
27 As 
a metaphor for the soul, Sales’ clockwork imagery is therefore almost exclusively 
concerned with the mechanical nature of clockwork rather than its use as a device for 
keeping time. Regularity is important in the upkeep of the soul; however, the passage of 
time is not acknowledged as essential to its purpose.
28 By contrast, the “disorder’d 
clocks” of “Evensong” do not merely concern inner workings, repetition and recurrence, 
                                                          
24 qtd. in Max Engammare, Time, Punctuality, and Discipline in Early Modern Calvinism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 241. 
25 Louis Martz, The Poetry of Meditation: A Study in English Religious Literature of the Seventeenth 
Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 126. 
26 qtd. in Engammare, 241. 
27 Engammare, 241. 
28 See pp. 240-242 in Engammare for a fuller commentary on this passage, including ways in which Sales 
overlooks precise temporal wording. Engammare’s purpose is to contrast Sales’ spiritual analogy with the 
strict scheduling practices of Geneva. The example of Sales illustrates that, while regular, recurring 
spiritual disciplines were emphasized in the lives of both Protestants and Catholics alike (to name two ends 
of a broad spectrum), Catholic practice seems to place less of an emphasis on scheduling one’s spiritual and 
secular life down to the minute. 
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but also the purpose (telos) of the clock as a timekeeping device. For Herbert, human 
consciousness is decidedly temporal.  
In “Evensong,” the speaker’s main preoccupation concerns day and night and 
“which shows more love” from God (l. 25). In mirroring motion throughout the poem, 
the gifts of each, day and night, are placed in opposition: labor and rest, work and grace. 
In title and in theme, “Evensong” ties devotional life to recurrence and to the communal 
life of the church as a body of worshippers. In fact, “Mattens,” after all, comes only a few 
poems before. Rickey situates “Evensong” as the last in a group of seven, which, “like its 
companion pieces, interprets certain of the Propers for Whitsuntide.”
29 Continuing this 
argument, “Evensong” is focused on what would have been the reading for Whitsunweek 
Monday, John 3, with Herbert’s “God of love” in the first stanza resonating with John 
3:16, “For God so loved the world.” In the poem’s first stanza, these elements of divine 
love from the gospel passage combine with the elements of thanksgiving prayer present 
in the service of evensong.
30 Likewise, Wilcox points out that the service of prayer at 
evensong involves a “twin motivation of confession and praise,” two mirroring modes of 
prayer.
31 Prayer is something that creates and sustains a rhythm of spiritual life, 
organizing one’s day as well as one’s approach to God. For Christians of all traditions, 
the means of grace are to be regular and recurring; time is marked by regular prayer, by 
liturgy, and by the church calendar. In “Evensong,” however, it is not repetition and 
recurrence, in and of themselves, that unite the believer to Christ; it is what they reveal 
                                                          
29 Mary Ellen Rickey, Utmost Art: Complexity in the Verse of George Herbert (University of Kentucky 
Press, 1966),169. 
30 See Rickey, 169-170. 
31 Helen Wilcox, The English Poems of George Herbert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
230. 
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about the reality of God's presence in the now. I would argue that Herbert’s temporality is 
not liturgical in its essence and theology and that his temporality is actually closer to 
Calvinism as an extension of Augustinian time. 
Arguably, prayer for Herbert stitches together the increasingly separate and 
purified spheres of labor and devotion, measured time and the time of divine grace. 
Herbert lived and wrote during a period of unprecedented increase in the technological 
precision of clockwork of all kinds, leading to sharp contrasts between the carefully 
measured, instrumental value of time and temporalities connecting human and divine. 
From a divine perspective, grace is ever-present, not divvied up into measured minutes. 
Nevertheless, human beings are confined to hours and minutes, as well as cycles of day 
and night, work and rest. The breakdown of that human clockwork, the soul, is not 
merely a mechanical breakdown, and “amendment” is not merely mechanical in the same 
way any machine might eventually need repair. The breakdown speaks to the nature of 
the clock as timekeeping device; amendment is needed, not just because human beings 
sin, but because souls dwell in created time and therefore experience time differently than 
God.  
The role of “liturgy” of any form in early modern religion is a complicated affair. 
Protestantism did not replace communal worship with individual devotional life, and 
Calvinism and Arminianism existed both within and without the formal structures of the 
English church. However, there are differences in how and whether lay devotion is 
inscribed within the system and practices of the church.
32 Advances in timekeeping 
                                                          
32 For example, Eamon Duffy calls the Book of Hours “not so much a rival to the religion of the official 
church as an aspect of it, cementing the lay devotee more closely to the institution by encouraging him or 
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technology during Herbert’s era illustrate the drive to rationally order time; however, 
presuppositions about temporal order reveal many competing theologies. Engammare 
associates liturgical time with cyclical time in observing that Calvin’s “understanding of 
time...did not emphasize the eternal round, perhaps because his time was not primarily 
liturgical.”
33 Dohrn-van Rossum notes that “The intention of the Reformers was to secure 
the greatest possible attention and participation for a smaller number of masses by fixing 
them precisely in time.” At least in early Calvinism, order was not theologically 
important; its importance arose from its utilitarian value in furthering the internalizing of 
belief.
34 On the other hand, Rosendale posits English liturgical form as a means of 
preserving an internal communal order against the “burgeoning multiplicity of unruly 
English individualisms” that England projected as a nation after the Reformation. “Upon 
the inexorable flow of time and quotidian events, it imposed a vision of divinely 
sanctioned time which transcended the uncontrollable linearity of the daily by touching 
the eternal.”
35 Daily, private prayer as well as liturgy can both reinforce the communal 
and structure interior life. The framework and placement of Herbert’s “Evensong” in a 
liturgically resonant sequence does express this “touching [of] the eternal”; however, in 
the temporal theology of the poem, divine time does not erupt into human time. Instead, 
quotidian structures reveal where human experience and consciousness fall short of 
recognizing the time in which God is already present. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
her to participate in its formal worship.” Marking the Hours: English People and Their Prayers, 1240-1570 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 59. 
33 Engammare, 12. 
34 See Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders, trans. by 
Thomas Dunlap (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 264. 
35 Timothy Rosendale, Liturgy and Literature in the Making of Protestant England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39. 
92 
 While “Evensong,” like Sales’ discussion of prayer and clockwork, implies the 
necessity of regular upkeep of the soul by the believer, Herbert’s “new wheels to our 
disorder’d clocks” is involved in a larger temporal schema that assumes not only 
consistency and regularity but rational predictability of divine providence, mirroring the 
operations of day and night. Herbert’s poem indicates a concern for keeping time, not 
merely by emphasizing the patterns of morning and evening prayer but most particularly 
through the implication that God’s love is present and available in every moment: “Not 
one poor minute scapes thy breast, but brings a favour from above” (ll. 30-1). This 
emphasis on all time being God’s time reveals a Calvinist view of providence and grace 
being continual. Calvin writes in the Institutes: 
This very might lead us to ponder his eternity; for he from whom all things 
draw their origin must be eternal and have beginning from himself. Furthermore, 
if the cause is sought by which he was led once to create all these things, and is 
now moved to preserve them we shall find that it is his goodness alone. But this 
being the sole cause, it ought still to be more than sufficient to draw us to his love, 
inasmuch as there is no creature, as the prophet declares, upon whom God’s 
mercy has not been poured out [Ps. 145:9; cf. Ecclus 18:11; 18:9, Vg.].36  
 
Less austere than his reputation for work ethic might imply, Calvin’s doctrine 
here conveys that God’s love continually intervenes to uphold creation moment by 
moment. This model of God’s relationship to creation is opposed to the concept of a 
clockwork universe that, once set in motion, operates according to its own laws and is 
self-maintaining. For Calvin, there is a clear relationship between God’s initial act of 
creation and the sustaining acts of providence motivated by his love, a philosophy of time 
and history drawn from Augustine. The smallest division of moments, such as “one poor 
                                                          
36 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles and ed. John T. McNeill 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 59. 
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minute,” is important within Calvinism because God is acting in every moment to guide 
or preserve. 
Herbert’s “ebony box” (l. 21), only a few lines before “disorder’d clocks” (l. 24) 
has its own effect on the temporality of the poem. Critics almost universally agree that 
the “ebony box” has some resonance of sleep, death, or both; thus much is certainly clear 
from context and the lyric’s recurring motifs of day and night.
37 Others see the box as an 
image of enclosure and containment, prevalent throughout The Temple.
38 This strand of 
interpretation situates the image among its larger thematic uses but ignores its 
particularity, especially as it stands in relation to the moving parts of the clock metaphor 
only a few lines later. In keeping with other images of the box in The Temple, it is 
possible to read more technology into this metaphor. For example, in Vertue, “Sweet 
spring,” in keeping with the other “sweets” of preceding stanzas, indicates the season of 
spring and its potentiality.
39 However, one critic has made the argument that the “box 
where sweets compacted lie” also has the resonance of a music box.
40 The “spring,” or 
spring drive mechanism found within a music box, drives the music’s “closes” (l. 11). 
This more material gloss of the metaphor complements and enhances the first meaning, 
since, like the season, the box depends upon a precise timing for its sweetness to be 
                                                          
37 Wilcox identifies four levels of reference for the ebony box: 1) containment or enclosure; 2) the 
medicinal properties of ebony; 3) a coffin, associated with death and sleep; and 4) a “place of repose” 
likened to Christ’s tomb (The English Poems of George Herbert, 233). 
38 Frank Huntley defends this interpretation in “George Herbert and the Image of Violent Containment,” 
George Herbert Journal 8.1 (1984): 17. See also Robert Higbie, “Images of Enclosure in George Herbert’s 
The Temple,” Texas Studies in Language and Literature 15 (1974): 268-279. 
39 On this level of interpretation, Wilcox describes line 10 as conveying “the potential for sweetness 
enclosed in spring and enjoyed in that season, though only fully released in summer” (318). 
40 Michael F. Moloney, “A Suggested Gloss for Herbert’s ‘Box Where Sweets Compacted Lie,” Notes and 
Queries 1 (1954): 50. Moloney quotes Percy A. Scholes, The Oxford Companion to Music (London, 1950) 
in enumerating a mechanical virginal owned by Henry VIII and, in the gift of Elizabeth, “an organ with 
carillon combined operated by keyboard, or by touching a spring, and also by the automatic action of a 
clock...which released the spring every six hours.” 
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released. This interpretation of Vertue is dependent on reading spring in connection with 
the box of sweets and attributing more material precision to both. A more concrete 
vehicle, even a technological one, does not prevent a conceit from unfolding meaning in 
the poem or limit possibilities for interpretation. Similarly, the ebony box, often read as a 
self-contained conceit, can be read in connection with disordered clocks as a 
technologically resonant metaphor. The spring drive, the same mechanism that enabled 
the compactness and portability of the music box, also enabled the table clock, common 
since its invention around 1430.
41 
 In modern parlance, a black box is a part of a system that cannot be observed; it 
has come to mean any knowledge that is bracketed off or inaccessible. Only the input and 
output of a black box can be read, not its internal workings. There is also a temporality 
inherent to the scientific concept of a black box because, as methodology, the black box 
involves a deferral of knowledge. Michel Serres writes, “When we do not understand, 
when we defer our knowledge to a later date, when the thing is too complex for the 
means at hand, when we put everything in a temporary black box, we prejudge the 
existence of a system.”42 In Herbert’s poem, the system being presupposed is God’s 
grace and its operations, which always exceed the speaker’s limited understanding, 
informed by notions of work and debt (ll. 9-12). Clockwork in this period, as metaphor 
for the universe or nature, came to represent the hiddenness of causes: the internal 
mechanism, concealed from view, which enabled the turn of clock hands. Feldhay 
observes, “The clock metaphor related observable natural phenomena (clock hands) to 
                                                          
41 Eric Bruton, Clocks and Watches: 1400-1900 (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 191. 
42 Michel Serres, The Parasite, Trans. by Lawrence R. Schehr (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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invisible mechanisms (clock weights and wheels) variously posited as ‘explanations’ or 
‘causes’ of the phenomena, or at least as ‘hypotheses’ about those causes.”
43
Just as 
endless diurnal cycles may be counted on and predicted, they also ensure that there is 
always a night to limit the horizon of human sight. Likewise, there is a rational 
predictability to God’s grace and providence; these may be known, but not beyond a 
certain horizon of human understanding.  
Similarly, the ebony box indicates hiddenness from both divine and human 
perspectives. From man’s perspective “inclosed” in the ebony box, God’s providential 
purposes are hidden; outside of it, man’s sin is hidden from God’s sight. In keeping with 
this reading, the Thus of “Thus in the ebony box / Thou does inclose us” is not merely a 
logical continuation of the last line of the preceding stanza, “Henceforth repose; your 
work is done” (l. 20), implying that God imposes a rest from sin, works, and the troubled 
labor of devotional reflection upon both. This is certainly the case, but the resolution also 
proceeds from the second stanza, in which the speaker describes the blindness God 
adopts with respect to human sin.   
  But much more blest be God above, 
 
    Who gave me sight alone, 
  Which to himself he did denie: 
  For when he sees my waies, I dy: 
But I have got his sonne, and he hath none. (ll. 4-8) 
 
In this case, “your work is done” also carries the sense that God, in grace, declares the 
speaker’s imperfect works “done” because the speaker has the Son. It may be tempting to 
read these lines as a rushed anticipation of something not fully realized in the speaker's 
                                                          
43 Rivka Feldhay. “Religion.” The Cambridge History of Science, Volume 3: Early Modern Science. Ed. 
Katherine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 749. 
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relationship with God. Does God really deny himself sight of the speaker's sin? Helen 
Vendler observes a “palpable falsity” in lines 4-8 on the part of the speaker, which, 
“evident in their logical exclusiveness as well as in their apparent complacency—ensures 
their insufficiency as a solution to Herbert's own remorse.”44 I disagree with Vendler 
here in part because I see the logic of these lines resolving precisely by means of the 
“Ebony box,” read not simply as rest or refuge for the speaker but also as a manifestation 
of divine grace. In theological terms, there is no game here; that the speaker “has” the 
Son is the reason God chooses to not see sin in the speaker. God has no need of the sun 
that divides day from night, since He dwells in eternity; as Vendler rightfully 
acknowledges, this does not rob God of any light, since He is Himself the source of 
light.
45 However, this view of Christ eclipses the sins of the speaker, and the redemptive 
reality of Christ’s death and resurrection is also an eternal reality. For both senses of 
“sun/Son,” God chooses to look upon the eternal, not the temporal.  
Such a reading ascribes profound intentionality to God's “inclosing” humanity; 
arguably, this implies more than the daily round of sleep and renewal. God adopts a 
forced perspective in hiding man’s sins from His view, yet this forced perspective cannot 
endure past death. This perspective of “hiddenness” is echoed by another Herbert poem, 
Colossians 3:3, a gloss on “My life is hid with Christ in God,” where the “double motion” 
of the speaker’s physical and spiritual lives create two temporal and directional paths: the 
first straight and “diurnall,” tending toward earth, and the second “obliquely bend[ing]” 
toward Christ.46 Just as this poem ends with the hope that the second temporality will 
                                                          
44 Helen Vendler, The Poetry of George Herbert (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 158. 
45 Vendler, 159. 
46 See Chauncey Wood, “A Reading of Col. 3:3,” The George Herbert Journal 2.2 (1979): 15-24. 
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overtake the first, in “Evensong,” there is a note of futurity in the promise of “new wheels 
to our disorder'd clocks,” such that “day” conveys both the day at hand and an 
unspecified final “day” after death, when such adjustments to our spiritual gears will be 
permanent. The grace that conceals the speaker’s sin through God disavowing sight of 
that sin (ll. 5-6) and the grace that provides rest from fruitless spiritual labor both meet in 
the image of the ebony box. 
In Herbert’s “Evensong,” time, whether worked out as order, sequence, or 
repetition are not the means of spiritual ascent; rather, these expressions of time reveal 
the limits of human consciousness in recognizing God’s presence in the now. Martz is 
among those who ties “Even-song” to practices of morning and evening self-examination, 
emphasized in devotional treatises of the time. He views the poem unfolding “in a 
manner similar to that recommended by the handbooks, which suggest that the nightly 
examination of conscience be preceded by a reckoning of benefits received and a 
thanksgiving for them.”47 However, Martz's reading applies most directly to the first half 
of the poem (the first sixteen lines). In these lines, the speaker follows the devotional 
form by thanking God for “eyes, and light, and power” (l. 2) the provisions of the day; 
notably, however, the speaker's analysis leads to frustration and, of itself, is insufficient 
to resolve the “balls of wilde-fire to [his] troubled mind” (l. 16).The backward-looking 
glance of devotional form provides the opportunity to recognize sins and futility; 
however, relief and resolution are not found in the form itself or in its repetition but in the 
turn toward the ever-present moment of grace. 
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This orientation of time that supplies the poem’s resolution is Augustinian in 
nature. The preoccupation with perspective in “Even-song” is continued from “Sinne” 
(II), the previous poem in the sequence, which conveys a distinctively Augustinian 
account of sin: “Sinne is flat opposite to th’ Almighty, seeing / It wants the good of 
vertue, and of being” (ll. 4-5).48 Augustine’s doctrine of sin is like his concept of time; 
both rest on an understanding of being and nonbeing tied to consciousness. In “Sinne” 
(II), sin has no substance of its own but is able to produce an effect, like an impression on 
the senses, which shapes perspective. While it was noted earlier that the ebony box in 
“Even-song” plays with the idea of concealment and hidden perspective, “Sinne” (II) 
explores the doctrinal implications of “seeing” sin, a nothing. Wilcox notes that there is 
most likely a punning meaning of “perspective”/“prospective” in the last lines: “Yet as in 
sleep we see foul death, and live: / So devils are our sins in perspective” (ll. 9-10). Like 
his doctrine of sin, Augustine’s concept of time also rests upon an understanding of being 
and nonbeing tied to consciousness, and Herbert’s poetry follows suit in its doctrine of 
time, mirroring Augustine’s departure from the Aristotelian account of time as the 
measurement of motion.49 
 However, while “Sinne” (II) explores the doctrinal implications of “seeing” sin, 
“Even-song” explores the both the orderliness and the limits of devotional practice.  This 
apparent contradiction echoes Herbert’s admonition in “The Church-porch” to “Summe 
up at night, what thou hast done by day / And in the morning, what thou hast to do” (ll. 
                                                          
48 Wilcox cites Confessions 7.18 as a doctrinal influence on Herbert’s depiction of sin as nothingness in 
“Sinne” (II): “whatsoever is, is good. That evil then . . . is not any substance: for were it a substance, it 
should be good.” The English Poems of George Herbert, 52. 
49 Gareth B. Matthews points out that the theory of time in Confessions is markedly different from that of 
City of God, where Augustine appears to be more in line with Aristotle. Augustine (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 82.  
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451-452). Again, Herbert’s blueprint for twice-daily prayer and meditation mirrors the 
devotional handbooks of his time. Summing up one’s deeds at the end of the day is 
retrospective and therefore analytical, but in the morning, it is prospective. The order of 
these motions are reversed in “Sin” (II) and “Evensong,” with the retrospective framing 
of “Evensong” coming after “Sin” (II). In “Evensong,” there is the promise of 
“amendment” (l. 24), and the diurnal pattern of reflection and rest contained in the poem 
suggests the hope of a new day. Reflection on sins and shortcomings, which involves 
analyzing whether one has spent his time wisely, is necessary but not sufficient for 
renewal, and while the speaker in “Sinne” (II) desires to see his sin aright, the speaker in 
“Evensong” almost seems to have achieved this correct sight. After all, the gifts of the 
day are “eyes, and light, and power” (ll. 2), and he has received sight of his own sins that 
God denies to himself (ll. 5-8): “Thy diet, care, and cost / Do end in bubbles, balls of 
winde” (ll. 13-14). 
Since the indivisible present moment is the only orientation of time that escapes 
measurement, it is the closest to eternity. God is therefore the author of time but does not 
dwell in it. Thus, when Herbert says of God, “Not one poore minute scapes thy breast, 
/ But brings a favour from above,” he uses accommodated language to represent man's 
understanding of God's grace dispensed, as its recipient perceives it, moment-by-moment. 
From a divine perspective, grace is ever-present, not divvied up into measured minutes. 
Nevertheless, human beings are confined to hours and minutes, as well as cycles of day 
and night, work and rest. The breakdown of that human clockwork, the soul, is not 
merely a mechanical breakdown, and “amendment” is not merely mechanical in the same 
way any machine might eventually need repair. The breakdown speaks to the nature of 
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the clock as timekeeping device. Amendment is needed because human souls no longer 
fulfill the telos of created time. Engammare explains that “for Calvin time is not 
measured by the passing of the hours but by the presence or absence of God, mirrored by 
human faith or unbelief.”
50 This presence is not only what restores the “disorder’d clock” 
of the human soul—harried, sinning, and recognizing futility in its own labors—but it is 
also what restores the speaker to a recognition that God’s rest is everywhere. The next-to-
last stanza posits this rest in a slower cadence that forces the reader to contemplate the 
dialectic relationships of supposed opposites: day/night, gale/harbour, walk/arbour, and 
garden/grove. It has been noted that these oppositions grow increasingly less distinct, 
until garden and grove seem more alike than oppositional. Put another way, it might be 




If “Evensong” moves toward harmony and the kind of self-presence that 
Augustine identifies as so elusive for the human soul, the next poem, “Church-
monuments,” complicates this move toward unity and synchronicity. Where “Evensong” 
is concerned with finding God’s presence in the now by means of recurring spiritual 
practices, “Church-monuments” introduces a tension in the speaker’s experience of time 
that it does not fully resolve. Although the poem does not include a “clock” as such, the 
central conceit of the final stanza does employ another timekeeping device—an 
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Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth Century Literature (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1972), 163-164.  
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hourglass. The discord between the measurement of time and God’s eternity occurs once 
again; in this poem, it is portrayed in the human inability to properly “mark” dissolving 
boundaries of meaning, or to make time cohere as a unified experience. As the poem 
moves toward its memento mori resolution, paralleling the crumbling of stone 
monuments with the body’s continual descent toward death, flesh is an hourglass through 
which the dust of existence disappears. As Joseph Summers has illustrated, this conceit is 
everywhere echoed in the formal aspects of the poem, particularly as “the sentences sift 
down through the rhyme scheme skeleton of the stanzas like sand through the glass.”52 
As the poem mirrors the body’s return to dust at every turn, it imitates Augustine’s 
paradoxical (Ricouer would call them aporetic) meditations on whether time can be 
measured in the soul. In the argument that follows, I place the poem’s enactment of 
dissolution in conversation with Augustine’s temporal categories of distention (distentio) 
and intention (intentio), both psychological modes of experiencing time and both 
entailing opposing, yet interdependent, spiritual realities.  
In addition to completing an arc beginning with “Sinne” (II) and “Even-song,” 
“Church-monuments” also marks a transitional moment in The Temple, inaugurating a 
series of poems focused on the structure to spirituality afforded by the Church. These 
poems are “Church-musick,” “Church-lock and key,” “The Church-floore,” and “The 
Windows.”53 In this series, individual liturgies are employed to convey spiritual realities 
of the Church as a whole. A good deal of critical discussion of George Herbert’s 
“Church-monuments” focuses on the “dissolution” of bodies and inscriptions in line 10, 
therefore turning upon the movements in the poem that lead to a collapse in 
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representation. Herbert scholars as diverse as Stanley Fish, Joseph Summers, and Barbara 
Leah Harman recognize “dissolution” (l. 10) of the self, the body, and even time as most 
central to “Church-monuments,” both in form and theme. Commenting on this poem, 
Stanley Fish observes that “to read many of Herbert’s poems is to experience the 
dissolution of the lines of demarcation we are accustomed to think of as real.”54 This 
comment usefully closes in on the poem’s tendency to dissolve boundaries and signs 
before meaning can be fixed. While the poem finds its center in a complex conceit 
exploring how bodies (in dust and ashes) measure time, Herbert’s concern with how the 
soul measures time should not be overlooked.  
According to Augustine, humans “are pulled many ways by multifarious 
distractions” (11.29.39). The enactment of dissolution in “Church-monuments,” I would 
argue, resembles Augustine’s concept of distentio, the experience of being spread out in 
time and a mental effect of the fall. Its spiritual and temporal contrast is intentio, or 
intention, which may also be translated as “active attention” or “concentration.” Intentio 
opposes the “tearing apart” of distentio with a “flowing together.” Says Augustine in 
Book 11 of Confessions, “In the most intimate depths of my soul my thoughts are torn to 
fragments by tempestuous changes until that time when I flow into you, purged and 
rendered molten by the fire of your love” (11.29.39). While distentio spreads the 
experience of time apart, intentio pulls it together toward unity, coherence, and focus. 
French theorist Paul Ricouer explains the spiritual grounding of these two temporal 
modes in this way: “While the distentio becomes synonymous with the dispersal into the 
many and with the wandering of the old Adam, the intentio tends to be identified with the 
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fusion of the inner man (‘until...I am fused into one with you’ [29:39.]).”55 Intentio 
reflects the focused characteristics of devotional practice. As Nightingale points out, 
intention “works against distractions and interruptions” as a means of organizing one’s 
approach to God, but she is careful to note that intention alone is not sufficient to 
overcome distention. Intention “uses specific memories and expectations to carry out 
activities that allow one to worship God (e.g., by controlling one’s body, helping one’s 
neighbor, etc.).”56 Indeed, memory and expectation, aspects of the “threefold presence” 
explained in the beginning of this chapter, are already and inherently subject to 
distention. Intention, therefore, merely draws upon and attempts to organize this already-
distended experience of reality in time. 
In this poem, the speaker’s relationship to time is marked out—at first, by 
experiencing time mediated via objects, signs, and markers, and later, by anticipating the 
final descent into dust by recognizing the speaker’s own unity with dust here and now. 
The coherence that the speaker attempts to make room for is evident from the first lines, 
which establish a sense of immediacy and presence as the speaker describes private 
prayer before sleep as embodying a rich symbolism that anticipates the sleep of death. 
Fish has commented on this immediacy, observing a distancing effect within the first two 
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reduce the feeling of being scattered and torn apart in time” (99). 
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lines as the speaker adopts a stance of objectivity by employing indicators of time and 
space, “While” and “Here.” This entrenched stance, giving a “strong impression of local 
identities, separable objects, discrete and specifiable,” works against the building sense of 
the poem, where such specifications become meaningless.57 Even in this first stanza, the 
question is raised whether the speaker is properly equipped to read himself as part of the 
various dissolutions that emerge as the poem moves to its conclusion.   
“Church-monuments” begins in the following way: 
While that my soul repairs to her devotion, 
Here I intombe my flesh, that it betimes 
May take acquaintance of this heap of dust; 
To which the blast of deaths incessant motion, 
Fed with the exhalation of our crimes, 
Drives all at last. 
 
Of this first stanza, Harman observes that the speaker struggles with “the difficulty of 
maintaining the body’s integrity in the face of the tendency of one body to merge with 
another, of dust to merge with dust. When present bodies study future ends they press 
themselves, dangerously, toward those ends.”58 The poem begins with the speaker’s soul 
“repair[ing] to her devotion,” a process that throws off the distractions of daily life to 
focus the soul on eternal realities. Yet, the prayerful focus that should provide the speaker 
with the means to attend, in the mode of intentio, reminds the speaker of his own lack; 
indeed, the speaker’s act of recognizing limitation and lack provides the very means of 
enacting his soul’s devotion. This attentiveness to human limits, with respect to death and 
mortality, is already obvious to the reader, but, as this portion of my argument will 
attempt to demonstrate, the poem implies a temporal lack in the speaker, as well. 
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Harman’s observation about the dangers of pressing too close to future ends should 
indicate that the spiritual paradox of the poem also implicates the speaker’s relationship 
to time. In the closing lines, the speaker instructs his flesh, “wanton in [its] cravings” 
(l.19) to “Mark here below” (l.22). But what can be usefully “marked” when all 
boundaries of difference have collapsed? How can the soul “take acquaintance” (l.3) of 
the body’s beginning and ending in dust and dissolution, while still maintaining its 
integral unity as a self, an identity?   
In the second line, the notion of entombing the flesh reinforces the position of the 
body in sleep while also drawing a parallel to monuments marking the dead. The 
speaker’s intent to “entomb [his] flesh” calls to mind tombs bearing effigies of the 
deceased, often figuring the deceased person reclining in peaceful sleep, or transi, a 
subset of effigies depicting the body as corpse, or even in a state of decomposition. The 
tomb of Herbert’s father, Richard, bears a typical skull and bones and a Latin inscription 
that translates to “I was once like you. You shall become like me.”59 Richard’s tomb was 
decorated with stone effigies of himself and his wife, Magdalen, as if sleeping, 
contrasting sharply with the transi below—Richard’s corpse in a winding sheet. Greg 
Miller views the contrasting images of this monument as “reenact[ing] this double motion 
of death and salvation, as does the double vision of the deceased as merely sleeping, at 
the imagined penultimate moment of being ‘made alive,’ with the represented figural 
reality of the corpse.”60 A similar tension underlies “Church-monuments,” but is not 
limited to the tension between death and resurrection, or between death and its 
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prefigurement in sleep. Rather, the decay of the body as it comes to represent the 
dissolution of signs echoes what Nightingale identifies as operative in Augustine’s 
Confessions: the “tension between fragmentation and unification, between dispersal and 
self-collection, between time and eternity.”61  
The poem’s enactment of dissolution calls into question the status of the self in 
the poem. At every turn in the poem, the temporal paradoxes give way to questions about 
representation and the self, topics which already underpin criticism of Herbert’s poetry in 
general. Fish’s point that the speaker reads dissolution within a framework that ultimately 
dissolves reminds us that the speaker cannot properly read dissolution, or therefore enact 
the kind of devotion he anticipates, because he is also the object of dissolution. The 
speaker’s attempt to read dissolution, therefore, reveals the speaker as self-divided and 
fragmented, or in Augustine’s temporal language, distended. 
 Just as “Even-song” employs the Augustinian notion of an indivisible present to 
emphasize the importance of recurrence to spiritual maintenance, in “Chuch-
monuments,” the speaker’s increasingly distended experience of time is balanced with his 
effort to unify, to actively focus on “taking acquaintance” of death, mortality, and the 
move toward dissolution. The act of remembrance is implicitly an attempt to filter out 
distractions, which distend (distentio) from the present moment into useless fears. Both 
distentio and intentio assume the perceiver only experiences time via a series a passing 
nows, and both modes mirror eternity in some sense; while distentio illustrates spiritual 
futility (“wandering”) in its attempt to imitate the eternal by being spread out in time, 
intentio joins the self with the eternal through a practice of active presence. To the extent 
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that Herbert’s poetry employs devotional modes, his poems arguably aim for this “fusion 
of the inner man” with Christ, which determines the speaker’s experience of time. 
However, distentio is more than just the effect of time on the soul, whereby the soul is 
stretched out; it is the mind’s effort to overcome its own temporal lack. It is only when 
time is compared with eternity that time is recognized as something bounded by non-
being and absence, and therefore, the stress of distentio is felt.62 The constantly 
dissolving boundaries in “Church-monuments” would appear, therefore, to have a 
complex relationship with both distentio and its countering concept, intentio, which 
implies union with Christ, as well as a cohesive self. 
Much like the “flowing together” of intentio, the enactment of dissolution leads 
the speaker to understand death as a joining, a fall toward “tame ashes” in the final lines. 
As Joseph Summers points out, the speaker’s inevitable “fall” (l. 24) is reinforced by the 
structure of the poem: “The movement and sound of the poem suggest the ‘falls’ of the 
flesh and the monuments and the dust in the glass. The fall is not precipitous; it is as slow 
as the gradual fall of the monuments, as the crumbling of the glass, as the descent of the 
flesh from Adam to dust.”63 The poem’s motion through these various falls reduces the 
field of representation until monuments, inscriptions, the body, and even time itself are 
no longer adequate signs. The poem, therefore, reduces multiplicity, the various ways that 
the soul reminds itself of death, until all that is left is dust. 
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While distentio is characterized by the soul being unnaturally stretched, torn 
asunder between past and future, intentio also involves a tendency to unmake the self, but 
by breaking down the distinctions that separate the soul from Christ. Although the two 
modes of temporality represent separate experiences, the concepts are interdependent. 
Augustine’s example of reciting a poem from memory demonstrates how the 
consciousness is divided by time even as the mind strives for active attention: 
“...whatever I have plucked away from the domain of expectation and tossed behind me 
to the past becomes the business of my memory, and the vital energy of what I am doing 
is in tension between the two of them: it strains toward my memory because of the part I 
have already recited, and to expectation on account of the part I still have to speak” 
(11.38). As the words he anticipates speaking become the words already spoken (or, as 
the anticipated future moves into the past), active attention is demanded. Here, even as 
active attention (intentio) increases, the self is pulled asunder between memory (what is 
already recited) and expectation (what is left to recite). Paradoxically, active attention on 
the present moment does not do away with the distending effects of expectation or 
memory. Ricouer notes that this passage in Augustine “marks the point at which the 
theory of distentio is joined to that of the threefold present. The theory of the threefold 
present, reformulated in terms of the threefold intention, makes the distentio arise out of 
the intentio that has burst asunder.”64 In other words, Augustine’s illustration of the mind 
during recitation shows how intention is stretched beyond its capacity to focus in any 
active and unified way. All actions of the mind described here occur within the threefold 
present (present of the past, present of the present, present of the future); the mind may 
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experience one moment at a time, but the act of intention can no longer hold these 
together in indivisible focus and the active attention of intentio “bursts asunder.” For 
temporal beings, this experience of time cannot be overcome, and intention and distention 
continue to live in tension with each other. 
Thus, in the effort to actively attend, the mind is distended, stretched between 
expectation and memory. In Herbert’s poem, the shortcomings of the speaker’s active 
attention to “mark” dissolution, already a form of recitation that escapes measurement, 
previews this same paradox of time measured within the soul. To “take acquaintance of 
this heap of dust” is the purpose related in the introductory lines of “Church-
monuments.” Notably, death approaches from the same direction that Augustine 
describes time moving, from the future to the present, a gradual wearing down that 
“Drives all at last” (l. 6). Although its “blasts” are “incessant,” death itself is something 
of a non-entity; it is characterized by motion but not by being. The reader calls to mind a 
strong wind reducing everything in its path to dust, yet this wind is not self-born but “Fed 
with the exhalation of our crimes” (l. 5). This description of death as nourished by an 
exhalation is reminiscent of “Sinne” (II), in which sin is described as “want[ing] the good 
of virtue and of being.” In “Church-monuments,” death, by feeding on sin, feeds on a 
nothing. 
By the end of the poem, the performance of devotion inevitably entails “marking” 
what can no longer be meaningfully marked--the distinction between flesh and dust. The 
poem concludes:  
Deare flesh, while I do pray, learn here thy stemme 
And true descent; that when thou shalt grow fat, 
 
And wanton in thy cravings, thou mayst know, 
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That flesh is but the glasse, which holds the dust 
That measures all our time; which also shall  
Be crumbled into dust. Mark here below 
How tame these ashes are, how free from lust, 
That thou mayst fit thy self against thy fall. 
 
Does the speaker accomplish his initial purpose to “take acquaintance”? Does 
recognizing one’s “stemme/ And true descent” (ll. 17-18) adequately address the 
speaker’s fleshly experience of time? Stanley Fish understands these last lines above to 
be portraying a “facile” conclusion on the part of the speaker, which also betrays the 
“easy and pious” desires of the reader. The injunction to “Mark here below” (l. 22), like 
the internal contradiction of “dustie heraldrie,” is another example of the “use of 
language--not to specify, but to make specification impossible--is on display in the final 
lines, where to monuments and bodies and sentences and questions is joined time....”65 
Dissolution in “Church-monuments” demonstrates how time is in many ways 
indistinguishable from the objects that measure it. Similar to the way that “disorder’d 
clocks” of “Even-song” indicate a distemper in the soul, the glass of time referenced in 
lines 20-21 is the body: “flesh is but the glasse, which holds the dust/ That measures all 
our time” (20-21). Instead of indicating a faulty measurement of time, bodies indeed 
measure time, but this measurement is ultimately meaningless, since time itself “also 
shall be crumbled into dust” (l. 22).  
The problem of indistinguishability that both Fish and Harman locate would seem 
to create a barrier to complete resolution. Here, Ricouer’s earlier question arises again: 
Can time be measured in the self? The slippage expressed when the speaker attempts to 
resolve the paradox of dissolution by “marking” is mirrored by the slippages that present 
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themselves when the soul attempts to measure time within the self. This raises the 
question: what, after all, do prayer, liturgy, and the other forms of devotional time 
employed to join the speaker to eternity and to Christ actually accomplish? 
Arguably, however, the possibility that the speaker may come to understand his 
“stemme/ And true descent” presents the possibility of another, equally true, perspective. 
The “stemme,” with its clear reference to Christ, is coupled with “true descent.” But what 
kind of “descent” is true? Descent is a stem, a source, a genealogical root. The lines 
contain a clear resonance with Isaiah 11:1, “And there shall come forth a rod out of the 
stem of Jesse,” appears to be obvious, a reading which is in keeping with the emphasis on 
birth and “dustie heraldrie” in lines 8-9, the records of origin written on gravestones. 
A second, contrasting meaning of “true descent” is almost inevitable: while one 
may trace one’s lineage to dust, one necessarily returns, or descends, back into the dust, 
and therefore the line echoes the “falls” that Summers identifies as building throughout 
the poem. But while most critics acknowledge the connection between the “stemme” in 
the third stanza and “dustie heraldrie” in the fourth, implying both origins and ends, few 
seem to acknowledge the presence of a spiritual genealogy that connects these two 
stanzas. Beginning in line 6, the poem reads: 
   Therefore I gladly trust 
 My bodie to this school, that it may learn 
 To spell his elements, and finde his birth 
 Written in dustie heraldrie and lines; 
 Which dissolution sure doth best discern, 
 Comparing dust with dust, and earth with earth. 
In keeping with the principle of dissolution that governs the poem, this reading flows 
naturally into the next lines, where “spelling” and reading (“find[ing] his birth”) are 
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undercut by the mode of writing: dust written on dust. While the obvious referent for 
“his” in “his birth” is the speaker’s body, I would suggest another possible level of 
meaning. While critical consensus of this poem accepts “dissolution” as a principle of 
interpretation, the Augustinian sense of time brought to the fore in this analysis should 
remind us that fusion of the inner man with Christ, in the mode of intentio, is also written 
into the various falls toward dissolution.  
First, there is some instability in the variety of pronouns employed to reference 
the self. The first line employs the typically feminine to reference the soul, i.e., “her 
devotion.” The use of the male pronoun in the next stanza to speak of the body, “his 
elements” and “his birth,” therefore seems unsurprising. However, the line before this 
employs the gender-neutral pronoun to clearly reference the body: “My bodie...that it 
may learn” (l. 7). With this abrupt change in pronouns, the possibility is introduced that 
the line does not merely refer to the speaker, but to Christ, to whom the speaker’s prayers 
are directed and to whom these mortal elements belong: “that it may learn to spell his 
[Christ’s] elements, and finde his [Christ’s] birth.” This reading of the line reinforces the 
connection to the Christological reference in lines 17-18.  
Second, the instability introduced by the poem’s use of pronouns should also 
invite us to question the role of the speaker’s agency. Is the speaker in prayer (and by 
extension, prayer itself) passive or active? The critical conversation on “dissolution” 
teaches us to be skeptical of the speaker’s agency, since the poem’s structure seems to 
undermine any agency the speaker may think he possesses. For the speaker to “spell his 
elements,” in the sense of recognizing that he, too, is made of mortal stuff that is subject 
to decay, he must perform two kinds of spelling. He performs the kind of spelling that is 
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also reading; thus, “to spell” and to “read” indicate the same act—the act of reading the 
inscriptions written on tombs. However, insofar as the speaker’s own body, schooled by 
prayer, is still implicated in this act, the speaker both becomes the writing and construes 
what is written there. Understanding this second implication leads us to place distance 
between the speaker and the object of reading. Several of Herbert’s poems include a 
reference to “spelling,” such as “The Holy Scriptures” (II), “Jesu,” “The Temper” (I), 
“The Flower.” Janis Lull argues that “spelling” in Herbert becomes “a synecdoche for all 
that is positive in human behavior.”66 Understanding the speaker as “spelling,” or 
cohering, God’s elements in his own body, recognizing his own created status, 
accomplishes not only a self-identity but an identity with Christ, as in Augustine’s 
description of intentio, “until I am fused as one...with [Christ].” As “spelling his 
elements” takes on this larger sense of spelling, dissolution is not merely, or 
pessimistically, an erasure of the self. Rather, it is a joining of the self to Christ, pointing 
the reader to an enduring spiritual genealogy in Christ, present even in the midst of 
dissolution, which every member of Christ’s family participates in.  
  
Conclusion  
Herbert’s poem “Hope” captures some of the same tension between expectation 
and fulfillment, so essentially Augustinian in his poetry, which I have analyzed in “Even-
song” and “Church-monuments”: 
I gave to Hope a watch of mine: but he 
                                                          
66 Lull further states, “To ‘spell’ is to read according to God’s intentions. In the text-oriented environment 
of The Church, ‘spelling’ defines a kind of Bible reading in which the human reader’s will is neither 
annihilated nor exalted, but merged with the will behind the Word.” The Poem in Time: Reading George 
Herbert’s Revisions of The Church (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), 22. 
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  An anchor gave to me. 
Then an old prayer-book I did present: 
  And he an optick sent. 
With that I gave a viall full of tears: 
  But he a few green eares: 
Ah Loyterer! I’le no more, no more I’le bring: 
  I did expect a ring. 
 
Vendler parses the concluding lines as, “I expected commitment, and all I kept receiving 
was postponement.”67 It is no coincidence, of course, that expectation and fulfillment are 
so intermingled in a poem that begins with a watch. While the speaker invests time, 
expecting a return, Hope returns an anchor; while the emblematic significance of an 
anchor is hope itself,68 the nature of the image as trope is more ambivalent, signifying 
hope as something both grounded and far off; to someone expecting a more immediate 
reward for his time, the anchor is delay. The rest of the poem follows the same pattern. In 
the passage where Augustine articulates his desire to “not [be] distended but extended, 
and not in the mode of distention but with active-attention” (11.29.39), Nightingale has 
argued that eschatological hope (contra Ricouer, who identifies it with intentio) is 
associated with extentio, extension, expressing the “hope for the last things.”
69 Here, the 
movement of desire that Nightingale describes both involves eschatology and grounds 
this hope in the present moment. It is this same dialectic, the tension of the conscious 
mind, torn between time and eternity, between the psychological experience of time and 
time as measured moments, that characterizes both “Even-song” and “Church-
monuments.”  
                                                          
67 Vendler, 64. 
68 Barbara Lewalski, Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth Century Religious Lyric (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), 203. 
69 Nightingale, 98. 
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Samson Archimedes: Action, Interpretation, and Time in Milton’s Play 
“The image of watch and watchmaker is so strikingly apposite precisely because 
it contains both the notion of a process character of nature in the image of the 
movements of the watch and the notion of its still intact object character in the 
image of the watch itself and its maker.”  
    —Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 297 
 
The beginning of Milton’s Samson Agonistes dramatizes an effort to reconcile 
temporal difference: even in a place of quiet, Samson’s unruly thoughts “present/ Times 
past, what once I was, and what am now” (21-22).1 These lines dwell on time even as 
they offer a challenge for interpretation. Samson wrestles with the present, his Philistine 
captivity, in light of his past, his origins as God’s chosen. However, reading the past as a 
map of the present is not always reliable methodology. Noting that lines 21-22 are 
“composed entirely of temporal signatures,” Stanley Fish looks for an interpretive 
“middle” between past and present.2 In dealing with temporal difference, we deal with 
missing evidence, the information hidden in the black box. Samson must rightly 
understand the past in order to take action, but at the beginning of the play, he does so 
from inside a narrative that he is not fully conscious of. Julian Yates’s description of the 
all-seeing vision of the Enlightenment (what Donna Haraway terms its “god trick”)3 is 
relevant here: “Choose your technology; freeze time; study the scene, and act upon it 
                                                          
1 All references to Milton’s poetry and prose are taken from Complete Poems and Major Prose, Ed. Merritt 
Y. Hughes (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003). 
2 Stanley Fish writes, “Given that this line is composed entirely of temporal signatures, it is difficult not to 
read the verb ‘present’ as a pun that telegraphs the questions that follow: How do we present the past? How 
can we make sense of it? How can it be seen as congruent with the past? How has this happened...There 
must be something--shall we call it a middle?--to occupy (and thereby to obliterate or cover up) the space 
between what was and what is now.” “Spectacle and Evidence in Samson Agonistes,” Critical Inquiry 15.3 
(1989): 557. 
3 Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge), 
189. 
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without being implicated in it.”4 In this way, the totalizing demands of Samson’s 
narrative mirror the paradox of early modern experimental science in its effort to 
construct an all-encompassing interpretive framework for nature and, at the same time, to 
leave no trace of a human mind or a subject.  
In the years leading up to the Restoration, revolutionaries, and Milton among 
them, were looking for a narrative, an interpretive framework, with sufficient explanatory 
power to account for the failures of the revolution. In other words, they were searching to 
recover the interpretive or epistemological “middle” that Fish identifies, one that would 
make sense of God’s expressed will in historic events. Clergymen compared England’s 
revolution and its aftereffects to the Israelites’ journey out of exile and into the Promised 
Land and compared a potential restoration of monarchy to a return to Egyptian 
captivity—a thread of analogy that was so topical that Christopher Hill refers to it as a 
“Puritan cliché.”5 As Shawcross has noted, “The hope in and expectation of millennium, 
and its subsequent failure to arrive, intensified deistic thinking and gave, for many, a 
death knell to revelation as proof of God and his works.”6 At the same time, in the 
scientific context of Milton’s time, an intelligible universe is one that yields predictable 
results. These two overlapping spheres of narrative and scientific constructionism bring 
surprisingly similar questions to the fore: Where does political action derive a mandate? 
When is the right time to act? 
My approach in earlier text-centered chapters was to analyze clockwork metaphor 
active in the texts; my reading in this chapter performs a different task. As the reader will 
                                                          
4 Julian Yates, Error Misuse Failure: Object Lessons from the English Renaissance (Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 2003), xii. 
5 Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), 206. 
6 John T. Shawcross, “Confusion: The Apocalypse, The Millennium,” Milton and the Ends of Time, ed. 
Juliet Cummins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 107. 
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be aware, Milton is more grounded in classical allusion than in technological metaphor. 
However, examining texts only in order to parse metaphor would not fully accomplish 
my goal of tracking parallel shifts in temporality and in representation. Clockwork, 
according to Hannah Arendt, dramatizes the contradictory approaches to nature, to 
knowledge, and to the world at the beginning of the modern era; these are questions that 
are likewise present to Milton in Samson Agonistes. In the quotation that opens this 
chapter, Arendt highlights an irony in clockwork as it came to represent the operations of 
nature. The watch or clock is an apt metaphor for nature because it accounts for both the 
“process character” and the “object character” of nature itself. Arendt’s point neatly 
illustrates the pliability of the clockwork metaphor; the metaphor at once represented the 
internal workings of nature to be known and discerned and its character as an intact 
object, which highlighted the usefulness of the invention.7 Arendt makes this point to 
reinforce her argument that the approach to knowledge in the modern era (or, after the 
seventeenth century) shifted the role of action in the world. Action was no longer the 
practical manifestation of thinking but a mode of knowing only by making.8 The purpose 
of action was no longer to reveal or disclose the human story; instead, action evidenced 
humans’ trust only in knowledge that they themselves could produce.9  
I argue in this chapter that Milton’s Samson undergoes a revised understanding of 
time. Rather than viewing divine intent as something that can be confirmed through his 
own action--an instrumentalist view, by the end of the play, he understands history as 
revelatory. Arendt’s observation serves as a reminder that clockwork, as a metaphor since 
                                                          
7 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 297-8. 
8 “In the place of the concept of Being we now find the concept of Process. And whereas it is in the nature 
of Being to appear and thus disclose itself, it is in the nature of Process to remain invisible, to be something 
whose existence can only be inferred from the presence of certain phenomena” (Arendt, 296-7).  
9 Arend, 298-9. 
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early modernity, did not just signify the passing of time; its machine aspect also signified 
nature, divine providence, and—with varying interpretation—the human ability to 
understand or reveal the secrets concealed by the first two. But as Fish’s commentary on 
the epistemological “middle” makes clear, time and the operations of knowledge are 
closely connected. This intersection, between meaning and the experience of temporality 
that frames it, forms the premise of Samson Agonistes. I began this dissertation with an 
explication of Heidegger’s understanding of time, which teaches the reader to view 
temporality as a structuring of existence. Understanding Milton’s view of meaning, I 
would argue, requires that we understand temporality, an implicit connection already 
pervasive in Milton’s body of work. Critical discussion of Samson over the years has, in 
fact, centered on divine intelligibility—implicating questions of meaning and 
interpretation. In the argument that follows, I continue this thread of criticism by 
examining Milton’s Samson Agonistes as a test case for Miltonic temporality; this 
requires that the reader make sense of action within time, as well as the holistic 
frameworks that enable humans to make meaning of their contexts, limited by time and 
partial knowledge. In Areopagitica, for example, the search for Truth (to preserve 
Milton’s capitalization) is compared to “the careful search that Isis made for the mangled 
body of Osiris,” and, after Truth’s body is dismembered, “[the sad friends of Truth] went 
up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them.”10 While Milton is 
careful to make clear that Truth entered the world in wholeness and perfection (“a perfect 
shape most glorious to look on”), the postlapsarian condition of Truth is portrayed as 
partial, fragmented, and “mangled.” In Milton’s framing, the fragmentation of Truth 
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assumes its prior wholeness, and Truth is reassembled through human activity, “limb by 
limb”—in other words, by putting things alongside one another. In unexpected parallel, 
Heidegger argues that time is a “primordial structural totality,” and the fact that we 
become more conscious of time only as we are “thrown” into the everyday cares of the 
world only serves to underline time’s relational nature.11 In keeping with Heidegger’s 
assertion that temporality “reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care,”12 Milton’s 
reinvented mythology imagines that the severed limbs of “virgin Truth,” like Osiris, are 
gathered up and put back into place through “careful search.”  
In Miltion’s view, then, arriving at the truth demands activity. However, this is 
not the instrumental action that seeks to confirm its hypotheses through artificial means, 
but ethical action that approaches divine knowledge by assuming its own 
incompleteness—the fragmented nature of human knowledge. The clock metaphor 
dramatizes a tension between the rational predictability of nature, and a universe in which 
causes are at least partially concealed, and therefore, divine providence is viewed with a 
greater sense of impenetrability. That the human experience of meaning might be 
revelatory in time, rather than derived from a predetermined telos fully known, is in 
keeping with what Silver identifies in Wittgenstein and sees as operative in Milton’s view 
of deity, “that the meaning of our expressions is created by their use and cannot consist in 
a single continuous reference or analogy to things in the world.”13 Considering the ways 
that God exceeds Samson’s and the reader’s knowledge places more pressure on 
Samson’s claims to knowledge and divine inspiration as the play progresses. Victoria 
                                                          
11 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
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Silver, in accounting for the reformers’ view of faith as well as Milton’s, has commented 
that “…religious contradiction throws us back upon ourselves in such a way that we are 
impelled to discover not the wonders of the invisible world, but a revised meaning for the 
ordinary one which at some point or other we have experienced as intolerably 
conflicted.”14 As I will explore in this chapter, these observations run parallel to the logic 
of midrash, which Milton would have been familiar with in Latin translation.15    
 What Samson believes about the intelligibility of God’s will determines what he 
assumes about the predictability of God’s will; his own ethics at the beginning of the play 
are drawn from what he infers about divine intent, affirmed through his own actions.16 
Silver’s point about religious contradiction rejects the direct chain of inference from 
human to divine. In Arendt, critiquing the same trend means noticing the altered role of 
reason and action in modernity. In other words, reason in the wake of Cartesianism 
became automized, according to Arendt: “Reason, in Descartes no less than in Hobbes, 
becomes ‘reckoning with consequences,’ the faculty of deducing and concluding, that is, 
of a process which man at any moment can let loose within himself.”17 The earlier 
observation from Arendt about clockwork as both process and as object indicates how the 
character of reason used to understand nature began to take on the essence of nature that 
it attempted to investigate.18 This is arguably the version of “reason” that Milton 
critiques through the voice of the Chorus, when they exclaim, “Down Reason then, at 
least vain reasoning down” (l. 322). The Chorus in the context of this passage resists both 
                                                          
14 Silver, 25. 
15 See Golda Werman, Milton and Midrash (Washington: The Catholic University Press, 1995). 
16 Fish backs up this point by saying, “Samson, Manoa, and the chorus will go to any length in their joint 
effort to piece together a story that can be read as confirmation of the reasonableness (and therefore the 
predictability of events in the world)” (“Spectacle and Evidence,” 558). 
17 Arendt, 283. 
18 Arendt, The Human Condition, 297. 
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atheism, whose “Doctrine never was there School/ But the heart of the fool” (ll. 297-8), 
and the skepticism of those who doubt God’s justice because they rely on their own 
restrictive internal logic, until “by their own perplexities involv’d/ They ravel more, still 
less resolv’d,/ But never find self-satisfying solution” (ll. 304-6). 
Even though critical trends examining Samson Agonistes have been concerned 
with these questions of meaning, rarely has this thread of criticism intertwined with the 
thread concerned with Milton’s Hebraism. Whether or not one agrees with Stanley Fish 
in characterizing Samson’s problem as one of “interpretive lust,” the reader is necessarily 
forced to adopt an ethical position with respect to Samson and Samson’s God. The 
options are limited; one must either perform theodicy by justifying Samson’s actions 
against the Philistines at the end of the play or condemn Samson’s “rousing motions” as 
resulting from epistemological error.19 Critics such as Virginia Mollenkott and Angela 
Balla have explored the absence of positive evidence in the play, a challenge to 
interpretation which is heightened by the absence of clear or direct divine intervention. 
Samson’s unique status as a Nazarite is implicated in questions surrounding God’s hidden 
will; the secrecy surrounding Samson’s strength is a mark of blessing and consecration, 
yet Samson’s own actions seem deeply flawed from the beginning. Mollenkott resolves 
the play’s ethical dilemma by separating the action into two categories, “absolute conflict 
of God versus Dagon and the humanly relativistic conflict of Samson with his 
contemporaries,”20 an approach which aligns Milton with God’s judgment against 
idolatry while holding Samson accountable for his actions against the Philistines. 
However, such a separation of both dramatic meaning and divine/human intent seems 
                                                          
19 See Stanley Fish, How Milton Works (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001), 450.  
20 Virginia Mollenkott, “Relativism in Samson Agonistes,” Studies in Philology 67.1 (1970): 90. 
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like an artificial solution. Throughout the play, Samson invokes his special status “As of 
a person separate to God, / Design’d for great exploits” (ll. 31-2) to justify his actions; his 
consecrated role before God, before his nation, and in redemptive history implicates God, 
as well as himself, since expression of the divine is inextricably intermingled with what is 
“sacred” or “set apart.” A more thorough justifying of the ways of God to men means 
examining how divine intent is expressed either positively or negatively in human action.  
A key example of the use of clockwork as a metaphor for invisible cause and 
visible effect in the natural world comes from Descartes, whose illustration runs as 
follows: 
For just as an industrious watchmaker may make two watches which keep time 
equally well and without any difference in their external appearance, yet without 
any similarity in the composition of their wheels, so it is certain that God works in 
an infinity of diverse ways (each of which enables Him to make everything 
appear in the world as it does, without making it possible for the human mind to 
know which of all these ways He has decided to use). And I believe I shall have 
done enough if the causes that I have listed are such that the effects they may 
produce are similar to those we see in the world, without being informed whether 
there are other ways in which they are produced.21 
 
Nature, in other words, is like a clockwork mechanism because, just as a clock’s inner 
workings vary according to the design of the device, hypotheses about the hidden causes 
of its workings (its wheels) cannot simply be inferred from outer appearance. In this 
analogy, Descartes represented a concern that would become central within the broader 
development of mechanistic philosophy coming after him, one which has been referred to 
as “the root metaphor of the mechanical philosophy.”22 It is a key illustration of the 
                                                          
21 Quoted in Laurens Laudan, “The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of Descartes on English 
Methodological Thought, 1650-65,” Ann. Sci. 22 (1966), 77-78. 
22 “...nature was like a clock: man could be certain of the hour shown by its hands, of natural effects, but 
the mechanism by which those effects were really produced, the clockwork, might be various.” Steven 
Shapin & Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 24. 
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probabilistic view of knowledge, in which nature’s hidden causes are treated in terms of 
probability and not certainty. While much can be observed from the outward effects of 
nature, enough to form a system and knowledge of outcomes, less may be said about the 
causes themselves. 
 In previous chapters, my argument addressed how measurement was important to 
timekeeping. However, the driver to measure time was equally (and perhaps more 
fundamentally) demanded by what may be termed, in the fashion of Arendt, the process 
character of reason. “Reckoning with consequences,” in this sense, implying a particular 
view of both reason and the phenomenal world, necessarily becomes reckoning with 
time. As noted in my introduction, Ricouer rightfully points out that temporality precedes 
any measurements we perform on its behalf: 
It is because we do reckon with time and do make calculations that we must have 
recourse to measuring, not vice versa. It must be possible, therefore, to give an 
existential description to this ‘reckoning with’ before the measuring it calls for. 
Here expressions such as ‘have the time to,’ ‘take the time to,’ ‘to lose time,’ etc. 
are very revealing. A similar thing can be said about the grammatical network of 
the verbal tenses and the highly ramified network of temporal adverbs: then, after, 
later, earlier, since, until, so long as, during, all the while that, now that, etc.23  
 
 
While Samson’s version of narrative observes itself from a point on the inside while 
assuming an outside perspective of such things as narrative or historical consciousness, 
Ricouer’s description of the temporality that underlies all attempts at narrative requires an 
alternative approach to the reasoning process that constructs narrative. In describing 
temporality as a “network,” Ricouer highlights its relational nature. In other words, 
temporality is not a framework imposed from above but something that can be more 
                                                          
23 Paul Ricouer, Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 62. 
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rightfully discerned by putting things alongside one another, like the torn limbs of Osiris. 
Our understanding of temporality, therefore, influences our understanding of reason and 
interpretation, the conditions under which divine will may be said to be rendered 
“intelligible” in the play.24  
 The rise of experimentalism entailed a corresponding shift, as Arendt argues, 
between action and thinking, with action taking primacy. After Descartes and even after 
Galileo, knowledge is increasingly identified with having, in the words of Charles Taylor, 
a “correct representation of things—a correct picture within of outer reality,” entailing a 
shift in the order of ideas from outer world to inner self. “As the notion of ‘idea’ migrates 
from its ontic sense to apply henceforth to intra-psychic contents, to things ‘in the 
mind,’” writes Taylor, “so the order of ideas ceases to be something we find and becomes 
something we build.”25 Thus, while ideas themselves once designated the “bare facts”26 
of the world outside the self, they instead become the mental impressions of that world.27 
What appears to be most culpable about an interpretive framework guided by ego-
affirming perceptions is that this act of interpretation renders the external world lifeless 
and inert. By implication, Samson’s interpretations are ego-driven at the beginning of the 
play, a distancing between self and world.   
                                                          
24 The influence of Heidegger’s notion of “within-time-ness” (Innerzeitigkeit) on Ricouer is expressed in 
this section of his argument. Ricouer defines “within-time-ness” as “defined by a basic characteristic of 
Care, our being thrown among things, which tends to make our description of temporality dependent on the 
description of the things about which we care. This feature reduces Care to the dimensions of 
preoccupation (Besorgen),” 62. 
25 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press: 1989), 144. 
26 A fairly well agreed-upon definition of “ontic.” 
27 In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger also challenges the assumption that truth is 
merely representational, and he does this by expanding on the meaning of “technology.” He points out that 
“the word techne is linked with the word episteme. They both mean to be entirely at home in something, to 
understand and be an expert in it.” Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 
2008), 318, 319. 
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 Epistemology in accordance with Luther’s Deus Absconditus, the Hidden God, is 
shaped by what is not known—what cannot be fully understood about God according to 
human capacity; for this reason, it contrasts with the totalizing nature of Cartesianism. 
This notion of the Hidden God necessarily forms the basis of Silver’s implicit critique of 
the cogito; all attempts to reconcile ideas of human and divine are fundamentally defined 
by the limits of human conception. What Silver describes in terms of Luther’s facere 
Deum is a model of “mutuality” between mind and world which is wholly out of keeping 
with Cartesianism.28 According to Silver, “When God’s hiddenness is understood in the 
reformers’ sense, there can be no stable ‘object,’ whether perceptible or metaphysical, to 
which our ideas of the divine can refer,” and because “there can be no ‘object,’ no 
‘outside,’ no ‘view’ to scripture’s expressions about God, they involve a sort of 
catachresis, a ‘wrenching of words.”29 What Haraway terms the “god trick” of human 
perspective, Silver identifies with the cogito, a brand of solipsism characterized by 
Milton’s Satan, including “a false Stoic imperturbability that denies the claim of 
suffering.”30 The activity of faith implying a creative capacity to reason that Silver 
characterizes as an alternative is close to the Hebraic approach to meaning. Midrash’s 
approach to knowledge and reality is close to what Silver describes in her description of 
an immanent approach to a hidden God—an approach that requires re-imagining a 
relationship with God even when his actions in the world seem absurd or unjust.31  
 
The Ontology of Action 
                                                          
28 Silver, 51. 
29 Silver, 57, 127. 
30 Haraway, 188 and Silver, 237. 
31 Silver, 103. 
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With a false ontology in place, Samson reads into God’s silence and constructs a 
system of ethics upon what he perceives about the world. Samson is not blameworthy 
because he is tormented by God’s apparent absence and the loss of meaning entailed. 
Samson is blameworthy because of how he deals with missing information, how he 
interprets and acts based on what the Reformers recognize as Deus Absconditus, the 
Hidden God. The appearance of inconsistency or injustice when one encounters a God 
whose purposes are hidden, rather than canceling out a particular avenue of 
interpretation, may become the occasion for a more immanent approach to revealed 
truth.32 According to Silver, there is “discrepancy between our ideas of God on the one 
hand and deity as it is actually made known to us on the other.”33 This is Silver’s 
interpretation and application of Luther’s facere Deum, the activity of faith by which we 
“make God,” a concept that Milton takes up. Facere Deum does not suggest anything 
idolatrous in the “making”; rather, it sustains an image of deity that is consistent with the 
idea of deity, in the face of apparent contradiction. This is not blind faith but dynamic 
activity, where reason plays a role but where we are forced to acknowledge its limitations 
in light of divine incommensurability.34 This approach is opposed to imposing a 
transcendent framework that may force an artificial commensurability between human 
experience and divine truth.35 Silver’s account of the Reformed understanding of divine 
intelligibility describes immanent knowledge rather than transcendent understanding; this 
description mirrors a Talmudic theodicy. 
                                                          
32 Silver, 103, 107. 
33 Silver, 103. 
34 Facere Deum uncovers truth’s immanence by bringing order to disorder, what Silver calls “a cosmic 
version of rhetorical kairos or opportune ordering,” 102. 
35 Silver, 108. 
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That the model of theodicy and human action undergirding the Samson drama is 
uniquely Hebraic should come as no surprise: a sizable portion of critics have 
investigated the Hebraic strains and influences in Milton’s poetry and polemics, including 
parallels between Milton’s Samson and the Samson of midrashic commentary.36 
Rabbinical commentary on the Samson story takes for granted the ethical ordering in 
Judaism of doing before understanding. This ethical and interpretive ordering parallels 
the immanent approach to knowledge of the divine inscribed in the reformers’ ideas of 
God’s hiddenness (Deus Absconditus) and faith as dynamic activity in Facere Deum. 
Levinas writes that the Talmud “extracts ethical meaning [from the Torah] as the ultimate 
intelligibility of the human and even of the cosmic.”37 Arendt speaks of the rise of action 
that says characterizes modernity and replaces thinking with doing (or, an 
epistemological trust only in the things that humans can produce). By contrast, the 
talmudic approach to reason does not, according to Levinas, “transform action into a 
mode of understanding but...[constitutes] a mode of knowing which reveals the deep 
structure of subjectivity….”38 Midrash, as a hermeneutic, restores the order before the 
reversal that Arendt describes; rather than action—in the sense of instrumental action, 
producing technology, inventions, the knowledge produced in laboratories—replacing 
thinking, ethical action expresses “the ulimate intelligibility” of what can be known. The 
difference between these two forms of action—instrumental and ethical—also necessitate 
vastly different implications for subjectivity. Teasing out Levinas’s argument above, the 
                                                          
36 See Jeffrey S. Shoulson, Milton among the Rabbis: Hebraism, Hellenism, and Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001); Golda Werman, Milton and Midrash (Washington: The Catholic 
University Press, 1995); Jason P. Rosenblatt, Torah and Law in Paradise Lost (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994). 
37 Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, Trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 42. 
38 Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, 42. 
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ethical ordering of doing before fully understanding is precisely that which, 
paradoxically, renders the Law “intelligible.” The point about subjectivity here, in which 
obedience to what is not immediately known or understood produces a new kind of 
knowledge, is very similar to Silver’s point regarding Facere Deum: the human 
experience of the world “throws us back upon ourselves” such that, as quoted earlier, “we 
are impelled to discover not the wonders of the invisible world, but a revised meaning for 
the ordinary one...”39  
Levinas calls Talmudic writing “the permanent renewal of the letter by the 
intellect.”40 Rather than spirit replacing letter, the spirit is folded into the letter, such that 
scripture in the Torah attains what one Levinas critic describes as “infinite density.”41 
The meaning of the letter as it unfolds, dense and weighty, is experienced at the level of 
the subject. Midrash is closer to a mode of commentary than a method of interpretation. 
The recursiveness of the midrashic mode of commentary (the “permanent renewal of the 
letter”) has much in common with the view of meaning and language that Silver 
interprets in Luther. This analysis of divine meaning in light of human understanding, or 
experiences of perceived injustice that precipitate a “crisis of coherence,” is drawn from 
Wittgenstein’s view of language as a “practical, functional aspect of human being” (thus 
avoiding either skepticism on the one side or human egoism on the other).42 According 
                                                          
39 Silver, 25. 
40 Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings, Trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994): 79. 
41 Catherine Chalier, “Levinas and the Talmud,” The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Ed. Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 103. 
42 Silver also says, “For both of them [Luther and Wittgenstein], the trial of incoherence is not to be proved 
against language itself but against its interpreters, who are incline to refuse any order of meaning that 
conflicts with their own conceptual customs, no matter the human suffering that ensues. Since human 
egoism automatically assigns primacy to its notions alone, we must be chastened by contradiction if we are 
to relinquish them,” 23. 
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to Silver’s reading, Luther’s difficulty with the seeming cruelty of the phrase “the 
righteousness of God” was transformed by “a certain grammatical usage, the Hebrew 
genitive,” which shifted the meaning of this phrase out of analogical reasoning that 
equated the human with the divine.43 Similarly, midrash also avoids interpreting the 
divine in light of the human by avoiding reasoning by analogy or all-encompassing 
symbolism. Daniel Boyarin, for example, has characterized midrash as “a hermeneutics 
of opacity” in contrast to a Pauline “hermeneutics of transparency,” a privileging of spirit 
over letter.44  
Boyarin defines interpretation as “virtually all of our methods of formal response 
to texts by which the text is taken to mean something, by which meaning is extractable 
from a text and presentable, even if incompletely and not exactly, in paraphrase.”45 As 
opposed to a mode of interpretation in the traditional sense, Boyarin further defines the 
hermeneutic of midrash as “the dominant mode of commentary in a culture within which 
value is expressed in terms of an abstract, universal, and in itself, substance-free standard: 
the coin.” Interpretation defined in this logocentric sense, then, assumes absolute 
commensurability between divine and human meaning, that divine meaning is easily 
adaptable to human value—which is precisely what Silver’s account of the reformed 
belief in divine incommensurability argues against. In contrast to interpretation, Boyarin 
                                                          
43 Silver, 22. 
44 Daniel Boyarin, Sparks of the Logos: Essays in Rabbinic Hermeneutics (Boston: Brill, 2003), 187. 
Boyarin is pushing against Paul’s reading of the veil of Moses in 2 Cor. 3:7-18. In this passage, as 
commonly interpreted, Paul glosses the veil over the face of Moses as the veil that remains over the hearts 
of Jews of the old covenant when they hear the law read; the veil is said to be lifted in the Spirit, the hearer 
“beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord.” However, Boyarin moves away from an alignment with 
Paul that would reinforce a split between letter and spirit, which he reads as running counter to the 
hermeneutics of midrash. Boyarin resists privileging the figurative in part to resist Paul’s figurative reading 
of the Church as the new Israel (either supersession or ongoing spiritual reality). More pertinently, he views 
this as more in line with Judaism’s concern with physicality and its ethical emphasis on doing, embodied 
by the letter. 
45 Boyarin, 144. 
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calls midrash “the dominant mode of commentary in a signifying economy without the 
‘universal equivalent.’”46 Jeffrey S. Shoulson has explored how midrashic texts shaped 
Milton’s understanding of the economy of meaning, and therefore ontology, of 
redemption in the Samson story. One notable example is the rabbinical interpretation of 
one of the background stories of Samson in Judges, which provides a gloss for Samson’s 
riddle to the men of Timnah, “Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong 
came forth sweetness” (Judges 14:14). The rabbis reason that the incident of Samson 
eating honey from a lion carcass (Judges 14) is striking for the same reason that the 
destruction of Nadav and Abihu (priests in Leviticus 10) is striking. The priests are 
consumed by fire from heaven for profaning the sacrificial fire, thereby their bodies are 
substituted as the objects of sacrifice. Like the eater whose body provides food (a lion 
producing honey), therefore, the priestly deaths are figured as sacrifices themselves. The 
fire from heaven is not merely an act of retributive justice but constitutes God’s act of 
supplying a sacrifice in place of the one desecrated. As Shoulson’s summary makes clear, 
this deft movement in the logic of the rabbinical commentary “extends the talionic nature 
of this story” by fulfilling the demands of justice not merely through retribution but 
through the provision of a sacrifice.47 Shoulson writes, “If God’s ways are just, man’s 
ways are mutable; yet because God’s ways can only be known through the ways of men, 
justice and mutability stand not in opposition to each other but rather as mutually 
constitutive.”48  
                                                          
46 Boyarin, 144. 
47 Jeffrey S. Shoulson, Milton among the Rabbis: Hebraism, Hellenism, and Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), 251. 
48 Shoulson, 247. 
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Shoulson’s point is an interesting one in light of what Silver has inferred about the 
reformers’ approach to reconciling (if it may be termed that) the appearance of God’s 
incoherence or injustice with human understanding. That God’s justice and human 
mutability are “mutually constitutive” implies that divine revelation, accommodated to 
human understanding, is embodied in and through human action. What the rabbinical 
commentary makes clear, however, is that the question of ethical human action may not 
have a primary role in this constitutive relationship. God’s justice is often revealed in 
contrast to human injustice and error. This describes the somewhat paradoxical nature of 
accommodation. Accommodation both reveals something of divine nature and marks the 
limits of its revelation. The two ends of this spectrum might be described as theodicy, 
man justifying the ways of God to man, and theophany, God revealing himself to man 
(and thereby delineating the limits of this revelation).  
 Borrowing her terminology from Wittgenstein, grammar according to Silver is a 
system of ordering meaning, particularly relational meaning between divine and human.49 
Silver argues that “neither Miltonic truth nor Miltonic reason is even remotely axiomatic: 
he seeks what Adorno calls ‘the open thought’—the sort of meaning that does not 
foreclose other avenues of significance.”50 Boyarin’s discussion of gramma (letter) 
mirrors Silver’s “grammar” but with a different emphasis. In reference to a midrash of 
the Job story, Boyarin points demonstrates that flesh (the embodied expression of the 
gramma, the carnal letter), suffering, circumcision, and erotic life all point to an 
understood truth in midrash, “the body...seen as the vehicle of encounter with God.”51 
                                                          
49 See Silver, 114-117. 
50 Silver, 107. 
51 Boyarin, Sparks of the Logos: Essays in Rabbinic Hermeneutics (Boston: Brill, 2003), 198. 
135 
The midrash therefore connects Job’s peeling skin to circumcision, implying this same 
encounter.52 Similarly, as Silver’s explication of Job makes clear, suffering [signals] a 
“fearful indeterminacy of human things,” which is irreducible in meaning and cannot 
explain God’s actions by invoking “past to present action, ordinary to religious meaning, 
the seen to the invisible.” Similar to Shoulson’s examination of the ambivalent meaning 
between justic and sacrifice in midrash, Silver’s analysis of Job examines Job’s 
accusations that his sufferings are the result of divine retributive justice:  
The idea that appalls Job is not whether his suffering implies his sinfulness, as a 
magical bane inexorably following upon some evil he or his children may have 
committed and for which he is now penalized. Von Rad comments that, for all that 
Job forcibly rejects it, this idea of an unknown, redounding evil speaks to his 
deepest and most perverse inclination; yet it holds no more terror for him than it 
does for the friends who expound it. That is because the analogy argued by divine 
retribution—of past to present action, ordinary to religious meaning, the seen to 
the invisible—would circumscribe the fearful indeterminacy of human things 
which his [Job’s] suffering otherwise signals.53  
 
Suffering—especially the physically visceral suffering of Job, similar to Samson’s bodily 
suffering—is not reducible to the tidy logic of analogy. Although the causes of Samson’s 
suffering are unlike Job’s in being much less innocent, his blindness, his shorn hair 
betraying the secrecy of his strenth betray a similar “fearful indeterminacy.”    
 In terms of how the travails of the flesh implicate time, Andre Furlani, 
distinguishes between kairos in the play as the traditionally-interpreted “opportune 
moment” and other instances of Greek usage, including kairos read as a “fatal stroke,” a 
wound on the body such as the place where Agamemnon is struck. Furlani states, “The 
distinction here between temporality and fateful points could scarcely be clearer, for 
                                                          
52 In midrashic readings, says Boyarin, “the performance of the rite was understood as a necessary 
condition for the divine-human erotic encounter--for seeing God” (36). 
53 Silver, 31. 
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kairoi are not subordinate aspects of time or their issue, but discrete realms of 
opportunity.”54 While this is a useful distinction in meaning, this argument seems to 
overlook the fact that temporality—or in the case of kairos, a decisive moment of 
action—is often described in terms of place or situatedness. In concluding that kairos in 
the play is “neither temporal nor redemptive, but rather spatial and tragic,”55 Furlani sets 
up a false opposition between time and space, rather than considering that temporality 
can assume the characteristics of either space or place.  
 
     Time and the Rise of Action  
 Samson, in reflecting back on his own actions and in agonistic dialogue with other 
characters, seems to arrive at a more self-critical understanding of his past actions and of 
the partially-known nature of God’s revealed will. This newfound self-reflection is 
manifest in his acknowledgement that disproportionate strength and wisdom “drove [him] 
transverse” (l. 209). Samson acknowledges that, because his strength is imbalanced with 
weakness of mind, strength is actually a liability: 
 O impotence of mind, in body strong! 
 But what is strength without a double share 
 Of wisdom? Vast, unweildy, burdensome[...] (ll. 52-55) 
 
This disproportion between strength and wisdom is also applied by Samson and the 
Chorus to Israel’s leadership in lines 241-289. The imbalance between strength and 
wisdom that results in “transverse” action works in the other direction, as well; or, more 
accurately, the imbalance described here is not the result of the exercise of true wisdom 
(any more than Milton is deriding true reason when he has the Chorus pronounce “Down 
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Reason!”). Rather, the imbalance is the reslt of calculation or cunning, in the same way 
that Samson’s use of strength is often violence.  
 Often when clockwork is used as metaphor or simile in this period, it seems to 
betray an underlying anxiousness, either for control or certainty (much like its use as 
metaphor for virtue or regularity of habit, which George Herbert made use of). John 
Suckling (1637) uses the image of winding one’s own watch to conform to an “authentic 
watch,” a more accurate device, as a vehicle for conveying the need to rectify one’s 
personal judgments in keeping with a greater degree of certainty.56 Suckling’s use of 
clockwork simile, therefore, invokes clockwork as universal standards or authorities that 
might regulate private thoughts or conduct. Like clockwork kingship in Richard II, 
clockwork in the seventeenth century could be associated with order or authority. The 
clockwork metaphor could encompass the state as a whole, thereby indicating the smooth 
running of history, or it might represent the predictability of rebellion and sedition, a 
caution to rulers. Of the latter description is an analogy offered in 1662 by royalist 
pamphleteer Roger L’Estrange, who claims that “We are to take for granted, that sedition 
is a kind of clockwork, and that the main spring of all rebellions is ambition.” All 
sedition, in L’Estrange’s view, can be traced back to the same cause—ambition. Given 
the erosion of authority entailed by this secret “spring” of ambition, regime change 
follows a predictable route, degrading to aristocracy and then to popular government. The 
metaphor takes for granted that sedition is as much a natural state of history as monarchic 
authority; sedition itself can be predicted, and therefore rulers must therefore be cautious, 
                                                          
56 But as when an authentic watch is shown, 
Each man winds up and rectifies his own, 
So in our very judgments.  
John Suckling, Aglaura, The Poems, Plays, and Other Remains of John Suckling, Vol. 1, ed. W. Carew 
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keeping a close eye on those looking to overturn the orderliness of the system.57 
Similarly, John Spencer, early modern author of a so-called “storehouse of similes,” 
compares a clock to the operations of justice. In doing so, he indicates that threats to 
justice are more often precipitated by the “lesser wheels,” the witnesses, lawyers, and 
jury who act as “under-agents and instruments” and thereby render the system as a whole 
vulnerable to subversion.58  
Each of the above instances emphasizes authority and certainty in some manner, 
and in the latter two examples, clocks are used as emblems of vulnerable systems. 
L’Estrange’s royalist paranoia about the constant threat of ambition and Spencer’s 
skepticism toward systems with many actors, or “lesser wheels,” are best explained with 
recourse to Shapin’s commentary on beliefs about the relationship between trust and free 
action in early modern society. As Shapin says, “Much early modern culture puts free 
action at the center of its practice of power and its theorizing about power. Society’s free 
actors were considered to be society’s powers.”59  
 As foundational as clock technology has been to the development of modern 
society, advanced timekeeping was an indirect consequence of the more general drive to 
                                                          
57 The quotation continues: “We may be again as confident, that never any one monarchy was destroyed, 
but with design to set up another. (The talk of this or that form of government; or of this or that shape of 
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attain scientific knowledge. Notably, Arendt also notices the role of clock technology in 
the advance of scientific constructionism: 
Thus, the watch, one of the first modern instruments, was not invented for the 
purposes of practical life, but exclusively for the highly “theoretical” purpose of 
conducting certain experiments with nature. This invention, to be sure, once its 
practical usefulness became apparent, changed the whole rhythm and the very 
physiognomy of human life; but from the standpoint of the inventors, this was a 
mere incident.60 
   
Arendt is describing the clock as representative of the tendency in scientific 
experimentalism to prioritize mastery over nature above use or purpose.61 With the 
invention of clockwork and the contributions of inventors like Galileo and Huygens, the 
purpose of clockwork to the everyday uses of timekeeping was secondary to what the 
process of experimentation contributed to theoretical knowledge; the pendulum alone was 
considered to demonstrate “‘the soul of the mathematicks themselves.’”62 More 
precisely, the methods that led to the greater perfection and accuracy of the clock as an 
instrument were enabled by a shift in the nature of thinking, which is Arendt’s larger 
argument concerning homo faber, referring to man as the maker of tools, man as 
fabricator of inventions. This shift, Arendt argues, was precipitated as science assumed 
an uncritical approach to the phenomenal world by acting in order to know.  
The prioritizing of doing in experimentation is representative of a larger 
epistemological shift. The approach to epistemology following scientific constructionism 
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is to deal with an apparent world in order to arrive at a picture of being. According to 
Arendt, man as homo faber creates a framework for interpreting the world prior to 
knowing it, and experimentalists handle a “hypothetical nature” in order to establish and 
know the real nature. In order for anything new to be made, nature must be fabricated. 
Thus appears the advent of the watch, the efficiency of which was a secondary outcome 
of scientific attempts to understand nature by recreating its conditions. As promising as 
this picture of scientific advancement may seem to be, Arendt intervenes to pose a 
problem: man as tool-maker never really gets beyond his tools.63 Similar to Yates’s 
description of Enlightenment thinking as the attempt to “act upon [the scene] without 
being implicated by it,” Arendt describes philosophy following the growth of empiricism 
as “Archimedean.” In other words, nature is treated as a whole edifice to be moved from 
a point outside of itself, while human beings ignore their placement within that edifice. 
Arendt writes, “Without actually standing where Archimedes wished to stand (dos moi 
pou sto), still bound to the earth through the human condition, we have found a way to 
act on the earth and within terrestrial nature as though we dispose of it from outside, from 
the Archimedean point.”64 When Arendt emphasizes “act[ing] on the earth and on 
terrestrial nature” in order to know, this is not so much a critique of the scientific method 
as it is a critique of the more endemic privileging of phenomena in the search for truth. 
Arendt is describing a new way of arriving at “truth,” one which ignores the subject’s 
limited perspective. In this new mode, action precedes thinking; one acts in order to 
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know. Insofar as doing-in-order-to-know, expressed in the rise of experimental science 
after Bacon, resulted in a steady proliferation of technological progress in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, the intellectual trend (if it can be called such) was a boon to the 
development of reliable clocks and watches—pocketwatches in particular. However, the 
implications of this shift apply more broadly to the ways that reality is received and what 
counts as confirmation of truth.  
 In the wake of homo faber, not only does truth become phenomenal, but the 
whole process by which we make meaning out of history is driven by phenomena as well. 
Arendt argues that instrumental thinking results in an instrumental view of time and 
history when she describes the resulting historical consciousness as centering on objects 
and concerned with “human activity”—i.e., inventions. “The modern discovery of history 
and historical consciousness,” says Arendt, “owed one of its greatest impulses neither to 
a new enthusiasm for the greatness of man, his doings and sufferings, nor to the belief 
that the meaning of human existence can be found in the story of mankind, but to the 
despair of human reason, which seemed adequate only when confronted with man-made 
objects.”65 Thus, a ready-made ontic world becomes the grounding for history and 
narrative as well as truth. In this construction, action (in the form of doing or making) has 
the status of confirming truth, rather than following upon “truth” already confirmed 
through thinking processes. Action in this sense was not merely observation or testing of 
nature and data, but packaged in the more fully-fledged form of objects and inventions. 
“Instead of objective qualities, in other words, we find instruments, and instead of nature 
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man’s hands, which finally forced nature, or rather the universe, to yield its secrets,” 290. 
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or the universe...man encounters only himself.”66 Since this sense of thinking is preceded 
and driven by doing, the version of meaning associated with it is instrumental, and its 
historical consciousness is instrumental, as well. “Thinking” of this sort is a newer 
version of logocentricism in which phenomena informs the deeper structure of 
knowledge and “truth” becomes self-referential. 
 Early in the play, Samson seems to undergo the realization that prophecy can be 
fulfilled with or without his own active participation in God’s will: “what if all foretold/ 
Had been fulfill’d but through mine own default,/ Whom have I to complain of but 
myself?” (ll. 44-46). As in Greek tragedy, the form of which Milton is imitating, Samson 
understands that his “default” may become the occasion for the fulfillment of prophecy. 
The Greek subtext concerning the ineffectualness of individual action in the face of fate 
is clear and the examples are well known: Oedipus’s attempts to escape the prophecy of 
killing his father and marrying his mother end up fulfilling it. This inescapability, not of 
fate but of God’s providence, becomes a through-line that ties Samson’s reflections in the 
beginning of the play with the logic of his final action against the Philistines, “that [God] 
may dispense with me or thee/ Present in Temples at Idolatrous rites/ For some important 
cause” (ll. 1377-9). In lines 290-2, a similar logic divorces Samson’s action from God’s 
dispensation, implying that God’s purposes can be vindicated even through Samson’s 
own neglect: “Mee easily mine [my people] may neglect,/ But God’s propos’d 
deliverance not so.” Yet the play implicitly offers an ironic gloss on the Greek tradition 
that it invokes. First, the play begins with Samson reflecting back on his past 
indiscretions, implicitly disarming the audience’s or reader’s first impulse to anticipate 
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that, like the figures of Greek tragedy, Samson’s hamartia will unfold in the play itself. It 
seems to be in the past. Second, Samson is not trying to escape prophecy but to fulfill it; 
the problem is not that he cannot avoid a predicted fate but that his attempts to fulfill 
prophecy are nearly always precipitated before their time. His actions are premature. 
 The problem posed by Samson’s egoistic hermeneutics therefore runs much 
deeper than mere arrogance. In the midst of circumstances in which divine purposes seem 
hidden (apart from what has been revealed through Samson’s own Nazarite calling), 
Samson is challenged to recover a strong enough sense of God’s will to act decisively. 
While Fish accuses Samson of “interpretive lust,” Samson’s problem is also akin to what 
Victoria Silver describes as “interpretive egoism,” the human desire “to believe in a 
certain immediacy, elegance, precision, and self-evidence to our perceptions of the world, 
because these dignify our position in it.”67 It is a representational version of knowledge, 
in which phenomenal impressions are mistaken for objective truth, that determines the 
conditions of Samson’s egoism. In the beginning of the play, Samson endeavors to 
account for God’s seeming absence from history and from his own context of suffering 
by relying on a totalizing and logocentric approach to interpretation. Samson’s self-
referential interpretive framework at the start of the narrative is not only egocentric, but 
fundamentally logocentric. Ricouer’s earlier description of narrative is helpful because it 
highlights the relational nature of narrative, demonstrating how our descriptions of 
temporal experience and our uses of language actually presuppose a relational 
framework. 
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 Insofar as Samson places himself and his own representations at the center of 
interpretation, his version of knowledge is suspect. Although Samson appears to avoid 
the guilt of doubting God’s justice, the Chorus’s cautions about “vain reasonings” (l. 322) 
indicate that such doubts are vulnerabilities, if not outright temptations:  
Yet more there be who doubt his ways not just, 
As to his own edicts, found contradicting, 
Then give the reins to wand’ring thought, 
Regardless of his glory’s diminution; 
Till by thir own perplexities involv’d 
They ravel more, still less resolv’d, 
But never find self-satisfying solution. (Ll. 300-306) 
 
“Giv[ing] the reigns to wand’ring thought” until one has completely lost one’s way 
provides a portrait of reason leading to overcomplexity rather than simplicity. When the 
Chorus warns about the dangers of doubting divine justice and relying too much on one’s 
own labyrinthine reasoning, there is an echo of Samson’s earlier lament, “Thou art 
become (O worst imprisonment!) / The Dungeon of thyself; thy Soul” (ll. 154-5).  
Moreover, Samson’s justification of his marriage to the woman of Timna is used 
to explain his subsequent marriage to Dalila. Samson presents the first marriage as 
justified by divine prompting; the second is described as an error in judgment.    
The first I saw at Timna, and she pleas’d 
Mee, not my Parents, that I sought to wed, 
The daughter of an Infidel: they knew not 
That what I motion’d was of God; I knew 
From intimate impulse, and therefore urg’d  
The marriage on; that by occasion hence 
I might begin Israel’s Deliverance, 
The work to which I was divinely call’d. 
[…] I thought it lawful from my former act, 
And the same end; still watching to oppress  
Israel’s oppressors [….]. (219-226, 231-236) 
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Samson claims that his error was in assuming the first marriage to be a prototype (“I 
thought it lawful from my former act”) rather than an exception. This logic leads the 
reader to question Samson’s judgment, but it also casts an implicit doubt on the “intimate 
impulse” that is privileged in Samson’s hermeneutics. While the reader is led to question 
this basic source of truth, Samson questions his own reasoning processes and application 
of divine inspiration only, rather than the inspiration itself. He takes for granted that 
“what [he] motion’d was of God.” If Samson’s inspiration is open to question in this 
case, how much more so when his “rousing motions” (l. 1382) lead him to commit his 
final act of destroying himself and the Philistines? 
Low observes that the play illustrates the “traditional distinction related to the 
controversy over the merits of the active and the contemplative lives.”68 According to 
Low, the Chorus makes the same division in lines 1268 to 1296 when comparing 
“invincible might/ To quell the might of the Earth” (ll. 1271-2) with “patience [which] is 
more oft the exercise/ Of Saints” (1287-8). These offer two possibilities for the kind of 
hero Samson might be, and tends to split the vote among critics. However, these two 
versions of heroism fit the drama into a framework that is either tragic (if we read 
Samson as heroic by virtue of action) or redemptive (if we read Samson saintly and 
suffering). The division between action and contemplation is expressed early on in the 
play, particularly in Samson’s exchanges with the Chorus. For example, contemplation is 
at least partially associated with wisdom, and Samson attributes his captivity to a badly 
proportioned pairing of ordinary wisdom with extraordinary strength. 
Immeasurable strength they might behold 
In me, of wisdom nothing more than mean; 
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This with the other should, at least, have pair’d, 
These two proportion’d ill drove me transverse. 
 
Chorus: Tax not divine disposal; wisest Men 
Have err’d, and by bad Women been deceiv’d; 
And shall again, pretend they ne’er so wise. 
Deject not then so overmuch thyself, 
Who hast of sorrow thy full load besides; 
Yet truth to say, I oft have heard men wonder 
Why thou shouldst wed Philistian women rather 
Than of thine own Tribe fairer, or as fair, 
At least of thy own Nation, and as noble. (Ll. 206-218) 
 
The Chorus’s response in this passage does not seem to be typical of Milton’s emphasis 
on human freedom. Like elder city-statesmen in a Greek tragedy, the Chorus appears on 
first glance to occupy a role of comforting and advising. Yet there appears to be an ironic 
undertone to the Chorus’s responses. The Chorus’s encouragement to Samson, “Deject 
not then overmuch thyself,” is quickly followed by the disjunctive “Yet truth to say” and 
passive speculation about the very thing that leads Samson to question his wisdom—
namely, his marriages to Gentile women. 
If the rise of action is a reversal between thinking and action, the nature of 
thinking undergoes a change as a result of this reordering. Prior to the rise of action, 
thinking functioned as inner dialogue—the process of arriving at truth which can be 
contemplated, but later, “contemplation, in the original sense of beholding the truth, was 
altogether eliminated.”69 With the rise of action in the process of knowledge seeking, 
thinking and contemplating are no longer sufficient as means of establishing 
epistemological authority. The development and privileging of action and the deletion of 
contemplation helps to explain what Milton’s Samson may implicitly be attempting to 
reconcile. Arendt describes the bifurcation of being and appearance as the pre-eminent 
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change of the seventeenth century and an inevitable consequence of Cartesianism. 
Although thinking implies a more active internal process than contemplation 
(“beholding”), before the reversal, the quietude of contemplation, not action, was the end 
goal of thinking.  
Whenever we do epistemology, we deal with meaning, either implicitly or 
explicitly, in the form of a narrative. Meaning requires tense, a temporal framework or 
historical consciousness. However, if we assume that “meaning” equates to an 
imminently readable interpretation of signifier and signified, we will begin by eliding the 
transformed sense of “thinking” that Arendt’s account of homo faber critiques. Milton’s 
Samson takes for granted his own limited perspective and acts on behalf of God and 
God’s redemptive purposes. Therefore, Milton’s Samson is not only Samson Agonistes 
but Samson Archimedes. As he endeavors to make sense of his own suffering, he ends up 
enacting a totalizing and arbitrary conception of time and history, one which embodies 
some of the problematic features of epistemology leading up to the Enlightenment, values 
embedded in the history of the clock’s technological development. This epistemological 
shift happens alongside political upheaval, which demanded a strong narrative framework 
to interpret providential purposes in history. While gaps in information demand 
interpretation, the wrong approach implicates human action, God, and the external world 
itself. Particularly insofar as Samson Agonistes has, for most critics, represented his 
attempt to provide an explanatory framework for contemporary events, part of my project 
in this chapter is to locate Samson within an ontology of action in time. The illusion that 
one can have an outside perspective on time illustrates the implications about time and 
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historical consciousness for a figure occupying the space of an Archimedes, which I will 
explore in the next section.  
 
The Problem of Intelligibility 
Samson’s self-absorption produces its own temporality, just as it produces its own 
experience of phenomena and of deity. Karen Edwards attributes Samson’s final action 
against the Philistines, the source of his “rousing motions,” to the temporally-inflected 
nature of Samson’s suffering, portrayed as a kind of mind-absorbing melancholia. 
Edwards argues that the indeterminate nature of Samson’s final inspiration arises from 
the indeterminate nature of his melancholy. Melancholic thought inflects Samson’s sense 
of time because it “erases the future by transforming the present into a prospect of 
unrelieved, indefinitely extended pain.”70 Waiting on God’s justice is excruciatingly slow, 
not primarily because of any outward affliction but because the pain originates from 
inward chaos and confusion, the thoughts that, “like a deadly swarm/ Of Hornets arm’d” 
(ll. 19-20), absorb his attention. Distinct from contemporary descriptions of melancholy 
influenced by Burton, Samson is not afflicted by the distorted idea-form of “objects or 
conceptions” but, in Edwards’s words, “a tormented inwardness, a painful consciousness 
of his thoughts as thoughts.”71 Samson’s turn inward to himself renders his experience of 
time torturously dilated. Without a grounding in external knowledge, Samson’s mental 
attention does not narrow to a focus but becomes increasingly distended by complexity 
directed inward. This view of Samson as a melancholic hero enriches our understanding 
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of the temporal nature of Samson’s mental processes, as well how waiting and suffering 
inform the flow of time in the play. At the same time, these observations about the 
temporality of suffering have their basis in Samson’s pronounced self-absorption.  
The sense of time in Samson Agonistes reflects Samson’s impulse to interpret a 
seemingly hidden divine providence, one which acts in human history in ways that defy 
interpretation. Investigating Milton’s view of God, Victoria Silver explains the the role of 
reason in Reformation theology as not to transcend the radical difference we experience 
between creator and the created order but to reorder what is felt on the level of being as 
“a crisis of coherence, when things we had assumed abruptly become disordered, 
inexplicable, unjust to us.”72 I would argue that this reordering of meaning based on 
what may be immanently known restores ontic value to the world. In other words, rather 
than a mind separated from the world, the more immanent approach to knowing 
instigated by a “crisis of coherence” makes the world become revelatory. In this process, 
Silver avers, “we render an unknowable God intelligible, palpable, and historical—
bringing deity as it were back into the world—so that relationship with him is possible.”73 
Samson’s predicament, his difficulty determining God’s purposes and his own future part 
in the promised deliverance of Israel, is intertwined with his concept of the divine. By 
extension, his understanding of divine intervention in history and his subjective sense of 
time, shaped by this retreat from the world, is similarly troubled. Silver encourages the 
reader to see the approach to reason (in Milton, but also in Luther and Calvin) as 
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paralleling the conception of God, since “[…]the idea of meaning and the idea of deity 
have always been mutual and mutually entangled[...].”74 
This mutuality between meaning and deity is reinforced thematically by aspects 
of inwardness and hiddenness implicit in Samson’s Nazarite gift. James Dougal Fleming 
argues against the view that Samson’s fatal flaw is his inability to keep the secret of his 
strength, since this view is premised on the belief that “radical mental sequestration from 
the world” (entailed by Samson keeping his secret) be viewed positively, which is 
essentially Satan’s view in Paradise Lost.75 Samson’s conscience “has ceased to be a 
knowledge joined to a knowledge: a mental secret constituted, paradoxically, by its divine 
sharing. Instead, the secret has been torn from the divine, and has therefore been 
committed to incoherent reflexivity.”76 Any analysis of Samson’s world picture must 
consider the implications of dualism, not simply in terms of the split between self and 
phenomenal world but also in terms of the split between self and God. A mind that 
sequesters not only treats the objective world as inert but regards any concept of deity as 
removed from human experience. Depicting human experience as its own sphere that 
never reveals divine nature or intent renders knowledge of the divine wholly transcendent 
and other, rather than immanently known. 
Milton’s play has been identified as having a “Hebraic historical consciousness” 
because of its structure, beginning near the end of what constitutes the biblical account 
and therefore relying on remembrance of the past to create the context of the tragedy.77 
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Samson’s role as God’s chosen is impossible without this recursive relationship with the 
past. However, it is not simply memory, enabling connection to the past and to a larger 
context to inform about divine purpose, that locates the play’s sense of time as “Hebraic.” 
Samson’s subjective sense of time is frustrated by the larger historical consciousness that 
structures it; as David Loewenstein points out, “the effect of sharply juxtaposing the past 
with the present is also to make the process of history itself seem deeply ruptured and 
discontinuous, and God’s purposes inscrutable.”78 The implication that the past may not 
always neatly map onto the present in fluid lines or easily disclose God’s purposes is 
accounted for by midrash as a methodology, one which opposes logocentric interpretation 
by providing commentary rather than reductive explanation that seeks to close all gaps. If 
the presence of rupture is what identifies Milton’s historical consciousness as “Hebraic,” 
the interpretive ethos that challenges any reader of Samson Agonistes is likewise 
premised on an embrace of discontinuity.    
The challenges that the juxtaposition of past and present in Samson Agonistes 
pose to a temporal hermeneutics reflect a tension between desire and fulfillment. Eugene 
Johnson argues that Samson, as well as the Chorus, “lacks a sense of messianic time” for 
a majority of the play.79 For Johnson, Samson constitutes a deconstructed jeremiad, 
parodying Milton’s own idealistic use of this form in earlier prose works, especially 
Areopagitica. Samson Agonistes, according to Johnson’s argument, follows the form of 
the jeremiad by addressing the sins of the past, but the doubt cast by the Chorus on 
Samson’s prophetic role calls into question the possibility of a redemptive future, or at 
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least that such a future will be brought into being through Samson’s action. The jeremiad 
functions by emphasizing the “gap between fact and ideal” in the past, present, and future 
states of affairs in the community, in contrast to its more optimistic treatment in 
Areopagitica, Johnson views Milton in Samson Agonistes. Johnson writes, “By declaring 
the gap between fact and ideal as resulting from the unfulfilled state of the present 
community, the genre partially defers individual dissent to a future time.”80 In Johnson’s 
reading, Milton in Samson therefore seems to be performing something of a midrash on 
his own earlier pamphlet writing. 
 
Conclusion 
 To understand history and temporality as revelatory requires that time and 
meaning be seen as conjunctive. Levinas expresses this connection in describing a 
condition that resembles Samson’s past actions and reasoning: “A reason liberated from 
temporal contingencies, a soul co-eternal with the Ideas, such is the self-image projected 
by a reason which has forgotten itself or is unaware of itself, a reason which is naive.”81 
Distinguishing between “a reason liberated from temporal contingencies” and an 
understanding that takes account of its temporal limitations requires that the reader tie the 
character of intepretation (the unfolding of meaning available to humans) to the character 
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of history (the human experience of meaning in time). Milton himself does this at the 
beginning of Areopagitica, when he opposes truth to custom: “Truth is compared in 
scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they 
sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition.”82 As a “streaming fountain,” truth 
progresses fluidly, yet not without interruption; alternatively, custom may stagnate 
progress but never inhibit its flow altogether. Much as the reader’s interpretation of 
Samson Agonistes emerges through the multiple agons that pit Samson against 
interlocutors, Milton views truth’s emergence in history as dialectical. Levinas observes 
that, “Ontology is not accomplished in the triumph of human beings over their condition, 
but in the very tension whereby this condition is assumed.” Action does not equal pure 
intention, since every action leaves “traces,” as Levinas points out. A robust 
understanding of Samson as a Hebraic figure, as well as a Christian or typological one, 
can inform the reader’s understanding of the dialectic between knowing and doing and 
the time that lies between, questions implicated in theodicy and divine revelation. 
However, it is the unintended consequences of action, the “traces” left behind, that 
produce knowledge.83  
 
                                                          
82 Milton, Areopagitica, 739. 
83 Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?”: 122-3. The version of action characterized here is in keeping with 
the larger structure of the philosopher’s thinking, in which he derives ontology from ethics rather than the 
other way around. The full passage reads as follows: “The comedy begins with the simplest of our 
movements, carrying with them every inevitable awkwardness. In putting out my hand to approach a chair, 
I have creased the sleeve of my jacket, I have scratched the floor, I have dropped the ash from my cigarette. 
In doing that which I wanted to do, I have done so many things that I did not want to do. The act has not 
been pure for I have left some traces. In wiping out these traces, I have left some others....When the 




Chapter Four Bibliography 
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958. 
 
Bacon, Francis. The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Balla, Angela. “Wars of Evidence and Religious Toleration in Milton's Samson 
Agonistes.” Milton Quarterly 46.2 (2012). 
 
Boyarin, Daniel. Sparks of the Logos: Essays in Rabbinic Hermeneutics. Boston: Brill, 
2003. 
 
Chalier, Catherine. “Levinas and the Talmud.” The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. 
Ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. 
 
Edwards, Karen L. “Inspiration and Melancholy in Samson Agonistes.” Milton and the 
Ends of Time. Ed. Juliet Cummins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003. 
 
Fish, Stanley. “Spectacle and Evidence in Samson Agonistes.” Critical Inquiry 15.3 
(1989). 
 
Fish, Stanley. How Milton Works. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001.  
 
Fleming, James Dougal. Milton’s Secrecy: And Philosophical Hermeneutics. Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2008. 
 
Furlani, Andre. “‘In Place’: Kairos in Samson Agonistes.” The Seventeenth Century 10.2 
(1995). 
 
Haraway, Donna. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology.” Basic Writings. Ed. David 
Farrell Krell. New York: Harper Collins, 2008. 
 
Hill, Christopher. Milton and the English Revolution. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. 
 
Ingold, Tim. “The Temporality of the Landscape.” World Archaeology 25.2 (1993). 
 
155 
Johnson, Eugene. “The Failed Jeremiad in Samson Agonistes.” Studies in English 
Literature 46.1 (2006). 
 
Laudan, Laurens. “The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of Descartes on 
English Methodological Thought, 1650-65.” Ann. Sci. 22 (1966). 
 
L’Estrange, Roger. A Memento. Directed To all Those that Truly Reverence the Memory 
of King Charles the Martyr. 1662. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Is Ontology Fundamental?” Trans. Peter Atterton. Philosophy 
Today 33.2 (1989). 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Nine Talmudic Readings. Trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994). 
 
Loewenstein, David. Milton and the Drama of History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). 
 
Low, Anthony. “Samson Agonistes and the Irony of Alternatives.” PMLA 84.3 (1969). 
 
Milton, John. Complete Poems and Major Prose. Ed. Merritt Y. Hughes. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 2003. 
 
Mollenkott, Virginia. “Relativism in Samson Agonistes.” Studies in Philology 67.1 
(1970). 
 
Ricouer, Paul. Time and Narrative, Vol. 1. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
 
Rosenblatt, Jason P. Torah and Law in Paradise Lost. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994. 
 
Shapin, Steven. Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth Century 
England (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
 
Shapin, Steven, & Simon Schaffer. Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
Experimental Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
Shawcross, John T. “Confusion: The Apocalypse, The Millennium.” Milton and the Ends 
of Time. Ed. Juliet Cummins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Shoulson, Jeffrey S. Milton among the Rabbis: Hebraism, Hellenism, and Christianity. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 
 
Silver, Victoria. Imperfect Sense: The Predicament of Milton’s Irony. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001. 
156 
 
Spencer, John. Kaina Kai Palaia: Things new and old. 1658. 
 
Suckling, John. Aglaura, The Poems, Plays, and Other Remains of John Suckling, Vol. 1. 
Ed. W. Carew Hazlitt. London: Reeves and Turner, 1892.  
 
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press: 1989. 
 
Werman, Golda. Milton and Midrash. Washington: The Catholic University Press, 1995. 
 
Yates, Julian. Error Misuse Failure: Object Lessons from the English Renaissance. 






 The central figures who have dominated my analysis—Shakespeare’s Richard II, 
the speakers of Herbert’s devotional poetry, and Milton’s Samson—share some 
significant similarities. While the figures in all three of these chapters find themselves out 
of the flow of time in some way, each textual self struggles to reconcile a personal 
orientation of time with the rhythms of a larger, external temporal schema. In turn, each 
textual self has demanded a different theoretical and methodological approach as a 
consequence of both theme and genre.  
 First, despite the assumption that his sovereign status entails co-extension with a 
temporal continuum, Richard’s selective hearing parallels his inability to “keep time” 
with the socius, his inability to listen to communal rhythms that lie outside kingly 
identity. To demonstrate this tension between the time associated with a mystical 
sovereign identity and the rhythms of communal time, a phenomenological reading was 
necessary in order to demonstrate how temporality is connected to what lies beyond the 
self, and I examined the play’s use of metaphors that unite time and music via hearing.  
 Next, for the devotional selves in Herbert’s poetry, clock-time, or the everyday 
experience of secular time, provides a continual reminder that the subject is already out 
of synch with God’s eternity, and even the attempts to recover a sacred time built by 
daily rhythms and habits can be an exercise in remembering the ways in which the 
spiritual self is torn apart in time. In Herbert’s poetry, the devotional self is constructed—
almost dramatized—through internal conflict, conflict between desire and devotion, and 
between the acceptance of grace and the continual striving of the law. The Augustinian 
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reading of Herbert’s time that I advance in the third chapter, while never “resolving” such 
conflicts in a traditional sense, clarifies the nature of the tensions that arise from the 
subject’s attempt to mark time within the self.  
 Finally, closely paralleling the way in which Richard’s orientation to time is 
biased by his sovereign status, Milton’s Samson must confront his misconceptions about 
divine intent and his role in providential history. Arendt’s argument that action ceased to 
be an extension of thinking in the modern era provides a lens for Samson’s rash attempts 
to act in order to know, stemming from assumptions about his role as God’s anointed and 
the implications of that role for the unfolding of history. Not only Samson, but the selves 
in all three text-centered chapters echo Richard’s exclamation upon hearing discord in 
music: “Ha, ha, keep time...” (Richard II 5.5.42). 
 
Thrownness and Keeping Time 
 Most fundamentally, in each text, the acknowledgement of a temporality other 
than the linear metrics of clock-time is the consequence of a reckoning with death, 
suffering, and limitation. When Richard comes to terms with his temporal discord, he 
does so from his prison in Pomfret Castle. Likewise, Samson begins to reexamine the 
temporal implications of his role as God’s anointed while blinded and imprisoned by the 
Philistines. In Herbert’s “Even-song,” renewal comes with surrender to limitations and a 
sleep that mirrors death, enclosed in an “ebony box,” while in “Church-monuments,” the 
very act of “intomb[ing] [the] flesh” in sleep as an attempt to “mark” the final dissolution 
of the body is paradoxical, reminding the reader that the attempt to mark time is equally 
doomed. 
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 Despite differences across genre, as well as the theoretical approaches demanded 
by each text, one could argue that all of these figures provide key illustrations of 
Heidegger’s concept of thrownness, the idea that subjects are thrown into the cares of 
daily life.1 This concept is closely tied, conceptually and linguistically, with the da- 
(“there”) of Dasein; to be thrown is to understand that we are already placed in the midst 
of existence, with all of its struggles and anxieties. Simon Critchley puts it well when he 
describes thrownness in Heidegger as “the simple awareness that we find ourselves 
somewhere, namely delivered over to a world with which we are fascinated, a world with 
which we share with others.”2 Likewise, as I have stressed in the introductory chapter to 
this dissertation, when Heidegger defines Care as the structure of temporality, he is 
defining temporality as relational.3 Temporality, as a rhythm of life, connects us to a 
shared world, and at the same time, it puts us in touch with the reality of our own 
suffering. Both the shared world and personal suffering are a reminders of limitations and 
contingency. For the seventeenth century texts that this dissertation has been concerned 
with, these reminders of the contingent life of the subject stand in contrast to the rise of 
the Cartesian self. Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, observes this lack of 
recognition of human contingency as concurrent with various changes in the modern age 
and resulting in a denial of telos:  
It is only and perhaps not even primarily the development of commercial society 
that, with the triumphal victory of exchange value over use value, first introduced 
                                                          
1 “This characteristic of Dasein’s Being—this ‘that it is’—is veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither,’ yet 
disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the ‘thrownness’ of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it 
is thrown in such a way, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there.’ The expression of ‘thrownness’ is meant to 
suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 174. 
2 Simon Critchley, “Being and Time, part 4: Thrown into this world,” The Guardian, 29 Jun 2009, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/29/religion-philosophy. 
3 Heidegger, Being and Time, 374. 
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the principle of interchangeability, then the relativization, and finally the 
devaluation, of all values. For the mentality of the modern man, as it was 
determined by the development of modern science and the concomitant unfolding 
of modern philosophy, it was at least as decisive that man began to consider 
himself part and parcel of the two superhuman, all-encompassing processes of 
nature and history, both of which seemed doomed to an infinite progress without 
ever reaching any inherent telos or approaching any preordained idea.4  
 
Somewhat ironically, just as man comes to view himself as “part and parcel of the two 
superhuman, all-encompassing processes of nature and history” (both processes that the 
clockwork metaphor represented in the seventeenth century), he also reduces himself to 
processes that deny meaning, that relativize value. 
 This is the temptation of the modern man in the chapters I have covered in this 
dissertation; in terms of the new clock-time, it constitutes a draw toward a self-absorbed 
temporality that aligns the self with a chronos-driven, universal time, rather than the 
communal rhythms that put the subject back into place. In each chapter, I have attempted 
to explore how subjects overcome this illusory relationship with time by rediscovering 
being as a relationship to what lies beyond the self—in the socius, daily habits of prayer 
and reflection, in communal time, in contingent action and partial knowledge. In Totality 
and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas writes in critique of Heidegger’s description of Sorge 
(care, anxiety) in Being and Time, “Life is love of life, a relation with contents that are 
not my being but more dear than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, 
warming oneself in the sun.”5 This is Levinas’s response to the description of existence 
in Being and Time as (in Levinas’s words) “the naked will to be.”6 However, a fuller 
picture of Heidegger’s description of being is supplemented by his later essays: the 
                                                          
4 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 307. 
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, Trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers), 112.  
6 Levinas, 112. 
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previously described connection between logos and legomenon (“relatedness”) in “The 
Question Concerning Technology,”7 as well as the description of “ bauen,” “to build,” in 
his essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.”8 In the latter, Heidegger traces the etymology 
of bauen to its etymology in the Old High German, where it means, “to dwell,” and 
finally to its relation to the verb form “to be.” Heidegger writes, “To be a human being 
means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell.”9 Here, Heidegger’s description 
of being is not far from that of Levinas; to exist is to dwell, to live in relationship with 
what is, in Levinas’s phrase, “more dear than my being.” To be thrown into the world is 
to realize one’s being belongs to the world, but rather than constituting a mere will to 
exist, the contingency of being thrown can also provide the means of overcoming this 
thrownness through connection and placement.     
 
Clockwork Subjects in the Twenty-first Century 
 As this conclusion has already touched upon, one central purpose of this analysis 
has been to examine how changes to the use and perception of time in the early modern 
era introduced a tension in subjects’ experience of temporality—a tension reflected in the 
literature of the period. As my examination of the literary subjects’ awareness of being 
thrown into time draws to a close, it seems fitting to ask what the experience of time 
looks like in the current era. The stakes of this argument extend well beyond the 
seventeenth century and into the twenty-first. What does thrownness look like in the 
twenty-first century, with its digital advancements? It seems fitting that we are 
                                                          
7 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2008), 318. 
8 Martin Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2008), 348-9. 
9 Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Basic Writings, 349. 
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increasingly tied to devices that moor us both to time, displayed on our smart phones, and 
instant communication via various applications and social media platforms. Casey’s 
observation about Galileo’s discovery of the gravitational force of the pendulum 
introducing an acceleration that reduced the world to “a single scene of communication” 
is more relevant than ever.10 The temporal rhythms of our lives are more asynchronous 
than ever, as it has become possible for individuals to exist within their own time 
streams, to communicate asynchronously; however, rather than asynchronicity producing 
a jarring effect, an opportunity to recognize one’s illusory relationship with time, our 
technology tends to preserve our illusions of control and fluidity.  
 My argument concerning the role of clock-time in the seventeenth century has 
been founded on other descriptions of clock-time as both personal and “pliable,” empty 
and accelerated.11 With these descriptions at hand, I have argued that the subject’s 
experience of time in the seventeenth century came at an intersection between the new, 
highly individualized time and the recurring rhythms of communal temporality. As these 
two times entered juxtaposition in the seventeenth century, the new clock-time, I have 
argued, began to elide the problems that arise when a subject is alienated from (what 
Heidegger defines as) the raw experience of time. The experience of temporality that 
entails a connection to place, to shared history, and even to ethics is not something that 
the subject can fully divorce from, but it is something subjects can ignore, fail to 
                                                          
10 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), xiii. 
11 As noted in the first chapter, the description of time as “pliable” comes from Jacques Le Goff, Time, 
Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1980), 38; the discussion of “empty time” comes from Stuart Sherman’s dissection of Walter 
Benjamin’s phrase in Telling Time: Clocks, Diaries, and English Diurnal Form, 1660-1785 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 10; and the discussion of accelerated time comes from Edward S. 
Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), xiii.  
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acknowledge, or renounce, particularly as the space that lies outside self begins to be 
viewed as an extension of the mind. While the seventeenth century introduced a tension 
between the new, increasingly dominant clock-time and the originary experience of time, 
expressed in older rhythms of communal and sacred time, our current era has all but 
obliterated this tension. Perhaps it would be inaccurate to describe the everyday 
temporality of the twenty-first century as “clock-time”; we are less reliant on timepieces, 
yet our daily habits are dictated by the temporal strictures of productivity apps, and our 
personal value is increasingly determined by the pressure to produce more in less time. In 
confronting these pressures and illusions, it becomes possible to break step with the 
illusory order of clock-time and, in the words of Shakespeare, to “keep time,” or in the 
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